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Abstract
Communist regimes have claimed that communism is the vehicle 
for women's emancipation. They maintain that sexual inequality 
can only be abolished as part of the broader socialist 
transformation through pulling women into the paid labour force. 
If the communist claim is true, women in communist regimes should 
be equal regardless of their cultural tradition, while women's 
position in communist regimes should be higher than in capitalist 
regimes.
However, women's experiences in communist regimes revealed 
that their position varies from country to country and region to 
region, revealing the influence of culture in a variety of 
guises. In this respect, the former two Germanies and the two 
Koreas provide a rare chance of a cross-regime and cross-cultural 
comparative study.
Germany and Korea have maintained distinct cultures 
different from their neighbours. The traditions of the two 
nations ran into revolutionary changes and discontinuities in the 
wake of their division into communist and capitalist regimes. The 
communist regimes of Germany and Korea advocated women's 
emancipation through making women part of the working class. 
Their achievements and failures compared with their severed 
national halves constituted a laboratory situation for the test 
of the communist claim. In this thesis, the communist claim is 
tested through the comparison of women's positions in the four 
countries, in all aspects of social life: under the law, in the
education system, at work, in the family and in politics.
The novel contribution of the thesis is its cross-cultural 
and cross-regime analysis, measuring the impact of the state on 
women's emancipation, taking into account different cultural 
impediments. It contributes to the development of feminist 
analyses of the state and culture, adding empirical evidence to 
theoretic arguments.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION 
1. 1 Women, Paid Work,1 and Emancipation
The collapse of communist regimes while producing political 
freedom in some cases also led to many casualties. One noticeable 
instance in some countries seemed to be feminist advocacy of 
women's participation in paid work outside the home. Since their 
inception, communist regimes claimed that communism alone could 
emancipate women through making women the working class. They 
insisted that they provided a paradigm of women's emancipation: 
a social order which guaranteed women's full employment and equal 
access to the labour market, which offered full-time child care 
from birth to adolescence, and which regarded combining paid 
employment and family life as the normal pattern of a woman's 
everyday life, not as a special problem nor as an achievement 
against the grain of socio-economic realities (Kolinsky, 1991). 
Legislation in communist regimes indeed supported their claim, 
guaranteeing the principle of equal pay for equal work, and 
providing equal opportunities at work and education, and in some 
cases, preferential treatment for working mothers. Although there 
were many variations among communist regimes the core communist
1 In this thesis, the terms 'work', 'labour force', and 
'labour force participation' imply that those are 'paid'. Women 
have always participated in the labour force of any society, 
albeit mainly in the unpaid one. Since women's unpaid work is 
work, too, I should add the word 'paid' to the terms 'the labour 
force' or 'labour market' and so on. However, following the 
common usage of those words, I omit the epithet 'paid' in this 
thesis. Wherever labour or work participation is mentioned, it 
means the paid one, unless otherwise stated.
1
framework for achieving women's emancipation was the same —  
women's participation in paid work. Women's labour participation 
thus constituted the necessary and sufficient condition of 
women's emancipation.
Despite the claim that communism is the vehicle for women's 
emancipation, there have been persistent criticisms of inequality 
between the sexes in communist regimes. Women in communist 
regimes shouldered the double burden of paid work and unpaid 
domestic work. Men hardly shared the responsibility of household 
chores and child-care. Even in paid work, women faced 
discriminatory practices in work assignments and promotions, as 
well as wage differentials between the sexes. Traditional gender 
relations were still alive in most communist regimes, with 
different patterns and shapes following their cultural 
traditions. Additionally, despite the similarly high level of 
women's labour participation among communist regimes, women's 
rights in statutes and women's educational advances varied 
country by country. Women's equal participation in the labour 
force did not in reality bring about full sexual equality. 
Therefore, many feminists became sceptical about communist 
regimes. Their enhancement of women's positions was condemned as 
tokenism or as a disguised form of exploitation of women. This 
led some to question whether women's labour participation has any 
relevance in achieving sexual equality (Einhorn, 1991).
Two questions arise from the comparison of communist and 
capitalist regimes: (i) did communist regimes by mobilising women 
into the paid labour force change gender relations, or, 
emancipate women? and, (ii) did cultural traditions hinder
2
communist efforts to emancipate women? The purpose of this thesis 
is to answer these two questions.
1. 2 Feminist Analyses of Women's Emancipation
Despite the scepticism about the achievement of communist 
regimes, existing feminist theories, except radical feminism, 
have broadly accepted the view that women's labour participation 
is a necessary condition of women's emancipation. Although the 
feminist claim of sameness between the sexes during the 1970s has 
been watered down by many feminists' subsequent acceptance of 
difference between the sexes, the sexual division of labour is 
still rejected, and women's equal labour participation still 
advocated.
Many feminists have argued that women's work at home has 
been under-valued, and that high status comes of being thought 
to hold a high position on a scale which is highly regarded. This 
leads to the conclusion that it is unjust to restrict women's 
work within the home or to specific women's jobs (Richards, 
1980). Socialist feminists conceptualize the "gendered category 
of the division of labour", or the sexual division of labour, as 
the essential and fundamental characteristic of both patriarchal 
and capitalist oppression of women. They point out that gender 
stereo-typing of activities has been persistent in human society, 
and label this division of labour as the intersection of two sets 
of social forces: capitalism and patriarchy (Young, 1981;
Mackintosh, 1981). A research report provides a clear picture of
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labour segregation in OECD countries, pointing out that women 
have been concentrated in less-paid, low-valued jobs (Bakker,
1988). similarly, many feminists' cross-cultural research 
concerns whether, and how, economic development alters the 
preexisting sexual division of labour (Reinharz, 1992, p.115).
Radical feminists by contrast reject this view and insist 
that without fundamental change the dominant patriarchal socio­
economic paradigm will continue to exert itself and retain 
struetura1 inequa1ity.
1.2.1 Liberal Feminism and Women's Rights
Liberal feminism assumes that women suffer injustice because 
of their sex (Richards, 1980, p.11). Liberals organize campaigns 
for equality and redistribution between men and women: equal pay; 
equal civil rights; equal access to education, health and 
welfare; and equal access to the democratic political process. 
The political rights of liberalism are redefined to include equal 
opportunity for women as well as men. Early liberalism accepted 
the separation between the private and the public and the 
separation between the home and society, and assumed women's 
place to be in the home, given women's lesser rationality 
(Jaggar, 1983, pp.28-33; Z. Eisenstein, 1981, pp.33-35, pp.56- 
59)• By contrast, modern liberal feminists question the 
separation of two realms and stress women's equal rationality 
(Richards, 1980; Z. Eisenstein, 1981). They demand equal 
opportunity with regard to every sphere of society irrespective 
of sex. Liberal feminists can be found wherever women fight for 
health, work, education, legal rights, decent housing, and an
4
improved standard of living for women in general.
As women's enfranchisement was a condition for equality in 
the political sphere, women's participation in the labour force 
is a condition for freeing women from economic dependence and 
inability. Harriet Taylor argued that the institution of marriage 
could be made equal only if: (i) a woman, by virtue of her
employment, has a real chance to remain husbandless; and (ii) 
once married, she has the confidence and sense of entitlement 
that come from contributing materially to the support of the 
family (Tong, 1989, p. 19) . In her discussion of "the problem that 
has no name," Friedan (1963) advised women in the United States 
to work outside the home. Liberal feminists argue that in 
patriarchal society women are supposedly only suited for certain 
occupations — e.g., teaching, nursing and clerking—  and are seen 
to be largely incapable of other tasks — e.g., ruling, preaching 
and investing. They claim that this type of gender stereotyping 
is unjust and must be remedied. The liberal feminist rejection 
of different sex-roles is to a great extent based on the 
assumption of the sameness of men and women in terms of human 
rationality. Rejecting the ideas of either biologically or 
psychologically determined "female sex-role," Kanter argues that 
the fate of women is inextricably bound up with organizational 
structure and processes in the same way that men's life-at-work 
is shaped by them (Kanter, 1977, p.9).
Liberal feminists focus on the equality and liberty of 
women, in particular, equal opportunity to engage in paid work 
outside the home and, hence, the economic independence of women. 
They have also paid increasing attention to equal opportunity
5
within work and in access to promotion, as a desirable route to 
the women's liberation (Z.Eisenstein, 1981; Kanter, 1977). 
Although their emphasis on legal reforms and institutional 
changes was open to the criticism of accepting the patriarchal 
nature of the state,2 their demands for equality have been 
acceptable to many men and women, inducing many legal reforms in 
many countries. Their programme can thus be considered to 
represent mainstream feminism.
1.2.2 The Marxist Theory of Women's Emancipation
After Engels formulated the idea of antagonism between men 
and women in monogamous marriage and the "first class oppression" 
of the female by the male (Engels, 1884) , most Marxist analyses 
of "the woman question" have attempted to include women in the 
working class and to understand women's oppression as another 
aspect of class oppression. For Marxists, the notion of class is 
the key to understanding all social phenomena, including the 
phenomenon of women's oppression. Early Marxists argued that 
capital and private property are the cause of women's oppression 
just as capital is the cause of the exploitation of workers in 
general. Therefore, women's liberation requires: (i) that women 
become wage-workers like men; and (ii) that they join with men
2 Initially, the four groups of feminists were easily 
discernible by their language. Liberals demanded women's rights, 
liberty, and equal opportunity, while radicals invariably 
attacked patriarchy. Socialist feminists attacked capitalism and 
patriarchy equally, but marxists blamed capital, or capitalism 
as the true oppressor of women. Recent development and 
interaction among feminists have blurred these linguistic 
differences. Many liberals have accepted the patriarchal nature 
of the state, capital's interest in women's oppression, and the 
difference between the sexes, biologically and psychologically.
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in the revolutionary struggle against capitalism. Contemporary 
Marxist analysis continues this early Marxist position and 
incorporates women into the analysis of everyday life in 
capitalism (Zaretsky, 1976). According to Zaretsky, women are 
labouring for capital, not for men. There are two reasons for the 
common misunderstanding that women are working for men privately 
in the home: (i) the separation of home from work place; (ii) the 
privatization of housework brought about by capitalism. According 
to this perspective, recognizing capitalism as the root of their 
problem, men and women should fight against capital and not 
against each other. Other Marxist feminists focus on the relation 
of housework to capital. For example, Dalla Costa (1973) argues 
that what is socially important about housework is its necessity 
for the reproduction of capitalism. She proposes that women 
demand wages for housework. All these Marxist analyses focus on 
the struggle against capital and try to include 'the woman 
question' into this theoretical structure. They lead to the 
conclusion that women's participation in labour outside the home 
is the way to emancipation.
1.2.3 Socialist Feminism: Dual Systems Theory
While traditional Marxist approaches consider the woman 
question as another aspect of class oppression, socialist 
feminists suggest what has been called "dual systems theory" 
(Young, 1981; Walby, 1990).3 Socialist feminism originated from
3 "Dual systems theory" refers to two systems of oppression, 
capitalism and patriarchy, by that socialist feminists have 
subsequently enlarged the analysis by incorporating other 
oppressive systems such as racism, imperialism or heterosexuality 
(Jaggar, 1983; Walby, 1990).
Marxism. However, they rejected the "unhappy marriage of Marxism 
and feminism"(Hartmann, 1981).4
A defining feature of socialist feminism is that it attempts 
to interpret the historical materialist method of traditional 
Marxism so that it applies to the sex/gender issues made visible 
by radical feminists. To revise Juliet Mitchell's comment,5 it 
uses a feminist version of the Marxist method to provide feminist 
answers to feminist questions. In the socialist feminist 
analysis, capitalism and patriarchy are inextricably intertwined. 
Consequently the abolition of any of these systems of domination 
requires the end of all of them. They believe that an adequate 
account of "capitalist patriarchy" requires the use of the 
historical materialist method developed originally by Marx and 
Engels. In investigating the fundamental causes of women's 
oppression, socialist feminists have developed a conception of 
the material base as the set of social relations which structures 
the production and reproduction of the necessities of daily life, 
the production of people, including sexual relations, as well as 
the production of goods and services. To socialist feminists, 
these relations simultaneously express capitalist and patriarchal
4 Hartmann describes the separation of Marxism and feminism 
in her article "The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: 
Towards a More Progressive Union" by beginning with this 
declaration (Hartmann, 1981, p.2): "The marriage of Marxism and 
feminism has been like the marriage of husband and wife depicted 
in English common law: Marxism and feminism are one, and that one 
is Marxism. Recent attempts to integrate Marxism and feminism are 
unsatisfactory to us as feminists because they subsume the 
feminist struggle into the "larger" struggle against capital. To 
continue our simile further, either we need a healthier marriage 
or we need a divorce."
5 Mitchell (1971, p.99) writes "We should ask the feminist 
questions, but try to come up with Marxist answers."
8
male domination, and both aspects must be changed to liberate 
women (Jaggar, 1983, p.332).
However, socialist feminists have confronted the criticisms 
that pointed out the cleavage within its theoretical framework 
between two systems of capitalism and patriarchy. To develop a 
single theory out of a materialist base and a feminist view, they 
needed a bridge to connect capitalism and patriarchy. Jaggar 
(1983) identified "alienation” as the concept that can unify the 
theoretical cleavage within the dual systems. She argues that 
socialist feminist explorations reveal the ways in which women 
are alienated as sexual beings, as mothers and as wives. To 
analyze the contemporary oppression of women in terms of the 
concept of alienation is to link that oppression inevitably with 
capitalism. It is to deny that "patriarchy" is an unchanging 
trans-historical and cross-cultural universal and to assert 
instead that the subordination of women takes different forms in 
different historical periods. The alienation of contemporary 
women is an historically specific feature of capitalism as is the 
fetishism of commodities, the rise of positive science, and 
especially the separation of home from workplace, accompanied by 
the characteristic split between emotion and reason, the personal 
and the political. Similarly, Young (1981) believes that 
feminists who wish to avoid the pitfalls of the dual systems 
approach to capitalist patriarchy need to develop a new core 
concept for Marxist theory. She suggests that the "gendered 
category of division of labour" or sexual division of labour has 
the conceptual power to transform Marxist feminist theory into 
socialist feminist theory.
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While traditional marxism has taken the abolition of class 
as its explicit goal, socialist feminism makes an explicit 
commitment to the abolition of both class and gender. Socialist 
feminists conceptualize the material base of society to include 
both the mode of reproduction as well as the mode of production. 
To abolish class and gender, they propose (Jaggar, 1983):
(i) the transformation of sexuality and reproduction;
(ii) the abolition of the existing wage system that
disregards the monetary value of housework; and
(iii) the development of independent women's organizations
to further these aims.
One distinctive feature of socialist feminism is its 
emphasis on democracy. It has argued that it is necessary to 
institute not only democratic control of the economy, as 
traditionally construed, but also democratic control of 
procreation — i.e., socialization of child-rearing, education and 
so on. However, they have not shown clearly how more genuine 
democratic practices can be instituted.
1.2.4 Radical Feminism: Rejecting Patriarchy
Radical feminists reject women's labour participation as 
meaningless unless the male-dominated cultural and socio-economic 
system itself changes. Radical feminists take the subordination 
of women as their central concern. Under the slogan of "the 
personal is political," they deny the distinction between the 
political and the personal: every area of life is subject to 
"sexual politics" (Millet, 1977). Radical feminism focused 
directly on women's relation to men as politically problematic. 
It brought sexuality and reproduction into the political arena 
and transformed women's political consciousness (Ramazanoglu,
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1989, p.12).
Radical feminists conceptualize men and women as opposing 
classes. Within the sex class system, the ruling class is known 
as "the patriarchs," or, in Mary Daly's conception, "the 
Planetary Men's Association" (Daly, 1973) ; a system characterised 
by power, dominance, hierarchy, and competition (Tong, 1989). 
Patriarchy, in their terminology, means the manifestation and 
institutionalisation of male dominance over women and children 
in the family and the extension of male dominance over women in 
society as a whole (Lerner, 1986). Patriarchy is named as the 
prevailing religion of the world (Daly, 1978) that sustains the 
class division of sex: men as the oppressing class, women as the 
oppressed. Even though men dominate women universally, they do 
so through a variety of social structures which vary tremendously 
both across and even within cultures. Marxists say women work in 
reality for capital despite appearances. Radical feminists, on 
the contrary, hold the view that women work for men, both in 
appearance and in reality. Men have a vested interest in the work 
women do.
Radical feminists have searched for a single overriding 
source of male power over women (e.g., Millet, 1977; Daly, 1978) . 
This ahistorical view of patriarchy raises very directly issues 
of biological reductionism and conceptions of the innate essence 
of being male and being female, which lead the radical feminists 
to emphasize sexuality (MacKinnon, 1982, 1989; Ramazanoglu,
1989) . Sexuality is conceived as a far broader social phenomenon, 
as no less than the dynamics of sex as social hierarchy
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(MacKinnon, 1989) .6 MacKinnon (1982) points to the role of sexual 
harassment in the workplace and indeed suggests that "labour is 
to marxism as sexuality is to feminism." They argue not only that 
sexuality is socially constructed, though not entirely, but also 
that female sexuality has, throughout history, become 
systematically constructed in relation to male dominance 
(Ramazanoglu, 1989, p.64).
For many radical feminists, but not all, the institution of 
heterosexuality is a central institution of patriarchy (Walby, 
1990; Daly, 1977; MacKinnon, 1989). Some radical feminists argue 
that it is the most important base of patriarchy. Within 
heterosexual relations women serve men, emotionally and 
materially, as well as sexually. Women support men more than men 
support women. Men sexually objectify women, reducing them to 
mere sexual objects. Male dominance is sexual, and the male 
sexual role centres on aggressive intrusion on those with less 
power. Male-dominated forms of sexuality reach into many areas, 
not merely the conventionally sexual. The form of control of 
women through sexuality has changed, but it is neither a simple 
reduction in degree, nor merely a substitution of one form of 
control for another equally pernicious (Walby, 1990, p.127). In 
this sense, the most radical feminists question the norm of 
heterosexuality and demand, in Firestone's words, "the
6 Much has been made of a supposed distinction between sex 
and gender. Sex is thought to be the more biological, gender the 
more social; the relation of each to sexuality varies. However, 
radical feminists deny the distinction. As race becomes ethnicity 
within a system of racial inequality, sex becomes gender within 
a system of sexual inequality. Both are social and political in 
a system that does not rest independently on biological 
difference in any respect (MacKinnon, 1989, p.xiii).
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elimination of the sex distinction itself" (Firestone, 1971). 
They believe that all existing societies have marginalized and 
exploited women through the sex-distinction. To radical 
feminists, women's oppression does not consist primarily in the 
lack of equal job opportunities or in exclusion from full 
participation in the public world. Instead, radical feminists see 
women as oppressed primarily in so-called intimate relations: in 
sexual and procreative relations, in the home, and more generally 
in that sphere of life that the male culture defines as personal. 
They argue that, so long as women are excluded from socially 
powerful activity, whatever activity women do will reinforce 
their powerlessness, because women are doing it. And so long as 
women are doing activities considered socially valueless, women 
will be valued only for the ways they can be used (MacKinnon, 
1989, p.80).
Radical feminists propose several ways to free women from 
the cage of femininity. These proposals range from working 
towards an androgynous culture in which male and female 
difference is minimized, or completely eliminated (Firestone, 
1971) , to replacing male culture with female culture. Similarly, 
radical feminists propose several ways to enable women to escape 
from the sexual domination of men. These range from transforming 
the institution of heterosexuality so that neither men nor women 
play a dominant role to rejecting heterosexuality in favour of 
celibacy, autoeroticism, or lesbianism (Tong, 1989, p.95).
To pursue these goals, they require separate political 
organizations in order to formulate their own demands and to 
ensure that those demands are taken seriously. Though this
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separatism may be partially necessary, or healthy (Tong, 1989; 
Jaggar, 1983), total separatism is open to the criticism that 
women will destroy patriarchy by confronting it, not by isolating 
themselves from it (Tong, 1989, p.126).
1. 3 Purpose of The Study
It has been a claim of communist regimes that they, and they 
alone, can bring about the full emancipation of women. They 
maintain that the abolition of sexual inequality can only be 
achieved as a part of the broader socialist transformation 
through pulling all women into the paid labour force. Many 
feminists who compared capitalist with communist states in terms 
of women's economic conditions have pointed out significant 
differences in the economic indicators between socialist and 
capitalist societies, in favour of the former societies, even if 
they criticised the lack of democratic institutions in these 
societies. State intervention seemed to bring about sexual 
equality, or at least greater sexual equality than in capitalist 
societies.
However, women's experiences in communist regimes revealed 
the persistent influence of cultural impediments, which delimited 
women's activities within traditional female spheres, or women's 
occupations within traditional female jobs. Women's 
disproportionate responsibilities for household chores and child­
care also confirmed that women were still subordinate to men in 
the family. Further, despite the similar level of women's labour
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participation in communist regimes, women's advances in society 
differed from country to country. Among capitalist democracies, 
a predominantly Catholic society is less likely to adopt 
progressive ideas, including the idea of sexual equality, than 
other societies (Kaplan, 1992, p.54). Similarly, communist 
countries with a Confucian tradition confronted the hard task of 
dissolving the familial bond which had presided over all other 
social bonds. Therefore, apparently similar devices to effect 
radical reforms including changes in gender relations brought 
about different results among communist regimes.
These uneven results among communist regimes prompt the 
following two questions: how much change can be delivered by the 
state, in particular, by communist regimes? And, what obstacles 
to institutional change are expected in different cultural 
traditions? The purpose of this study is, therefore, to provide 
empirical evidence about whether, or to what extent, communist 
regimes in practice emancipated women, or changed gender 
relations; and whether, or to what extent, cultural traditions 
hindered the effort to effect changes in gender relations. By 
answering the questions, this study could also establish which 
of the four feminist theories is most sound in reality.
1.3.1 Political Regimes and Culture
Feminist analyses of communist regimes have so far 
concentrated on the East European countries, including former 
East Germany and to some extent on developing countries — e.g., 
Nicaragua and Yemen. These regional analyses have mainly focused 
on the achievements and failures of communist regimes,
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irrespective of cultural hindrances. On the other hand, many 
feminists compared the living conditions of women in the GDR and 
the FRG, to some extent simply applauding women's advances in 
East Germany. These regional studies and comparisons between the 
former two Germanies fell short of analysing the impact of 
political regimes with a full understanding of cultural varieties 
among communist regimes.
In this respect, the comparison of the former two Germanies 
and the two Koreas should provide an insightful example of the 
impact of political regimes with the cultural difference 
controlled. Germany and Korea have been maintained as distinct 
nations different from their neighbours. Although their histories 
have similarly shown a patriarchal and submissive culture within 
their respective domains, their specific restrictions of women's 
activities have differed considerably. While women in Germany 
were subject to the restriction of activities within the Three 
Ks — i.e., women's duties with regard to children, kitchen, and 
church—  women in Korea were confined at home under the Rule of 
the Three Obediences — i.e., obediences to the father, to the 
husband, and to the eldest son. Domestification of women was 
stricter in Korea than in Germany.
The traditions of the two nations ran into revolutionary 
changes and discontinuities in the wake of their division into 
communist and capitalist regimes. East Germany and North Korea, 
on the one hand, were at liberty to abolish the economic 
foundation of class division and to mobilize women to participate 
in production in accordance with their new Marxist foundations. 
West Germany and South Korea, on the other hand, kept their
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traditional order even if South Korea experienced some 
transformations in introducing a capitalist market economy. These 
political divisions and their impact have made significant 
differences to the status of women between East and West Germany, 
and between North and South Korea. Yet, not only between East and 
West Germany, but also between East Germany and North Korea there 
have been considerable variations in women's position in society. 
If the differences between the former two Germanies and between 
the two Koreas could be explained as the impact of political 
regimes, the differences between the two communist regimes must 
be attributable to cultural difference.
Therefore, these four countries can give us an incisive 
example of cross-cultural, cross-country analysis with a very 
small number of cases — i.e., four. This is not to say that there 
has been no such cross-country or cross-cultural analysis of the 
status of women. Many feminists have undertaken cross-country 
analyses, yet with an overwhelming focus on Western European 
nations (Lovenduski, 1982; Jenson et.al., 1988; Dominelli, 1991; 
Kaplan, 1992). Although these studies have paid some attention 
to cultural differences, their concern has been limited to 
Christianity. Other feminists, notably Robin Morgan (1984) , have 
done cross-cultural analyses to explore how women's lives in 
seemingly disparate societies actually have much in common 
(Reinharz, 1992, pp.109-125). However, existing cross-cultural, 
cross-country analyses have focused either on public policy or 
on cultural specificity. They have not yet questioned how 
specific cultures respond to a regime trying to deliver changes 
in gender relations with more universally-oriented political
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perspectives. The cross-cultural, cross-country analysis of the 
four countries chosen here permits a two-dimensional analysis of 
cultural and political effects on women's emancipation.
1.3.2 The Two Hypotheses of the Study
The two questions under review can be restated as two 
hypotheses:
Hypothesis One. Women's positions are equal among communist
and capitalist regimes, regardless of the political system.
Hypothesis Two. Women's positions are equal among the
communist regimes, regardless of cultural tradition.
Hypothesis One is tested by measuring the differences 
between the former two Germanies and between the two Koreas. 
Hypothesis Two is tested by measuring differences between the two 
communist regimes and between the two capitalist regimes. In 
order to test the claim that communism is the vehicle for women's 
emancipation, Hypothesis One need to be rejected, and Hypothesis 
Two accepted. If Hypothesis One is accepted, the claim that 
ocmmunism is the vehicle for women's emancipation can not be 
accepted, since there is no regime difference. If both hypotheses 
are rejected, the communist claim can not be accepted either, 
because communists claimed the universal relevance of their 
pledge, and attributed women's oppression to capital alone. The 
rejection of Hypothesis Two would prove the existence of causes 
of women's oppression other than capital. This result, rejecting 
both hypotheses, could partially support socialist feminism, 
because the difference between communist and capitalist regimes 
may be attributed to capital, whereas the difference between the
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communist regimes could be attributed to differences in 
patriarchy. Yet, both liberal and radical feminism can also be 
seen to be supported, because liberal feminism has not attributed 
women's oppression to a single social cause, and because radical 
feminism has been sceptical about the claim that the state can 
deliver fundamental changes in the position of women. However, 
these hypotheses can reject Marxist feminism, even if they are 
inconclusive about the other feminisms.
1. 4 Data and Methodology
The methodology of this study comprises two sequential 
steps. In the first step, descriptive sociological surveys on 
women's position in the four states are carried out, and in the 
second step, a comprehensive comparison of the four countries is 
performed.
1.4.1 Methods and Data for the Sociological Surveys
In the first step of this study, an individual sociological 
survey is carried out country by country. This sociological 
survey includes the political and the historical and cultural 
background of each country. Yet, greater emphasis is placed on 
five interrelated aspects in accordance with the emphases of 
feminists analysis;
(i) Legislation for Sexual Equality;
(ii) Women's Educational Achievements;
(iii) Women's Economic Conditions;
(iv) Women between Paid Work and the Family;
(iv) Women's Political Representation.
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Legislation for Sexual Equality is the cornerstone on which 
demands for equal opportunities could be based. Though so often 
an empty promise on paper, the law nevertheless reflects 
different views on women's roles, and enables women to claim 
their rights.
Women's Educational Opportunities, together with legal 
equality, were the first target of liberal feminist struggles. 
Men's exclusion of women from the public sphere stemmed from the 
assumption of the irrational female, and uneducated females in 
turn strengthened male prejudice against women. Women's 
educational achievement is also important in equal opportunities 
at work, since discrimination by vocational qualification is in 
many respects justifiable by reference to education 
differentials.
Women's Economic Conditions are the foremost concern of 
Marxist and socialist feminism, but liberal feminism also 
struggles for equal opportunities at work. By participating in 
the labour force, women could obtain economic independence and 
self-confidence. In appearance, the biggest difference between 
communist and capitalist regimes occurs in women's economic 
conditions: the great difference in women's labour participation 
rate, women's unemployment rate, and social support for working 
mothers. On the other hand, there still remains the sexual 
division of labour in communist regimes as much as in capitalist 
regimes. Wage differentials between the sexes, too, are found in 
both communist and capitalist regimes. The question here is, to 
what extent, and in which aspects, are women in communist regimes 
better off?
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Women between Paid Work and the Family reveals the reality 
of women's emancipation through paid work. Unless women could 
expect equal shares of household work, women's employment outside 
the home could result in women's "double burden". As long as 
women are subordinate to men in the family, or women alone are 
supposed to do unpaid household work, women's emancipation is 
improbable.
Women's Political Representation is a further index of 
sexual equality. Women have long been supposed not to rule, and 
have been under-represented in political institutions. Sharing 
power may be the last thing men will accept. Although the number 
of women in parliaments increased, women's presence in the core 
of policy making, or in the locus of power, is still very 
limited. This has certainly been true of communist regimes. Yet, 
as a symbol, a large number of women in parliaments could 
encourage women to become politically interested and active.
Data for each of these dimensions are collected through 
various sources such as official publications, academic writings, 
magazines, newspapers, historical archives, and so on.7 Major 
data for each aspect are as followes:
(i) Legislation for Sexual Equality: stipulation of
equality in Constitutions; legislation on family, marriage, 
divorce, and abortion; legal protection of maternity and 
child-care.
(ii) Women in Education: Women's school enrolment rate; the 
proportion of women in higher education; women's vocational 
qualifications.
(iii) Women's Economic Conditions: the proportion of women
7 Subject to availability of data, each aspect may be 
captured by different variables for the four countries. However, 
best efforts are made to ensure comparability across countries.
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in the labour force; the proportions of women by occupation 
(managerial, technician, clerical, manual operatives); wage 
differentials between men and women; women's working hours.
(iv) Women between Employment and the Family: numbers and 
capacities of kindergartens; division of household chores 
between the spouses; marriage and divorce rates.
(v) Women's Political Representation: numbers of women MPs; 
numbers of women Cadre members in the leading party; 
numbers and distribution of women ministers.
1.4.2 A Comprehensive Comparison of the Four Countries
In the second stage, a comprehensive comparison of the four 
countries is carried out to test the two hypotheses of this 
study. The focus is placed on cross-country differences in 
women's position under the law, women's political representation, 
and the socio-economic conditions of women.
Analyses of women's position in the legal, political, and 
economic arenas involve both qualitative and quantitative 
dimensions. Although economic analysis could be carried out by 
quantitative methods, the analysis of legal changes could hardly 
be quantitative, whilst the analysis of women's political 
representation would require both qualitative and quantitative 
perspectives. Therefore, in analysing women's status in the four 
countries, I employ both qualitative and quantitative methods: 
in the analysis of the legal and political status of women, 
qualitative argument with figurative comparison is carried out; 
and in the analysis of the economic position of women, a limited 
quantitative comparison with standardized variables is 
undertaken. In either case, I try to deal with concrete and 
tangible material rather than abstract arguments.
There is the time limit set to the data collection : from 
1945 to 1989 when Germany and Korea were divided. Since the
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unification of Germany, the two-dimensional analysis has not been 
valid. The impact of unification to women's life is left to 
further study.
1. 5 Composition of the Thesis
This thesis is composed of eight chapters. Following this 
introduction, Chapter 2 examines the cultural patterns of Germany 
and Korea before their respective partitions. What were the 
cultural impediments for women in Germany and Korea? Was either 
of the two harsher and more oppressive to women? By examining 
these two questions, Chapter 2 provides a broad picture of 
women's experiences in Germany and Korea, with the assumption 
that, irrespective of the political regime, women in the more 
oppressive culture would remain less equal to men than those in 
the less oppressive culture.
From Chapter 3 to 6, women's conditions in the four 
countries are examined one by one. Chapter 3 considers women's 
life in the Federal Republic of Germany, Chapter 4 in the German 
Democratic Republic, Chapter 5 in the Republic of Korea, and 
Chapter 6 in the Democratic People's Republic. The primary 
concern of these four chapters lies in the continuity and 
discontinuity of traditions affecting women, and changes in 
women's status after the respective partition. In particular, the 
differential changes between the two former Germanies and between 
the two Koreas are paid special attention. Also, the difference 
between the two communist regimes and between the two capitalist
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regimes are considered.
In Chapter 7, a comprehensive comparison of the four 
countries is carried out, with three different methods being 
applied to three major aspects of women's conditions: women under 
the law, women's political representation, and women's socio­
economic conditions. Through this comparison, the two hypotheses 
of this thesis are tested. The conclusion follows in Chapter 8.
Through this thesis, the claim that communism is the vehicle 
for women's emancipation is tested on empirical grounds, and the 
impact of political regime, or of the state, is assessed with the 
influence of culture taken into account. This cross-cultural, 
cross-country analysis of the impact of political regime will, 
I hope, aid the understanding of both the necessity and the 
limitations of state intervention in women's issues. Sexual 
equality ultimately is to be obtained by women's struggles, not 
by state intervention, though the latter can help.
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CHAPTER TWO
CULTURE AMD WOMEN IN GERMAN AND KOREAN HISTORY, 1871-1945
2. 1 Two Cultural Patterns: Christianity and Confucianism
Feminist concern with the impact of culture has centred on 
three principal issues. Why have women so long accepted, or 
acquiesced in, sexual inequality? Is there a dominant ideology 
maintaining sexual inequality? Is it possible to change culture, 
and in particular to what extent can women change male-dominated 
culture towards sexual equality? This thesis is mainly concerned 
with the latter question, but this Chapter deals with the second 
question.
The first question has been discussed in socialization 
theory, psychoanalysis, and discourse theory (Walby, 1990; 
Chorodow, 1978; Mitchell, 1975; McNay, 1992)-1 The second 
question has been the subject of cross-cultural studies, and the 
third question has been the main concern of cross-country
1 Socialization theory, following Parsonian concepts, 
explains how an individual accepts and internalizes existing 
ideas of masculinity and femininity. However, this process of 
socialization does not explain where the content of these notions 
come from. The psychoanalytic approach, though originating in 
Freudian biological determinism, tries to explain gender 
inequality by the unconscious. Chorodow suggests early childhood 
experience of gender difference leads individuals to shape gender 
identity in the unconscious (Chorodow, 1978) . Another 
psychoanalysist, Juliet Mitchell, suggests a dualistic approach, 
in which capitalist relations are rooted in the economy, while 
patriarchy is based in culture and the unconscious 
(Mitchell,1975). Discourse analysis, following Derrida and 
Foucault, attacks traditional forms of thought and orthodox 
notions of rationality, and in particular, the unitary notion of 
"woman." Unlike socialization theory, discourse analysis examines 
how the category of woman is construed in society (Walby, 1990).
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empirical studies.
The question of dominant ideology has led to the criticisms 
of existing religions. Christianity, Judaism, Islam and 
Confucianism among others have provided the core beliefs which 
have shaped social relations. These dominant cultural patterns 
have provided and maintained the ideology of women's 
subordination to men as part of the social and cultural order. 
Yet, the pattern of women's experiences varies country by 
country, society by society, and period by period. In this 
chapter, therefore, two questions are considered: what were
dominant cultural patterns that shaped women's lives in Germany 
and Korea?; and, which cultural pattern was more oppressive, or 
more benevolent, to women, Korean or German culture?
Empirical studies show how existing political regimes, and 
the women's movement, have tried to change gender relations 
through constitutional promises, legal and structural guarantees, 
and through struggles. Yet, changing laws and policies is one 
thing, changing gender relations is another: empirical studies 
suggest that gender relations that were shaped by cultural 
traditions are least susceptible to changes. The question 
therefore arises whether the efforts made by political regimes, 
or by the women's movement, have changed gender relations. In 
this thesis, the following four chapters, from Chapter Three to 
Chapter Six, examine whether the four countries — the former two 
Germanies and two Koreas—  have changed gender relations. Before 
discussing the four countries, however, I shall describe the 
background against which these countries developed their 
policies.
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2.1.1 An Overview of Christianity and Confucianism
The two dominant cultural patterns in Germany and Korea were 
Christianity and Confucianism, respectively. Yet, Christianity 
and Confucianism are not easily comparable with each other. While 
Christianity is first and foremost a revealed religion, 
Confucianism refers to the body of practical, secular, and moral 
teachings. The texts of Confucianism, the Classics, introduce 
their readers to a world of moral values, human action, and 
reliance upon a superior power.2 Confucian teaching has always 
acknowledged man's possession of an inner faculty of moral 
discernment —  his conscience. The difference between the 
Confucian and the Christian teachings of conscience lies 
especially in the Christian's emphasis on God, the giver of moral 
law and the judge of human conscience. Though Confucian teaching 
implies that conscience is a gift, it does not dwell on God's 
role as supreme lawgiver and judge. It prefers to analyze the 
meanings of conscience itself (Ching, 1977, p.90). Christianity, 
by contrast, is a religion with basic insights into God and man, 
and with an institutional church that comprises an organized 
hierarchy and priesthood, a clearly defined system of dogmas and 
moral concepts, a solemn and public cult and a sacramental 
system.
Yet, both Confucianism and Christianity have exercised 
decisive influence in shaping the beliefs, moral codes and
2 Confucianism is actually a misnomer, a Western designation 
of an East Asian tradition. The Chinese themselves have usually 
preferred Juchia, or Juchiao, the school or teachings of the 
scholars. Confucius himself never made exclusive claims as a 
teacher, calling himself rather a "transmitter” of the teachings 
of ancient sages. The term Ju refers to the entire development 
of the so-called Confucian tradition, throughout the centuries.
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behaviours of large populations in the East — i.e., China, Japan 
and Korea—  and in the West — i.e., North America and the whole 
European continent including Germany. Confucianism and 
Christianity have woven the history of the East and the West, by 
demanding compliance from the individual, and by legitimizing or 
condemning specific events. Every phase of individual life 
including marriage and familial life as well as political 
activity in the West and the East has been regulated, instructed 
and transformed by the demands of Christianity and Confucianism, 
respectively.
2.1.2 Christian Womanhood: The Original Sin of Eve
Christian womanhood, especially in the Catholic tradition, 
has been constructed around the notions of women's inferiority 
to men, submissiveness, the polluting power of the woman's body, 
and the imperatives of being wife and mother as second-best to 
celibacy in serving God. Women as sinful beings had only two ways 
of being forgiven: either getting married, and bearing and
rearing children as chaste wives and devoted mothers; or 
remaining virgins in service of God. Women's independence outside 
religious asceticism was suspect and deemed anti-social, amoral, 
and promiscuous.
Though every known history all over the world showed the 
persistence of patriarchal order, Christianity has been accused 
of displaying the "original spell of patriarchal myth" (Daly, 
1978). While man (Adam) was created in the image of God, woman 
(Eve) was an inferior, sinful, and secondary creature. In the 
Judaeo-Christian myth of Creation, Genesis, Eve was a secondary
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creature made from Adam's rib, as a helper for Adam. Referring 
to Eve's supposed creation from Adam's rib, Paul instructed 
people to "let a woman learn in silence with all submissiveness" 
(I Timothy 2:11). In the New Testament there is talk of male 
"headship" and teaching of the subordination of the wife to the 
husband.
Because Eve inspired lust in Adam, and seduced him into the 
original sin, Christian writers asserted that women's bodies had 
the power to pollute, which led them to oppress female sexuality. 
Female sexuality was denounced as a sinful desire,3 indeed, if 
possible, the Church would have demanded celibacy for all women 
(Ranke-Heinemann, 1989) . But since most women —  and men —  were 
too weak to practice asceticism, they were allowed to get 
married, in order to 'increase and multiply and fill the earth' 
(The Book of Genesis) — i.e., to reproduce offspring. Therefore, 
in the Christian world, women's proper role was to serve God 
(Church), to please men (wifery and housekeeping) , and to 
procreate (motherhood).4
3 Through this Biblical imagery of the male God and the 
sinful female, Christianity excluded women from the priesthood. 
So women were denied any leadership in this religion. Despite 
many debates and long conflicts, the Roman Catholic Church 
continues to deny women priesthood. Protestant Churches first 
launched the idea of women priests in the 1940s. The Anglican 
Church decided to accept ordination of women on 11 November 1992. 
At the news of Anglican Church's acceptance of women ordination, 
the Vatican Church announced that the ordination of women in the 
Anglican Church would be a grave obstacle to reconciliation 
between the two Churches.
4 A few feminists who have deep faith in Christianity have 
read the Bible in favour of women, in order to escape from the 
criticism of Christian misogyny. They exalt the Virgin Mary as 
being a true model for women; she is the highest to which 
humanity has attained. They want to make common cause with Virgin 
Mary as a counterweight to the male Christ. However, this idea 
has been attacked: in the story of Virgin Birth, Mary does
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Protestantism created an atmosphere more conducive to the 
women's movement. Though Protestant women were supposed to be 
wives and mothers, the Protestant emphasis on individual 
spiritual responsibility could provide an encouraging atmosphere 
for a strong-minded woman, like Mary Wollstonecraft. In Germany, 
as early as 1927, Protestant women won the right to function as 
assistant pastors (Vikarin) in some synods.3 Even so, the 
Protestant emphasis on motherhood and the imperative of being a 
chaste wife leave little room for equality between women and men.
2.1.3 Confucian Womanhood: The Duty of Filial Piety
While Christian womanhood was shaped around original sin and 
procreation, Confucian womanhood was woven by a notion of society 
that was inexorably hierarchical, and gave the utmost importance 
to filial piety. Although Confucian scholars did not explicitly 
express female inferiority, their hierarchical perspective placed 
women under men. Women's subordination to men was considered part 
of the natural order. Also, the duty of filial piety inescapably 
focused on motherhood.
The Confucian regards human society in terms of personal 
relationships and ethical responsibilities resulting from such 
relationships. In Confucian teachings, society is composed of the 
well known "Five Relationships": ruler-subject; father-son;
nothing (Daly, 1978, p.83; Hampson, 1986, p.135). The Virgin Mary 
enters in the story because she is humble and obedient, and 
produces a male child.
5 Though this was not full priesthood, Protestant theology 
on the relation of the soul to God provided a new horizon for 
women to read the Bible, and further, to take theological degrees 
in the early twentieth century (Phayer, 1990).
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husband-wife; elder-younger brothers; and friend-friend 
relationships. Three of these are family relationships, while the 
other two are usually conceived in terms of the family model. The 
system of Five Relationships, all the same, emphasizes a basic 
sense of hierarchy. The only truly horizontal relationship is 
that between friends; however, even here, seniority of age 
demands a certain respect, as is also the case with brothers. The 
husband-wife relationship bears natural resemblance to that 
between elder-younger brothers, but is more usually compared to 
the ruler-subject relationship. The wife should be submissive to, 
and obey, her husband and her parents-in-law.
Filial piety is the first of all Confucian virtues, that 
comes before loyalty to the sovereign, conjugal affection, and 
everything else (Ching, 1977, pp.97-101).6 For women, filial 
piety, the need to procure progeny to assure the continuation of 
the ancestral cult, meant the duty to get married and to bear 
sons. Consequently, womanhood in Confucian society has been 
summarised as "Wise Mother, Good Wife" with varied emphasis among 
the countries.7
This Confucian conception of womanhood shows no significant 
difference from the Christian one. In both societies, women were 
inferior and submissive to men, and had to be wives and mothers.
6 In Korea, a son or a wife who informed on the crimes of 
his father or her husband to the authorities would face severe 
punishment, not be praised, because he, or she, betrayed familial 
loyalty. This priority of filial piety and familial loyalty 
lasted until the beginning of twentieth century.
7 In Korea and China, motherhood was pre-eminent. However, 
in Japan, motherhood gained attention only after the Meiji 
Restoration. Even then, the Japanese said "Good Wife, Wise 
Mother," reversing the order of the phrase. See Bernstein (1991) .
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Instead of serving God (the Church) , the Confucian world 
emphasized ancestor worship (filial piety)• The only difference 
between women in the Christian world and the Confucian world was 
whether women were condemned as original sinners, or were trapped 
in filial piety. Yet, Korean and German women's lives were 
different, as were their struggles for better living conditions.
2. 2 Kinder, Kueche and Kirchei Cultural Impediments for
German Women
The classic functions assigned to women in German society 
have been neatly, and famously, summarized by the Three Ks - 
Kinder (children) , Kueche (kitchen) and Kirche (church) . These 
Three Ks, which are clearly the outcome of Christianity, were 
crystallised and reinforced in the Nazi regime. In the late 
nineteenth century, many German women actively joined in the 
economy, fought for socialist ideals, women's suffrage, and 
social welfare, often as prominent leaders. German women 
published the first women's newspaper in history, and were ahead 
of their times in arguing for women's ordination in the church.8 
During World War One, they contributed on a large scale to the 
wartime national economy, while sustaining the churches and 
families. Partly as a result, they won the right to vote for the
8 Apart from winning the assistant pastoral position in 
1927, both Catholic and Protestant women, led by Paula Mueller 
(Evangelisch Women's League) and Gerta Krabbel (Catholic German 
Women's League), began to discuss the question of women's 
ordination in the early years of the Weimar Republic (Phayer, 
1990).
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national parliament in the Weimar Republic. Most of these 
achievements were, however, eclipsed in the course of the Nazi 
regime. The Nazi regime revitalised the traditional notion of 
separate spheres for men and women, and returned women back to 
the realm of the Three Ks. Since the permeation of Nazi dogma was 
so thorough, German women's past achievements were much shaded 
by the fixed cultural impediments of the Three Ks.
2.2.1 German Unification
Although the Germanic tribes showed up in Europe as early 
as the Middle ages, the history of modern Germany began with the 
unification of 1871. The fact that militarist Prussia took the 
initiative in the unification was decisive in moulding the 
political culture, constructing political and economic 
institutions, and in shaping the role of women in Germany.
The rise of capitalism and the emergence of the bourgeoisie 
led in Germany, as elsewhere, to a confrontation with the feudal 
aristocracy; but in Germany, unlike France or Britain, this 
resulted in a victory for the old order (Evans, 1987) . The defeat 
of the bourgeoisie set the pattern for the next century, which 
was characterised by state intervention in the economy and a 
comprehensive social welfare system. The unification of Germany 
in 1871 was the last, and final, victory of the feudal 
aristocracy, and left the legacy of a "missing revolution" to 
Germany (Evans, 1987, pp.94-127).
For women, the strengthening and the expansion of the 
Prussian order further hindered their activity in the public 
realm. Early Germanic and Celtic tribes had ranged in structure
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from patriarchal to matriarchal, and some of them surprised Roman 
chroniclers by the presence in battle of women, often leading 
raids (Morgan, 1984, p.241). Although Christianization confined 
German women within the home, there remained regional variations 
in the extent of delimiting women's activity, the extreme of 
which was the Salic Law. The Salic Law in most of the European 
monarchies barred women from ruling, although the ascension of 
Maria Theresia to the Hapsburg throne in the eighteenth century 
was a notable exception (Morgan, 1984, p.242). Further, the 
Prussian Law of Association (Vereinsgesetz) of 1851 prohibited 
women from engaging in politics, joining political parties and 
even attending political meetings; only in the states of Baden, 
Bremen, Hamburg, and Wuerttemberg were women permitted to join 
political parties. This regulation of women's participation in 
the public sphere remained valid until 1908. Therefore, German 
unification under Prussian militarism implied, in a manner of 
speaking, the expansion of the Salic Law to the whole of German 
society, limiting women's role to the church and the home.
However, many German women rejected the status of passive 
victims. The women's movement, which had sprang up before German 
unification, continued to voice demands for women's rights. 
Although the German women's movement was bitterly split between 
bourgeois and socialist movements, it succeeded in achieving the 
abolition of the Law of Association, and after the First World 
War, in obtaining universal suffrage.
2.2.2 The Bourgeois Women's Movement
The first women's movement in Germany emerged in 1848 when
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turbulence reigned throughout the country. Stimulated by the news 
of the Paris February Revolution of 1848, liberalisation 
movements swept Berlin. During the period of petitions, 
demonstrations, and aggravating political struggle between the 
bourgeoisie and the military, many bourgeois women organised 
themselves, and demanded women's freedom and liberation along 
with political liberalisation. The forerunner of the women's 
movement was Luise Otto-Peters who demanded better education for 
girls and the 'participation of women in the life of the state' 
(Frevert, 1986, p.74) . She published the first women's newspaper, 
The Women's Newspaper (Die Frauen Zeitung, 1849), under the 
slogan of "Recruiting Women Citizens for the Realm of Freedom 
(Dem Reich der Freiheit werb' ich Burgerinnen)" (Herve, 1983, 
p.18). Otto-Peters criticized those men who had only the 
masculine half of humanity in mind. Yet for women too, she wrote, 
the realm of freedom was not infinite, the boundaries were marked 
by feminine morality.
As was revealed in Otto-Peters' emphasis on feminine 
morality, the women's movement in 1848 represented the liberal 
idea of female rights. It demanded the right to participate in 
the public life, on the ground that a woman could not fulfil her 
duty as a mother, or as a housewife, without understanding the 
world outside the home. This was much concerned about education 
and political rights for women.
After the first women's movement had been silenced by a wave 
of political repression in 1849-1850, new organizations 
developed. Under Otto-Peters's leadership, the German Women's 
Association (Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein: ADF) was born
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in October 1865. The ADF, unlike the first movement, carefully 
maintained its distance from political parties and groupings, 
though its position was unmistakably bourgeois and liberal in 
character (Frevert, 1989, p.116). While the ADF petitioned for 
better occupational training for young proletarian women, and for 
their employment in the post and telegraph office, its energies 
were primarily directed towards ensuring that the 'young ladies' 
could enjoy sound educational and employment opportunities. The 
ideals of young ladies were too high for proletarian women. The 
'ladies' required etiquette, morality and self-responsibility, 
chastity, tidiness, the ability to manage a healthy and clean 
household, and child-care. For proletarian women, however, those 
standards were almost impossible to reach because of their 
working and living conditions.
During the nineteenth century the numbers of female and 
child workers were greatly increasing,9 and the conditions of 
work and housing were deteriorating. Frequently female workers 
were the breadwinners, with unemployed husbands and children at 
home (Herve, 1983, pp.15-16). Male workers' wages, though much 
more than those of female workers', were also not enough to 
sustain the family, forcing wives to the factories. Under these 
circumstances, cleaning the house, where there was a house, meant 
depriving women of the already insufficient time for sleep. 
Child-care hardly mattered, and the idea of childhood had not yet
9 In 1849, Sachsen recorded 11,000 female workers and 20,000 
male workers, Prussia 13,000 male and 12,400 female workers, in 
the spinning industry (Herve 1983, p.13).
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spread down.10 For proletarian women, participating in work 
outside the home was not a right, but the only way to sustain 
their family. Thus, the ideal of ladies was only for bourgeois 
women, revealing the class split in German society.
2.2.3 Women and Socialism
Engels wrote in his Origin of the Family, Private Property 
and the State (1884) that the first condition for the liberation 
of women was to bring the whole female sex into public industry. 
August Bebel also wrote in his extremely popular book Women under 
Socialism (Die Frau und der Sozialismus, 1879) that there could 
be no emancipation of humanity without the social independence 
and equality of the sexes, and advocated the employment of women.
However, socialist positions on women's paid work were not 
consistent.11 Many socialists believed that cheap female labour 
was one of the major obstacles to the economic advancement of the
10 Following the research of P. Aries (1960) , some 
sociologists argue that the idea of childhood developed in the 
eighteenth century among the nobility. This idea infiltrated into 
the bourgeoisie, and contributed to the idea of modern nuclear 
family (Firestone, 1970; Weeks, 1981).
11 They had deplored the disappearance of women's traditional 
roles: Marx called the dissolution of the old family ties 
"terrible and disgusting"; and Engels early in his career 
declared that a wife earning wages outside the home "deprived the 
husband of his manhood and the wife of all womanly qualities." 
Lassalle declared in 1867 to the General German Workers Congress 
that "the employment of women in the great industrial workshops 
is one of the most shocking abuses of our age. It is shocking 
because it causes the condition of the working class not to be 
improved but to be impaired, and it places the working population 
in a wretched condition through its destruction of the family." 
He reflected the position of majority of male workers whose wish 
was to keep their family just like the bourgeois family (Herve, 
1983, pp.12-40; Pore, 1981, pp.8-23; Frevert, 1989, pp.94-106; 
Anderson and Zinsser, 1988 II, pp.371-390; Engels, 1859; 
Fletcher, 1987, pp.16-24, etc).
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working class and clamoured for the exclusion of women from 
industrial work. Contrary to this view, Clara Zetkin vehemently 
argued that the only way to combat the capitalist system was not 
to deny work to women but to socialize the means of production. 
The liberation of women and men depended upon the liberation of 
labour from capital. One of the first steps towards this 
liberation was the organizing and political awakening of women 
workers to make common cause with men of her class (Pore, 1981; 
Koepecke, 1979; Thoennessen, 1969).
Despite the controversy about female workers within 
socialist circles, the foundation of the Social Democratic Party 
of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands: SPD) 
in 1875 through the merger of two socialist parties, Ferdinand 
Lassalle's General German Worker's Association (Allgemeiner 
Deutscher Arbeiterverein) and Wilhelm Liebknecht and August 
Bebel's Social Democratic Labour Party (Sozialdemokratische 
Parted) , gave a new chance for the proletarian women's movement. 
In fact, at its founding Congress in Gotha, the SPD demanded the 
right to vote for all citizens, without making clear the meaning 
of all. The party leadership was well aware of the necessity to 
recruit female members since the Sozialistengesetz of 1876 
outlawed the socialist party, and since organising the party was 
very tough. However, it was not enthusiastic about guaranteeing 
equality or establishing a clear party line on that matter. The 
Gotha Programme12 was the best compromise of the conflicting
12 The Gotha programme reflected the greater influence of the 
popular ideas of Lassalle. Lassalle strongly opposed Marx's view 
that the state was the product of class division and that its 
function was the perpetuation of the existing power distribution. 
While Marx believed that the state would wither-away together
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interests of the moment (Herve, 1983; Frevert, 1989; Pore, 1981; 
Anderson and Zinsser II, 1988; Berlau, 1949).
However, in its Erfurt Programme of 1891, the SPD 
officially endorsed and supported the emancipation of women. More 
significant was the party's support for the organization of a 
separate women's affiliation13 under the leadership of Clara 
Zetkin, who ran a socialist women's newspaper, The Women Worker 
(Die Arbeiterin) , and later Equality (Gleichheit, 1904) . However, 
Zetkin herself was a devoted wife as well as a mother, demanding 
women to be super-women who could shoulder the double burden of 
household and paid work with the spirit of self-sacrifice 
(Koepcke, 1979; Pore, 1981).
Although the SPD was not always of one mind, and there were 
persistent and decided opponents of sexual equality, it was the
with class division, Lassalle viewed that state as a separate 
power, independent of the nature of society, and indispensable 
for the realization of socialist ideas. Therefore, the Gotha 
programme accepted the existence of the state, and declared that 
"by utilizing all legal means, the SPD aspires to establish the 
free state and the socialist order, to destroy the Iron Law of 
Wages" (Berlau, 1949, pp.17-37). The programme demanded state- 
supported, democratically controlled socialist co-operatives in 
industry and agriculture. The programme also demanded universal, 
equal, secret and compulsory elections; universal military 
service (Allgemeine Wehrhaftigkeit) and a militia system; the 
abolition of all restrictions upon the press, assembly, 
associations and coalition; jurisdiction by the people; free 
legal aid (Unentgeltliche Rechtspflege); universal, compulsory, 
free and equal education; the ban of child-labour and of all 
female labour detrimental to health and morals.
13 Lovenduski assesses the establishment of a separate 
women's organization in the SPD as very important, since it 
enabled women's issues to be developed and women to have groups 
in which they felt comfortable and in which they could learn to 
speak in public and think for themselves (Lovenduski, 1986, 
p.37). Though the women's organization did not have decisive 
power in the party leadership, it was effective in training and 
in recruiting female leaders, for the party and for the women's 
movement.
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socialist movement that tried to improve the living conditions 
of proletarian women.
2.2.4 Struggles, War, and Disillusionment
While the socialist movement on a large scale won the 
support of proletarian women, a new bourgeois women's 
organisation, the Federation of German Women's Associations (Bund 
deutscher Frauenvereine: BDF) emerged in 1894, under the
leadership of Auguste Schmidt, Marie Stritts, Helene Lange, and 
later Gertrud Baumer. The BDF, as an "umbrella organization" 
(Dachverband: Herve, 1983, p.50; Frevert, 1989, p.113), united 
thirty-four women's groups including regional associations and 
religious organizations, with social welfare orientations. In 
1899 Marie Stritts was elected chairwoman, and led the BDF to 
call for female suffrage as the official BDF programme (1902).
As a result of the emergence of the BDF and the SPD, the 
German women's movement had confirmed class and ideological 
divisions that were to endure. Nevertheless, the organizational 
power of the women's movement gained a new impetus, and in 1908 
the Law of Association (Vereinsgesetz) was abolished, permitting 
women to join political parties and groups.
During World War I and the Weimar Republic, the women's 
movement encountered a new chance to enhance women's status. 
Women were increasingly incorporated into the labour market, and 
their work given public recognition and praise. Above all, 
middle-class women proved their civic maturity and social 
responsibility. This new environment, however, turned out to be 
the cause for another split in the women's movement.
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In the socialist movement, the dispute over the "Truce in 
the Fortress” (Burgfrieden)14 led to the division of the SPD into 
three socialist parties: the core of the future Independent 
Social Democratic Party (Unabhangige Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands: USPD) and the Communist Party (Kommunistische
Partei Deutschlsmds: KPD) left the party, opposing the truce. 
Most importantly, Zetkin left the SPD, and her replacement, Marie 
Juchacz, steered socialist women into more womanly concerns, 
accepting the bourgeois ideas of a separate female sphere.
In the bourgeois women's movement, nationalist and pro-war 
sentiments caused a split in the BDF. When the BDF set up the 
National Women's Service to support the war, the radical wing in 
the BDF, headed by Anita Augspurg and Lida Heymann, vehemently 
criticized support for the war, calling for German participation 
in the international peace movement. However, the majority of 
women's organizations, in particular, the Protestant women's 
organization, agreed the "truce”, and supported the government 
in conducting the war.
After the defeat of Germany in the war, constitutional 
reforms were introduced, including "universal" suffrage but 
excluding women. Women finally won the vote with the
14 On the brink of World War One, an intense nationalist mood 
ruled the whole of German society, which led the SPD to a crisis 
of conscience between nationalism and the socialist principle of 
internationalism. When the war broke out, the Imperial government 
suggested all political groups which had fought against the 
government should make a truce for the duration of the war (Truce 
in the Fortress). Despite vehement disputes within the 
leadership, the SPD decided to conclude a temporary peace with 
the state, which was named the "policy of the 4th August" in 1914 
(Thoennessen, 1969, p.75). Likewise, many political groups, 
including the BDF, agreed a truce to support the war (Herve, 
1983, pp.84-118).
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constitutional recognition of sexual equality as a basic right 
in 1919. In the Weimar Republic, 41 of 421 delegates sent to the 
national assembly were women, with the largest delegation coming 
from the SPD. Marie Juchacz, in the first address by a woman 
before a German parliament, stressed that the woman question no 
longer existed in the old sense of the word. She did not mention 
that women might have special problems that prevented them from 
exercising those rights. In her two addresses, she specifically 
mentioned the special credentials and interests of women as 
mothers. This was indicative of the way the SPD was to view and 
appeal to women during the Weimar republic. "Vote for the SPD for 
the future of your children" was a common campaign slogan 
designed to appeal to women (Pore, 1981, pp.40-42) . Other parties 
also continued to woo the female vote and to accept the presence 
of a few women in elected bodies, but they kept them well away 
from high-level politics. No political party undertook the task 
of re-educating women to accept full citizen status.
On the economic front, women's labour participation and 
their contribution to the reconstruction of Germany were not 
rewarded, rather they were condemned for abandoning their family. 
Men allegedly cherished the peculiar camaraderie of the trenches, 
and the "stab in the back" myth grew. According to this myth, the 
war was lost on the home front rather than by the army, because 
of subversion by Jews, Communists, Social Democrats —  and also 
women (Bridenthal et al., 1984; Conradt, 1978). Women were forced 
to leave the workplace by the Demobilization Orders 
(Demobilmachungsverordnungen, 1921) .
Despite much rhetoric about women's rights, most Germans did
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not envision a change in the traditional role of women. When 
women did enter the traditionally masculine occupations, they 
were neither paid nor treated equally. No political solution to 
this problem appeared to be forthcoming. When the Nazis came to 
propagate the traditional ideas of woman's sphere, the Three Ks, 
disillusionment had already eroded much of the impetus of the 
women's movement. Without an appealing alternative, many women, 
mostly middle-class housewives, were attracted by the Nazi 
propaganda of the familiar Kinder, Kueche, Kirche ethos and saw 
emancipation more often as a threat than as a blessing 
(Bridenthal et.al., 1984, p.56). Thus, many women voted for the 
Nazis on the basis of what they perceived as their own 
interests,15 with the hope of security and comfort.
2.2.5 Women under the Nazis
The Nazis promised orderly families and healthy children in
15 Despite the myth of massive female support for Hitler, 
research has made it clear that until the 1930 election, as many 
men as women were leaning towards the Nazis. In Saarland, 489,000 
men out of 2,816,000 total male voters voted for the Nazis (22 
percent), while 472,000 women out of 3,081,000 total female 
voters (15 percent) did so. In the Greater Berlin area, the 
voting difference was reversed: 204,122 females voted for the 
Nazis, so did 191,866 males (Beyer, 1933, p.82; Charles et.al, 
1982, p.23). The support for the Nazis was more differentiated 
by age and class than gender (Childers, 1986) . Further, the Nazis 
never won an absolute majority —  in July 1932, they won only 37 
percent of the vote, and in November 1932, 33 percent. However, 
the fact that many young girls frantically joined the march to 
Berlin, and that many middle class housewives were attracted by 
Hitler helped the Nazis to power. Bridenthal (1984) argues that 
some bourgeois women's gender specific attraction to Nazism was 
the outcome of a long development of middle-class housewives 
organizing to gain some control over their own lives.
43
place of "double earners" (Doppelverdiener) and illegal 
aborters.16 It also promised women gender-separated spheres of 
activity. For many women this meant home and family, as well as 
the female worlds of teaching or social work. Instead of 
demanding equality, Nazi women called for "Room for living" 
(Lebensraum) , changing Hitler's word.17 Nazi women adapted the 
dream of a separate space and forswore claims to "masculine" 
public power and in exchange expected greater influence over 
their own, feminine social realm. Health care, education, 
reproduction, folk traditions and handcrafts, social work and 
religion all fell into the sphere that women called their own 
social space (Koonz, 1986, p. 14). "We want more than the Three 
Ks," wrote one Nazi women, "besides Kinder, Kueche, Kirche, we 
want two more - Krankenhaus (hospital) and Kultur (culture)" 
(Koonz, 1984, p,213). The sexual division of labour and retreat 
to the home were demanded by many women themselves. It was the 
logical outcome of some German women's frustration. When their 
lot was cruel competition with men, women began demanding some 
control over their own lives, though much restricted. Rather than 
competing in the men's world, they expanded their own sphere
16 In the setting of the Depression, unemployed men condemned 
married women workers as selfish double earners. Thus, the notion 
of "Doppelverdiener" supposed that married women should return 
and keep the home, and that husbands should entirely provide for 
the family.
17 Before Hitler used "Lebensraum" to popularize conquest in 
the East, the term was ambiguous. Besides serving as a code for 
bellicose expansion, it also meant to contemporaries a space in 
which to live inside Germany —  a social sphere where domestic 
tranquillity and traditional values reigned (Koonz, 1984, p.200) . 
When Nazi women used this word, they meant a peaceful social 
sphere within which women of all classes and ages would cooperate 
to revive the gospel of love and harmony. This sphere, they 
believed, would not be disturbed by men.
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beyond men's direct intervention.
While Hitler's misogyny allegedly allowed women to hold more 
power in HfeminineM spheres (Koonz, 1984, 1986; Pore, 1981;
Herve, 1983; Frevert, 1989; Bridenthal et. al., 1984), the Nazi 
regime strongly reinforced the sexual division of labour, making 
it the period when biology became "destiny" (Bridenthal et. al., 
1984; Kaplan, 1992). Nazi doctrine created a society structured 
around "natural" biological poles, based on racial mythology. 
When he seized power, Hitler promised renewed nationalism and 
"volkisch" solidarity in place of class, cultural, religious 
divisions. To Germans, the term Volk meant a racial unity, a 
shared history, fate, and consciousness. To the Nazis, however, 
only Arians belonged to the racial community or 
Volksgemeinschaft. Jews and "asocials" were to be ostracized and 
excised from the Volk. In addition, they propagated the ideology 
of innate differences between men and women and sex-specific 
work. Under this ideology, the only legitimate role of a woman 
was being a mother or one of its derivatives in "social 
motherhood" — e.g., social worker, teacher, nurse and the like. 
Race and sex, therefore, became the predominant social markers.
Nazi policies towards women were carried out in two 
patterns. One was pushing women towards motherhood, the other was 
segregating the labour market.18 On the one hand, the Nazi regime 
decreed many laws and regulations to encourage motherhood: 
providing material incentives for childbirth and marriage, 
promoting Mother's Day, and organizing the Federation of German
18 Troeger depicts these two patterns as "the blood and soil 
model" and "the social engineering model" (Bridenthal et. al., 
1984, pp.237-270).
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Women (NS Frauenschaft) and the Federation of German Girls (Bund 
deutscher Madel -BDL). These two organizations were to integrate 
women into the Nazi regime and provide essential support for the 
regime (Kolinsky, 1989) . The BDF, once the biggest women's 
organization of Germany, had already dissolved itself in 1933, 
before the Nazis imposed authoritarian forms on all existing 
associations in the process of so-called Synchronization 
(Gleichschaltung) .19
On the other hand, the Nazis curtailed women's engagement 
in paid work: by segregating the labour market along sexual
lines, educating girls for womanly skills, dismissing married 
women, and by condemning married women workers as selfish double 
earners. Though the sexual division of labour was certainly not 
a Nazi invention, the impact of numerous laws and governmental 
regulations was more powerful than at any other time (Bridenthal 
et. al., 1984). As a result, women came to perceive going out to 
work as a sign of hardship, and not-working as a sign of 
affluence. When World War Two broke out, women were reluctant to 
work for the fatherland. Despite statements about women's duty 
to work, female labour participation hardly rose throughout the 
war (Kolinsky, 1989, p.22). Women had seemingly embraced the 
ideology of the separate sphere, and accepted the Three Ks as
19 Under the name of Synchronization, all organizations and 
groups in Germany were forced to co-operate with the regime. In 
this process many organizations were either dissolved, coerced 
into propagating Nazi ideology, or integrated into a national 
organization. The BDF dissolved itself in 1933, when the 
authoritarian character of the Nazis became clear. Historians and 
feminists continue to debate the meaning of the BDF's 
dissolution. Was it a courageous act of defiance or an act of 
passive resignation? (Koonz, 1986; Bridenthal et.al, 1984; 
Frevert, 1989)
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their own, secure space.
After World War Two, many women were devoted to rebuilding 
family and nation, and sweeping away the rubble.20 Once again 
women joined the world outside the home, in the work place, in 
social activities, or in politics, putting aside the experience 
that they were demobilized after World War One.
2.2.6 The Fluctuating Women's Movement
In line with the sharp discontinuities in the history of 
German politics, the women's movement fluctuated. German women 
won the franchise as early as in 1919. They sent almost ten 
percent of female delegates to the Reichstag in 1919, when 
British women had not yet been fully franchised. Some of them 
were eminent socialist leaders and theoreticians. Yet, with the 
emergence of the Nazi regime, German women retreated into the 
"female sphere", surprising other western women.21 The Nazi 
propaganda of the Three Ks' feminine functions had such a 
sweeping impact that the history of the powerful women's movement
20 "These Prussians, these German men! So marvellously 
competent —  you could conquer half the globe with them. And then 
in defeat they were suddenly no good for anything, not even 
stealing spinach." The memoir of Countess Libussa Frits-Krockow 
shows the immediate post-war years of German aristocratic women. 
Though this memoir is not a conventional history text, it vividly 
shows the life of women trying to keep their family alive after 
a total national destruction. See Krockow (1992).
21 Rose traces the perspectives of the English language press 
about the position and activities of women in Nazi Germany. She 
argues that English-speaking journalists were so critical of 
German women's acceptance of the regime that they did not 
conceive that some German women could rise up in revolt against 
the Nazis (Rose, 1975) . Therefore, the myth of the massive female 
support for the Nazis could be the outcome of the international 
press, ignoring the fact that not only the women's movement, but 
also almost all the social, political movements were silenced 
during the Nazi regime.
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was almost buried into oblivion. Many feminist scholars have been 
deeply disappointed because, they think, the German women's 
movement had lost its long history of struggles and progress 
towards sexual equality during the Nazi regime (Bridenthal et. 
al., 1984; Kaplan, 1992; Koonz, 1986).
However, in my view, German women had taken advantage of 
every possible opportunity. In the decision making process, human 
beings are presumably taking strategies to optimize, or maximize, 
their utility considering the conditions. The German women's 
movement was an exemplary case of conditional optimization. It 
depended upon the situation and the condition of struggles. When 
women were allowed to join the world outside the home, they 
extended their spheres to the masculine realm. When they were 
condemned for abandoning their family, they intensified their 
control over the separate female sphere. Though their acceptance 
of the ideas of the Three Ks hindered women's activities and 
achievements for decades, German women's experience during the 
Nazi regime had not only a negative, but also positive impact for 
the women's movement.
During the Nazi regime, German women, particularly middle- 
class women, strengthened their power in the "female spheres." 
As Koonz puts it, Nazi men inadvertently gave women unique 
opportunities because they cared so little about the women in 
their ranks. Men allowed women considerable latitude to interpret 
Hitler's ideas as they wished, recruit followers, write their own 
rules, and raise funds. In the service of womanly ideals, Nazi 
women sometimes behaved in most un-"ladylike" ways: managing the 
funds they raised, marching, facing down hecklers, making soapbox
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speeches, and organizing mass meetings, marches, and rallies 
(Koonz, 1986, p.5). Through this process, women learned skills 
of organizing and financing, which are indispensable for 
political leadership. As the separate women's organization in the 
SPD contributed to recruit female leaders, the Nazi policy of 
sexual segregation and indifference to the female spheres helped 
the middle-class women to cultivate their potential. In the 
churches as well, while the Nazi regime furthered the sexual 
segregation of labour, Christian women were greatly integrated 
into the churches, and through them, into community affairs 
(Phayer, 1990). For Protestant women, this integration led 
directly to eldership and eventually full ministerial ordination 
from 1946 onwards.22
Therefore, I would argue, German women developed their 
competence and power under these circumscribed conditions. The 
fluctuation by the women's movement was the outcome of strategic 
efforts and compromises of women to enhance their status, and to 
expand their control despite being bitterly divided by class, 
even if not always successful. However, without the change of 
gender relations, sexual equality can not be achieved. Although 
the sexual segregation of labour allowed women some control over 
certain matters for a while, the Three Ks hindered the change of 
gender relations. Thus, after World War Two, the task of German 
women was the abolition of the Three Ks, the key legacy of the 
Nazi regime for women.
22 Beginning with Westphalia in 1946, the church synods 
changed their constitutions to allow women elders one by one 
(Phayer, 1990, pp.225-244).
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/2. 3 The Rule of the Three Obediences:
Restrictions on Korean Women
Korean women had for centuries lived under the Rule of the 
Three Obediences, which demanded that women obey three men during 
their lives — i.e., their fathers in their childhood, their 
husbands after marriage, and their eldest son after their 
husbands' death (Nahm, A., 1988, p.114; Morgan, 1984, p.150).23 
That means that the Korean women's realm was only inside the 
home, within the family. When Japanese colonisation of Korea 
(1910) brought about a sudden collapse of the Confucian order, 
Korean women were overwhelmed by the demand to join the 
independence struggle. During the colonial period, the national 
cause overrode all the other causes, and almost all the organized 
movements were in one way or another in subservience to the 
independence struggle. In Korean, "the women's movement" referred 
only to women's activism in nationalist struggles.
Nevertheless, during this period, women's sphere was 
expanded irreversibly: women were allowed to join the world 
outside the home, as industrial workers or as students, or as 
members of rapidly spreading social organisations, most of which 
were nationalist. Women's education and women's organisational 
activities were supported and legitimised by nationalism. Women's 
participation in the labour market, and their subsequent
23 Though the Rule of the Three Obediences culminated under 
Confucian teachings, this way of confinement of women was not 
distinctive to Asian society. In ancient Greece, 'respectable' 
women were placed under the guardianship of men: first her father 
had control, then her husband; finally, should he die before her, 
the eldest son took charge of her life (Roberts, 1992, p.15).
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participation in industrial disputes gained national support. 
Women could be students, workers, strikers, and nationalist 
fighters —  yet, it was insisted that women should be mothers and 
wives in the end.
2.3.1 Women's Confinement at Home
Before the infiltration of Confucianism in the fourteenth 
century, Korean women enjoyed relatively equal status with men.24 
The establishment of the Chosun dynasty in 1392, however, led to 
the thorough Sinification and Confucianization of Korea. The 
ruling Confucian scholars stressed the importance of the virtues 
of loyalty, filial piety, self-cultivation and self-control. The 
Korean version of the Confucian code comprised Three Cardinal 
Principles (Samgang) and Five Ethical Norms (Oryun) . The Three 
Cardinal Principles are loyalty to the ruler (Chung), filial 
piety (Hyo) , and chastity of the wife (Yol) . The Five Ethical 
Norms run parallel with the Confucian Five Relationships: namely, 
the principle of righteousness and justice between the ruler and 
the subjects (Ui), cordiality and closeness between parents and 
children (Chin), distinction between husbands and wives (pyol), 
order between elders and juniors (Su), and trust between friends
24 Ancient Korean society showed a strong shamanist faith, 
in which female shamans performed the roles of priestess, healer 
and diviner (Nahm, A., 1988; Jayawardena, 1986; Morgan, 1984). 
In Korea, the word "shaman" (Mudang) assumes the person is a 
woman. Male shamans, though rare, are called "Paksu Mudang". 
Although the introduction of Buddhism in the fourth century 
diminished the power of shamans, women still managed to keep a 
large part of their previous rights: both matrilineal and
patrilineal descent was recognized; women had equal inheritance 
rights and the remarriage of widows was not frowned upon; divorce 
was possible, though it was easier for a man than for a woman 
(Nahm, A., 1988; Morgan, 1984).
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(Shin). These principles of Samgang-Oryun were regarded as those 
qualities possessed only by superior and civilized individuals, 
keeping them separated from inferior men.
The status of women declined with the permeation of these 
moral codes. The domestif ication of women reached its 
culmination, and the Rule of the Three Obedience took firm hold. 
Remarriage of widows was also prohibited by law in 1485. Sons of 
remarried widows, even those out of first marriage, could not 
apply for the state examination. A man was at liberty to divorce, 
or rather expel, his wife on the grounds of the Seven Evils 
(Chilgujiak): disobedience to parents-in-law, failure to bear a 
son, jealousy, adultery, hereditary disease, garrulousness and 
larceny. A woman who gave birth to many daughters, but not a son, 
could face a forced divorce, or, if very lucky, had to endure the 
presence of many consorts of her husband —  jealousy of her 
husband's consorts or concubines was included in the seven evils.
The only comfort for Korean women was the existence of the 
"Three Cases of Non-Expulsion", which prohibited expelling the 
wife even when the wife committed one or several of the Seven 
Evils. The three cases were: first, if the wife had performed the 
three-year lasting mourning rituals for the deceased parents-in- 
law; second, if the wife had managed to save the family from 
poverty, and amass a fortune after the marriage; and last, when 
the wife had nowhere to go. However, these exceptions did not 
prohibit men abandoning their wives inside the home. The wife 
could remain in the house, without rights or voice.
Women, including young girls, were not to be seen in public 
or heard, and when they went out in public they covered their
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head and face with a large scarf. Women over the age of seven 
were not permitted to sit with men in a place not separated by 
a curtain or wall and so on, which was called the rule of male- 
female separation over seven years of age (Namnyu Chilse 
Boodongsuck). With the exception of peddlers, peasants and the 
like, most women were confined to domestic activities in what was 
called anpang, the inner quarter, where no man, with the 
exception of the state police in charge of high treason cases, 
was allowed to enter.
Also, after the middle of the seventeenth century, only the 
first son, who was responsible for performing ancestor worship 
rituals, had inheritance rights, thereby establishing the 
primogenitive system. Confucianisation of Korea thus deprived 
women of most of their traditional rights. The only traditional 
women's right which survived Confucianisation was that women kept 
their natal family's name after marriage.25 Confined in the inner 
quarter and under the Rule of the Three Obediences, Korean 
women's role was only to serve their husbands and, more 
importantly, to bear and rear children, to be "Wise Mothers and 
Good Wives".
2.3.2 Mothers without Sexual Desire
Although the idea of "Wise Mother, Good Wife" is common in
25 Since the beginning of the Korean history, Korean women 
have never experienced the custom that they should adopt their 
husbands' name after marriage. Therefore, a Mrs. Kim's husband 
is not necessarily a Mr. Kim. Korean people normally use the 
title Mrs. only when they intend to show she is married, without 
showing her husband's family name. For example, the first lady 
in Korea now is Mrs. Sohn, Myung-Sook, though her husband is 
President Kim. Japanese and Chinese women are named after their 
husbands.
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Confucian society, the Korean version gave overwhelming emphasis 
to motherhood. In the case of China, wifery held the same 
importance as motherhood. A wife without children could face many 
consorts, but was in control of the whole household. After her 
husband's death she could take revenge on consorts by separating 
the children from their natal mother, or by selling the 
concubines to a brothel. In Japan, wifery was more important than 
motherhood. Women were valued as workers, wives, and especially 
as daughters-in-law, not solely as mothers.26
By contrast, child-bearing and rearing were the sacred, 
foremost duty of Korean women. Fathers were not expected to show 
any affection to their children. The father should be a model for 
his son, not with affection, but with discipline. Thus, the sole 
responsibility of child-rearing rested with the mother. While 
women were supposed to be good wives, the adjective "good" almost 
exclusively applied to household management. The wife was to 
please her husband, not with sexual pleasure or conjugal 
affection, but with absolute obedience and good household 
management. Women's sexuality was thoroughly denied: a coquettish 
wife would be blamed for promiscuity; a wife who revealed her 
sexual desire could be expelled. The only reason for intercourse
26 In Japan, the traditions of the merchant class, especially 
in the Kansai era, apparently encouraged women to be active in 
their family's business. The most outstanding of female 
entrepreneurs was Tatsuuma Kiyo, whose management strategies made 
her a pioneer in the sake-brewing industry during its period of 
most rapid growth and prosperity (Bernstein, 1992, p.6) . This was 
beyond the understanding of Korean people during the Chosun 
dynasty.
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should be procreation. Even upper-class consorts, Kisaeng,77 
could keep their reputation only by their academic knowledge of 
the Classics and poetic and artistic talent, not by their sexual 
attraction.28
However, regulation of sexuality could not permeate into the 
working class. There is much historical evidence of adultery and 
promiscuity among the working class, particularly among peasant 
women and female servants. Among the working class virginity in 
any case was not sacred, and the stigma against extra-marital sex 
seems to have been very weak.29 Yet, on the whole, women of the
27 Kisaeng was the group of women entertainers. They were 
beautiful women mainly from the lower classes, who were trained 
in a special institute, the Kyobang, to be professional 
entertainers who could sing, dance, play instruments and engage 
in lively and witty conversation. Their duty was to entertain at 
court and at the houses of the nobility. They very often became 
victims of sexual oppression, but they existed outside the 
boundaries for women fixed by the Confucian system. Some of them 
became strong forces in the polity, acting from wbehind the 
screen". A notable example of a "behind the screen" figure was 
Mahap, who became a consort of powerful minister Kim who was in 
control of the puppet king. Another Kisaeng, Sulmae, helped a 
successful coup d'£tat that led to the enthronement of King In jo. 
A large proportion of female poets and novelists came from among 
the Kisaeng. For example, Hwang Jin-i (1516-1559), has been 
considered the greatest poet of the Chosun dynasty.
28 In China, by contrast, there were few limitations on the 
sexual behaviour of upper-class women. Many classical Chinese 
novels show the sexual behaviour of upper-class members. Though 
female chastity was the most valuable virtue, a woman was 
expected to maintain her husband's love with sexual attraction. 
Women could, or should, make themselves up to maintain their 
beauty and sexual attraction. For example, Chinese women have 
long endured painful foot-binding since they believed that bound 
feet would certainly arouse sexual passion from their husbands.
In Japan, women's sexuality began to be oppressed after the 
Meiji restoration, but not as thoroughly as in Korea. See: The 
Dream of Red Chambers, written in the early Qing dynasty; Golden 
Lotus, written in the late Ming dynasty; Flowers in the Mirror, 
written in the late Qing dynasty. Also see Spence (1991).
29 As Weeks (1989) shows in the case of Britain, the working 
class in Korea held their own autonomy in terms of regulating 
sexuality. They shaped their sexuality within a world dominated
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upper and middle class in the Chosun dynasty were curtailed 
within the home without parallel in history.
The Confucian order in Korea came to face a heavy pressure 
for change during the nineteenth century because of the 
advancement of western powers, the transmission of Christianity 
and Japanese invasion. The aggressive presence of foreign powers, 
which drove Korea to the open door policy (1876) and Japanese 
colonisation (1910), urged Korean intellectuals to search for a 
balance between change and tradition, and between adaptation and 
preservation. In the quest, many intellectuals developed a modern 
Korean nationalism, and accepted many aspects of western culture. 
For women, western culture, particularly Christianity, and 
nationalism provided a new opportunity: Christian missionaries 
preached equality between the sexes before God, and established 
schools for women; and the nationalist movement supported women's 
rights.
2.3.3 Transmission of Christianity
During the nineteenth century, Christianity was introduced 
via China, and began to spread amongst women and deviant 
intellectuals. Despite its patriarchal nature, Christianity in 
Korea advanced women's status by propagating equality between 
nobles and commons, and between men and women in the eyes of God, 
as well as by denying church membership to non-monogamous males. 
For Korean women, the practice that the churches seated women in 
the chapel along with men was almost revolutionary. Although the
by respectable values, but even when they approximated such 
values, they did so for reasons which had a different rationale 
in each class.
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church instructed women to subordinate themselves to their 
husbands, at least it condemned polygamy. This was one of the 
most important factors that motivated women to step into the 
church (Kim Yung-Chung, 1976) . Like Protestantism in Europe, 
Christianity, regardless of Catholicism or Protestantism, was a 
revolutionary cultural movement in Korea. In this regard, it was 
not surprising that more women than men were attracted to 
Christianity (Min Kyungbae, 1972; Kim Yung-Chung, 1976; Park 
Suncheun, 1977)•30 The organization of female believers, "Women 
Believers' Association" (Nyu-Sinja Hoe) in the Catholic churches, 
also brought in women's organizational activities, which Korean 
women for centuries had not even dreamed of.
Most important of all, Christian churches supported women's 
education and women's organisations: the first school for women 
was established by a missionary; and the organisation of women 
believers in the Catholic churches provided women with the 
experience of organisational activities. Mrs. Mary F. Scranton, 
a medical missionary of the Methodist Church, established the 
first school for Korean girls. In 1877, Queen Min named it Ehwa 
Haktang. It developed into one of the finest educational 
institutions, and still remains the best university for women in 
Korea. Another school for girls named Yongdong Haktang began in 
1887, by Annie Ellers of the Northern Presbyterian Mission.
Many women educated in these Christian schools later opened 
schools for women, and played a leading role in the women's 
movement and anti-Japanese resistance. However, this group was
30 In the 1839 massacre of Catholics, for example, two-thirds 
of the victims were women (Park Suncheun, 1977, p.99).
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conservative in gender relations, and often submissive to Western 
powers in foreign relations. Their commitment to women's 
education stemmed from nationalist concerns, rather than women's 
rights. In their schools, they educated Korean women with a 
combination of Christian principles, national consciousness, and 
traditional womanly virtues (Lee Hyoje, 1992, p. 66), never 
questioning Korean womanhood.
2.3.4 Nationalist Support of Women's Rights
Korean nationalism had a dual character: one resistant and 
antagonistic to foreigners, the other reformist and popular in 
nature. The reformist movement advocated women's rights, 
particularly equal opportunities in education and social 
activities; but resistant nationalism overrode all the other 
causes, delimiting women's activism in subservience to the 
independence struggle.
Nationalism provided legitimacy for women's education. Most 
nationalist intellectuals perceived education as an ultimate 
national resource. Under the slogan of "Knowledge is power", they 
established many schools, public or private, registered or 
underground, not only for men, but also for women.
The Tokrip Hyuphoe (Independence Club), the most reformist 
and clearly nationalist group of intellectuals, delivered the 
strongest support for women's education. This club made it clear 
that men and women had equal rights in all spheres of social 
life. Its newspaper, Tokrip Sinmun (The Independence) , often 
published articles advocating sexual equality, and demanding 
equal educational opportunities for women. The Tokrip Hyuphoe
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perceived education as a prerequisite for sexual equality, and 
urged the government to establish public schools for women 
(Chandra, 1988; Shin Yong-Ha, 1990).
Under the influence of the Tokrip Hyuphoe many intellectuals 
joined the enlightenment movement, and opened a number of schools 
for women and men. Immediately before and after Japanese 
colonisation, all the newspapers run by nationalists emphasized 
the importance of women's education, for much the same reason as 
Mary Wollstonecraft demanded women's education: education can 
produce enlightened and strong mothers and wives, and hence, make 
the nation healthy and modern. In 1897 the first women's school 
run by a Korean woman was established, and in 1898, the first 
women's organisation presented a petition to open a public school 
for women (RCKW, 1992; Lee Hyoje, 1989). From 1905 to 1910, the 
number of women's schools was officially reported as up to 170 
(RCKW, 1992). Taking into account night schools and underground 
schools, the number must have been far larger. As a result, 
women's education in Korea was easily accepted as a principle 
after independence.
Nationalism also supported women's organisations. Many 
women's organisations emerged during colonisation, independently 
or under the auspices of nationalist organisations. The first 
women's organisation outside the churches, the Chanyang-Hoe 
(Meeting of Praise) , was born in support of women's education in 
1898.31 Following the Chanyang-Hoe, many women's organisations
31 When a small number of women announced their intention to 
form a meeting to establish a school for women, all national 
newspapers came to their aid, and named the meeting "Praise" 
(Chanysmg) . Its members had a variety of backgrounds, from the 
high nobility to Kisaeng. It first petitioned for the
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emerged, on local or national basis. Most of them pursued 
expanding women's education, and raising national consciousness. 
Women's organisational activities culminated in 1907, when a 
movement spread, on an unexpected scale, appealing to Koreans to 
pay off the national debt to Japan. Almost every women's 
organisation mobilised its members, and collected a large amount 
of jewellery and money that possibly constituted the only 
property at their disposal. Although the "Pay Off the National 
Debt" movement could not save the destiny of the nation, women's 
organisations through this movement expanded the range of their 
members, including not only women in the ruling class or Kisaeng, 
but also housewives of commoners or the lowest caste. This event 
opened a new era for women's activism, for the nascent women's 
organisations afterwards took deep roots in Korea, with pride and 
support (RCKW, 1992; Chung Yosup, 1971).
There could have been a bitter struggle for women's 
education had it not been supported by the nationalists. Also, 
women's activities outside the home might have been ridiculed and 
suppressed by men had they not exerted themselves so vigorously 
through nationalism. Yet, women's activities in the independence 
struggle were not a women's movement in its original sense. Nor 
was nationalist support of women's rights an outcome of a concern 
with sexual equality. The demands of reform and women's education 
arose from sheer nationalist necessity —  strengthening the
establishment of a public women's school, and held weekly 
meetings and open lectures for women's education. As most 
lecturers were members of the Tokrip Hyuphoe, its meetings and 
lectures were all about reform and independence. While the 
government, already under Japanese control, was indifferent to 
its demands, to a great extent because of its nationalist 
activities, it opened a school for women in 1899.
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nation. The women's movement was rather suffocated by 
nationalists, on the grounds that it would undermine the unity 
of national forces.
2.3.5 Women in the Communist Movement
Under Japanese colonial rule, many nationalists became 
communists, as happened in many other colonised countries. During 
this period, class oppression was so inextricably interwoven with 
national oppression that the oppressor was in any analysis the 
same, Japanese imperialism. In fact, in the early stages of 
communist development in Korea, communism was taken as a strategy 
for nationalist struggles during the 1920s (Suh Joong-Suk, 1985; 
Suh Dae-Sook, 1967; Lee and Scalapino, 1972).32 As in western 
European countries, communists in Korea pledged sexual equality 
through labour participation and economic independence of women. 
In practice, communists focused on organising trade unions, and 
induced many industrial disputes as part of the anti-imperialist 
struggle. In these organisations and disputes, women workers 
played a crucial, almost indispensable role.
32 Although many communists cherished a strong nationalist 
sentiment, the communist perception of the fundamental conflict 
did not coincide with nationalist one. In the ideology of 
nationalism, the nation is the source of all political and social 
power, and loyalty to the nation overrides all other allegiances 
(Smith, 1991, p. 74) ; but in the ideology of communism and 
socialism, class struggle should supersede all other causes of 
struggle. As Korean communists expanded their activities, and 
penetrated into the nascent working class, the communist emphasis 
on class struggle became stronger, making a discernible 
difference from nationalists. In Korea, communists centred on the 
labour movements; nationalists focused on the "Patriotic 
Enlightenment Movement”. In the Korean diaspora of Manchuria and 
Shanghai, communists were actively engaged in the small scale 
guerilla warfare in cooperation with the Chinese Reds; 
nationalists were inclined to diplomatic appeals to the Western 
superpowers and to supporting the exiled government in Shanghai.
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The Korean Labour Mutual Aid Association (Chosun Rodong 
Gongjehoe, 1920-1922) , the first nation-wide labour organisation, 
led Korean workers to organise trade unions and led to many 
industrial actions. Women participated in these unions and 
strikes. In the textile industries, in which the female 
proportion of the labour was about 80 percent, industrial 
disputes broke out with the highest frequency (RCKW, 1992, p. 
130). All-female industrial action was not rare either: strikes 
took place at the Kyungsung Rubber Production Company (1923) ; at 
Sunmi Production (1923-24); and a synchronised strike was 
organised in four rubber production companies (1923), and so on.
After the successful organisation of some trade unions, the 
first communist women's organisation was born in 1924, the Korean 
Women's League (Chosun Nyusung Dongwoohoe). It focused on 
organising female labour, moulding women into the working class, 
and enhancing women's economic conditions, in line with the 
communist theory of women's emancipation. During 1923-1927, the 
number of women's organisations grew up to 200, of which a 
quarter were inclined to communist ideals (RCKW, 1992, p. 142).
Although the communist movement contributed to expanding 
women's activities in Korea, it had many limitations. First of 
all, its activities were based on the Marxist framework of class 
oppression, not on gender relations. Men and women were 
instructed to struggle against capital, not each other. Although 
women's wages on average were half of men's (Lee Hyoje, 1989, p. 
94), the issue of wage differentials between the sexes was 
suppressed for the sake of the unity of the working class.
In addition to this common problem of the communist
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movement, there was the colonial question: national oppression 
was far more obvious than class oppression. The average wage of 
Japanese workers employed in Korea was, at their lowest, twice 
as high as that of Korean workers. An adult male Japanese worker 
earned twice as much as an adult male Korean, four times as much 
as an adult female Korean, and six times as much as a Korean 
minor (Ibid., p. 94). Further, in the case of industrial 
disputes, the Japanese military police was utterly brutal. The 
indifference of the colonial government to the conditions of 
Korean workers goes without saying.
Worst of all, the communist women's movement had very little 
impact on Korean society. In the 1920s, 90 percent of the male 
and 93 percent of the female labour force were engaged in 
agriculture; in the 1930s, 85 percent of males, 91 percent of 
females; and in the 1940s, 78 percent of males and 89 percent of 
females still remained in agriculture. Until 1940, the proportion 
of employees in the industry was less than 3 percent (Kang Ee- 
Soo, 1993, p. 174). While communist women were organising only 
3 percent of the Korean populace, a vast majority of women 
suffered from feudal relations and national oppression.
2.3.6 A Condemned Group of Feminists
Women's organisations increased in numbers and in their 
membership, but as a part of anti-colonial, anti-imperial 
struggles. Women's organisations under the communist line, like 
the European women's movement in the nineteenth century, were 
subject to class struggle; under the nationalist line, women's 
organisations were auxiliaries to the resistance struggle. In
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either case, women and men were, and had to be, in cooperative 
relations —  the concept of sexual oppression was ruled out.
Nevertheless, in the early 1920s, a minuscule number of 
women demanded sexual equality and women's emancipation. Host of 
them came from the upper or upper-middle class, and had 
experienced education abroad. They preferred "women's 
emancipation" to "women's rights." They rejected the traditional 
Rule of the Three Obediences, and the double standard of morality 
between men and women. The most notable feminist, Na Hyesuk, who 
was an artist and poet, called for women's independence from 
their fathers and husbands. One of her poems, the House of Dolls, 
described women as dolls for fathers and husbands, and urged 
women to recognise their own human dignity, not to be dolls 
(RCKW, 1992, p. 124). Another feminist, Kim Wonjoo, also demanded 
women's self-esteem and full development as individuals. She 
argued that "men, since the beginning of history, had treated 
women as lower animals, not as human beings" (RCKW, 1992, p. 124- 
126) . They recognised that women's emancipation required 
struggles against men, albeit implicitly.
However, they confronted utter rejection and suspicion since 
they were accused of undermining the nationalist movement. Their 
demands were despised as immoral, and their struggle as pro- 
Japanese. This national condemnation called forth a bitter end 
in which the feminists fell into personal misery and their 
demands withered away. Na Hyesuk was accused of being a pro- 
Japanese bourgeois, which was clearly untrue, and an adulterer, 
which was doubtful. The fact that Na Hyesuk had once been 
arrested and imprisoned for five months because of her activity
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in the independence struggle was almost always ignored. She ended 
her life as an abandoned homeless person in Paris.
Although they lacked a theoretical framework and strategies, 
these women the only group to question sexual oppression. The 
condemnation of this group eliminated the first chance for the 
development of an autonomous women's movement. The recognition 
of sexual oppression thereafter remained ever-missing in Korean 
women's activities.
2.3.7 Women's Activism: All for Independence
As the oppression from the colonial government became worse 
during the late 1920s, the national cause more and more dominated 
all social organisations. As a response, communists and 
nationalists sought joint warfare against Japanese colonialism, 
leading to a united front, the Singan-Hoe (1927-1931) . In 
accordance with the emergence of the Singan-Hoe, women's 
organisations also had an opportunity to combine the communist 
and liberal ideas of women's emancipation. The Geunwoo-Hoe (1927- 
1933) was a unified national organisation of women. Though the 
formation and decline of the Geunwoo-Hoe very much resembled that 
of the Singan-Hoe, it was an independent organisation of women.
The programme and purpose of the Geunwoo-Hoe was ambiguous, 
in order to avoid suspicion from the colonial government and 
obtain legal registration. Its ostensible goals were to 
strengthen women's cooperation and to protect Korean women's 
political, economic, and social interests. Its programme included 
the abolition of social and legal discrimination against women, 
the elimination of feudal custom and superstitions, women's right
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to choose their marriage, prohibition of public prostitution, 
prohibition of lower wages and night work for women, and the 
protection of female labour. These were advanced, and promising 
for the development of the Korean women's movement. Also, it 
consisted of all social groups: the communists and nationalists, 
the nobles and commoners, the educated and non-educated, and 
female workers and housewives. For these reasons, some Korean 
scholars today regard the Geunwoo-Hoe as the first moment of the 
modern Korean women's movement (Chung Yosup, 1971; RCKW, 1991).
The Geunwoo-Hoe was, however, more enthusiastic about the 
independence struggle than a women's movement. Its notable 
activities were obviously nationalist: investigating and
supporting the Gwangjoo Students' Movement (1929) in which a 
conflict between Japanese and Korean students developed into an 
anti-Japanese independence struggle; supporting and protecting 
the student movement that often set off national resistance and 
independence struggles (Sook-Myung Girls High School Strike, 
1927; Kyungsung Girls Trade School Strike, 1928; Junjoo Girls 
High School Students' Communist Union Incident, 1929) ; attempting 
demonstrations for independence (Chungjin, 1930; Seoul, 1930); 
and supporting Korean workers' industrial actions (Gwangjoo 
Textile Industry Strike, 1929; Pusan General Strike, 1929).
However, the Geunwoo-Hoe disappeared by 1933-1934, even 
without official dissolution. Its decline was first of all the 
outcome of its nationalist activities and the subsequent arrest 
of the leaders. Yet, the split between the communists and 
nationalists was equally responsible. After its disappearance, 
Korean women's activities lost their sense of direction, and fell
66
into depression until independence.
During colonisation, many women's organisations and 
activities were supported and legitimised by many Koreans, 
because "the forerunners of the women's movement rightfully 
(sic!) perceived national independence as the supreme end of 
their activities, more than their own emancipation and 
improvement" (Chung Yosup, 1971, p. 7). Like South African black 
feminists (McClintock, 1993), Korean women's activities were 
evaluated only by the extent of their nationalist commitment. 
Also, the overwhelming concern for independence held the women's 
movement at bay: what Koreans refer to as the history of the 
Korean women's movement is better described as the history of 
women's activism in the independence struggle. Women were 
fighters in the independence struggle and, at the same time, had 
to be wise mothers and submissive wives.
2• 4 Summary
Returning to the issues posed at the beginning of this 
chapter, it is clear that the dominant cultural heritage in 
Germany has been Christianity; and in Korea Confucianism. For 
German women, German culture delimited their sphere within the 
Three Ks; and Korean culture confined women within the home as 
in the Rule of the Three Obediences. Comparing the two cultural 
patterns, it is evident that the Korean one was more oppressive 
to women, restricting women's activities to the utmost. The 
German women's movement had been continuously developed, though
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not in a linear fashion, to enhance women's status in society. 
But in Korea, women's activities, when they developed, were 
overwhelmed by the national cause — i.e., Japanese colonisation, 
and the Independence struggle.
The thriving and decline of the German women's movement had 
provided a variety of experiences, which enabled women to respond 
respectively to the changing social relations. The acceptance of 
Nazi propaganda of the Three Ks, however, had been severely 
attacked as the "selfish" middle class collaboration with racist 
and sexist Nazism (Bridenthal et.al., 1984). The Three Ks 
toughened the traditional, unequal gender relations. Instead of 
changing the gender relations towards sexual equality, Nazi women 
apparently strengthened the ideas of women's subordination to 
men. Nevertheless, German women's experience enabled women to 
realize how much the class division within women had weakened 
their power. The experience of Nazism also proved that women 
could obtain power and control over their lives only by changing 
the existing cultural pattern of gender relations. After the fall 
of the Nazi regime, many women began to search for a new strategy 
for sexual equality.
While German women were partially able to choose their 
strategy, Korean women were crippled by harsher surroundings and 
Japanese colonisation, and their struggle towards sexual equality 
more circumscribed by the national cause. Although nationalism 
supported some women's rights, the national imperative of 
independence left no room to question the Rule of the Three 
Obediences. While German women "accepted" the Three Ks for their 
own perceived interest, Korean women had no alternative but to
68
fight with men for the national cause. Some forerunners of 
feminism were suspected of undermining the national solidarity, 
and condemned to death. It was not until the defeat of Japanese 
colonialism that Korean women began to advance full-scale sexual 
equality. Yet, the widely accepted necessity of women's education 
and the experience of organisational struggles, combined with the 
hope of rebuilding an independent nation state, enabled women to 
search for new gender relations.
After the partitions of Germany and Korea, the two communist 
regimes claimed that they would emancipate women. But since 
gender relations are the least susceptible to institutional 
change, the efforts made by the political regimes towards sexual 
equality would be hindered by the cultural impediments. 
Therefore, it would be expected that, ceteris paribus, gender 
relations in the two Koreas would remain less equal than in the 
former two Germanies after the partition — i.e., less equal in 
South Korea than in West Germany, and less equal in North Korea 
than in East Germany. The following four chapters examine 
whether, or to what extent, gender relations in the four 
countries have changed; in particular, whether, or to what 
extent, the communist regimes outdistanced the capitalist regimes 
in achieving sexual equality, overcoming the cultural impediments 
of the Three Ks and the Rule of the Three Obediences.
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CHAPTER THREE
WOMEN IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
3. 1 Introduction
After partition West Germany struggled to regain its 
sovereignty and control over its citizens as a new democratic 
state. Sovereignty was incomplete, and its political system was 
penetrated by external states (Katzenstein, 1987). Despite 
initial confusion and conflicts, West German people developed the 
"social market economy” (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) and 
parliamentary democracy as their principles of political and 
social life. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) soon won a 
reputation for political stability and miraculous economic 
recovery. But missing in the FRG was an ideological preoccupation 
with women's emancipation. While women in the East were fully 
participating in a buoyant labour market, women in the West were 
under pressure to return to full-time home-making (Kolinsky, 
1989; Helwig, 1987). The traditional notions of separate men's 
and women's spheres remained almost intact, and legal amendments 
towards sexual equality were slow and painstaking. However, in 
tandem with dramatic economic growth and the need for an expanded 
labour force, women's employment and social activities of all 
kinds increased steadily. So did women's voices. By comparison 
with the GDR, enhancing women's status in society was pursued by 
women themselves. This chapter examines how FRG women have 
struggled for sexual equality, without a regime-commitment.
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3.1.1 Politics and the Economy
The political structures of the two Germanies were initially 
very similar. Both were federal, with lower and upper houses of 
parliament (in the East, Volkskammer and Staatsrat; in the West, 
Bundestag and Bundesrat), and ceremonial Presidents in addition 
to the political leader (Prime Minister in the East and 
Chancellor in the West) . However, even in 1949, the systems were 
very different in practice. Whereas the SED in the East 
monopolised power, the parties in the West had to compete for 
parliamentary seats and to compromise with each other to form a 
coalition government.
Under the Basic Law, the only way to control the Federal 
government was to obtain as many seats as possible in the 
Bundestag through election. However, neither the CDU nor SPD 
managed to gain a working majority in the Bundestag, except in 
1957 when the CDU gained an absolute majority. Therefore, the 
Federal government has been formed through coalition and to a 
large extent has depended on compromise between the coalition 
partners. In this multiparty system, the ideological commitment 
of a party, if any, was narrowly circumscribed by the onus of 
attracting votes1 and by the coalition requirements.2 Therefore,
1 The two parties announced themselves to be ’’people's 
parties” (Volksparteien), and transformed their party programmes: 
the CDU claimed to hold a general Christian commitment and a 
concern with class conciliation (Smith, 1986, pp, 92-93); and the 
SPD adopted the Godesberg Programme in 1959, accepting private 
enterprise as the economic order (Turner, 1992, p. 130).
2 The CDU/CSU in the 1950-6Os and 1980s, and the SPD in the 
1970s had to rely on the FDP to form a government. Though the FDP 
narrowly escaped extinction and suffered twice from party splits 
(1956 and 1972), it has played an indispensable role in 
government composition: the FDP joined nine of the eleven 
governments formed during 1949-1989.
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a new programme, or a party's proposal for progressive change was 
modified during election campaigns and by party compromises.
FRG economic consensus was set by the philosophy of the 
11 social market economy" (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) .3 The social 
market economy enjoined a limited state with the responsibility 
of securing law and order, and providing a stable monetary 
system. Therefore, while the GDR controlled the economy with 
central planning, the FRG stimulated the freest possible 
competition in the market. Women's labour participation, too, was 
subject to the labour market.
3.1.2 Family Policies (Familienpolitik)
The parties in the FRG, except the Green Party, considered 
women's issues almost always in relation to the family. While the 
SED issued policies for women (Frauenpolitik), the CDU and SPD 
had family policies (Familienpolitik).
During the Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition (1949- 
1966) marriage and the family were regarded as social 
institutions which needed the special protection of the state 
(Textor, 1991). The Ministry of the Family (Bundesministerium 
fuer Familie) was established in 1953, and issued an "Eight-Point 
Programme" (Acht-Punkte Programm), which paid much attention to
3 As first spelled out by Ludwig Erhard in the Economic 
Council of Frankfurt, the social market economy implied a 
commitment to a capitalist system based on the operation of 
market forces, but was modified by an important social 
qualification (Barry, 1993) . It was based on the belief that 
private property and the price system were the best means of 
exploiting scarce resources for the maximisation of human 
welfare. The state had certain welfare responsibilities for the 
innocent victims of economic change, but not for a comprehensive 
social security system supported by general taxation. Instead, 
the FRG welfare system was predominantly insurance-based.
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families with children. In line with the government's 
reaffirmation of the family, many Germans looked forward to 
"normalising" their private life — i.e., husbands as 
breadwinners, and wives as full-time house-keepers and mothers. 
However, this expectation was not fully met: too many families 
were under the poverty line; war widows were not rare; and in the 
1950s, every second woman between the ages of twenty and thirty 
was not married (Kolinsky, 1989).
During the Social Democratic-Liberal coalition (1969-1982), 
the emphasis in family policies changed. The SPD considered the 
family as a voluntary organisation of individuals. The 
relationship between the married couple was assumed to be a 
partnership (Partnerschaft), and the responsibilities over 
children were to be shared by both parents. The government also 
regarded child welfare and the socialisation of education 
(Vergesellschaftung der Erziehung) as of great importance, and 
changed the Ministry for Family into the Federal Ministry for 
Youth, Family and Health (Bundesministerium fuer Jugend, Familie 
und Gesundheit: BMJFG).
In 1982, the Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition returned 
to government, once again emphasising the family as a social 
institution. However, the emergence of the Greens and the women's 
movement, along with the pressure from the then EEC, obliged the 
government to recognise the "woman question." The concept of a 
women policy (Frauenpolitik) came into use in government as an 
independent subject (BMFJ, 1992).4
4 Accordingly, the Ministry for Women and Youth 
(Bundesministerium fuer Frauen und Jugend) was conceived of in 
1989, and fully set up in 1991.
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Despite wavering public policies and staggeringly slow legaL 
reforms, FRG women continued to expand their space in society. 
By the end of the 1980s, women composed 40 percent of the labour 
force, 40 percent of university students, and around a quarter 
of the party membership, and made their voice heard.
3. 2 Women under the Law
The original constitutions of the FRG and GDR containei 
almost identical equal right provisions that men and women are 
to be equal under the law, and that no one is to be givei 
preference or be discriminated against because of sex. However, 
the two Germanies developed quite different ways to enforce these 
basic rights provisions. The GDR enacted radical, ani 
theoretically informed, laws to realise the principles of the 
constitution; the legislature of the FRG took some time to 
relieve the shock that rapid change might cause. By the end o? 
the 1980s, many equal right provisions of the constitution were 
fulfilled through legislation, but not all.
3.2.1 Equal Rights Promise in the Basic Law
Article 3 of the Basic Law makes explicit reference to the 
principle of equality. According to Article 3 (2), women have 
equal rights unconditionally. Another provision for equal rights 
in the Basic Law is Article 33 (2) , which declares that ever7 
German shall be equally eligible for any public office according 
to his aptitude, qualifications, and professional achievements.
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This provision, however, could not prevent the revised Civil 
Service Law of 1950 from retaining the discrimination against 
married women: "a female civil servant can be dismissed if he 
(sic) marries" (BG; S63 (1)).
The Basic Law provided that any previous law that 
contradicted the equal right provision "remains in force until 
it has been adjusted to the constitution, but no later than 31 
March, 1953" (Article 117 (1)). The Federal Constitutional Court 
declared on 18 December 1953 that the equal right provisions of 
the Basic Law were henceforth in force. However, the new Civil 
Code on equality of the sexes dated only from 1957, and became 
effective from 1958. Not until 1977, when the new Family Law came 
into force, had equality between the husband and wife within the 
family been provided. Legal reform towards sexual equality, 
therefore, demanded a great deal of energy and time of the 
women's movement.
3.2.2 Family Law
The Family Law composes Book Four of the German Civil Code 
(Buergerliches Gesetzbuch: BGB) . The original Civil Code was 
based on the assumption that wives were subject to their 
husbands. Every decision in the family was taken by the husband. 
With regard to children, the old Civil Code gave the father sole 
parental power over their persons and their property and made him 
their sole representative in legal transactions. An illegitimate 
child had the legal status of a legitimate child in respect to 
the mother, but not in respect to the father; it was not even 
deemed to be related by blood to the father. The mother had the
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right and the duty to take care of the child; but the mother 
could represent the child only if she was appointed guardian.
In 1957, the FRG adopted an Equal Rights Law (Gleichberecht- 
igungsgesetz) that transferred parental power to both parents "by 
mutual consent", and called on the parents to solve the 
differences of opinion which might arise between them (BGB 
§1626) . In the case of illegitimate children, the mother alone 
held parental authority (§1705-1712).
The major improvement in the 1957 Equal Rights Law lay in 
the economic relations within marriage: the property and
possessions of the spouses which were obtained during the 
marriage were declared joint property (§1416); each spouse was 
allowed to have and manage special property (§1417) and separate 
property (§1418) independently. In the case of widowhood or 
divorce, the wife had a right to her share, regardless of whether 
she had contributed to the family income by gainful employment 
(§136la). However, the guilt principle in the case of divorce 
remained, and the guilty party's claim to property was restricted 
(§1478) .5
Nevertheless, the Equal Rights Law did not effectively alter 
the sex roles in the family. The law was based on the notion that 
a woman should marry, and keep the household as a housewife and 
mother. Women's gainful employment was assumed to be
5 Under the old Civil Code, marriage could be dissolved only 
if at least one of the spouses was found guilty of severe 
matrimonial transgression such as adultery or desertion. After 
divorce, the guilty party should make support payment to the 
other party.
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exceptional.6 Therefore, the 1957 reform was taken to "advocate" 
that women be full-time housewives as the most suitable type of 
marriage (Kolinsky, 1989, p. 49; Berghahn and Fritzsche, 1991, 
p. 138; Helwig, 1982, p. 48).
Throughout the early 1970s, the Social Democratic-Liberal 
coalition government tried to revise the marriage and family law, 
but confronted strong opposition and controversies. Eventually, 
however, the First Act for Reform of Marriage and Family Law 
(Erstes Gesetz zur Reform des She- und Familienrechts: EheRG) was 
passed on 14 June 1976, and took effect on 1 January 1977.7 The
6 The Equal Rights Law did not modify Art. 1355-6 and 
Art.1360 of the Civil Code. Art.1356 stipulated that a wife could 
be gainfully employed, but only to the extent that such 
employment did not conflict with her marital and family 
obligations. It regarded the management of the household as the 
wife's individual responsibility. Also, Art.1360 made it 
obligatory for the wife to find gainful employment and contribute 
to family income if her husband's income was not enough to 
support the family. The married and family name continued to be 
the name of the husband (S1355) .
7 By this new Family Law, sections §1355-1360 of the Civil 
Code were rewritten as follows:
§1355 (1) . The spouses have a common family name (married name).
(2). On their wedding, the spouses declare to the 
authorities one of the spouses' family name which he or she 
was given by birth as their family name (married name). 
§1356 (1) . The spouses arrange the conduct of the household in 
mutual agreement. If only one of the spouses takes full 
charge of the household, then he or she alone assumes full 
responsibility for it.
(2) . Both spouses are entitled to be gainfully employed. 
In the choice and the performance of their gainful 
occupation, they are to give due consideration to the 
interests of the other spouse and of the family.
§1357 (1) . Each spouse is entitled to enter into business
linked to the needs of the family and also on behalf of the 
other partner.
§1360. The spouses are obliged to each other to adequately 
support the family by their work and personal means. If one 
of the spouses is left in charge of the household, then he 
or she meets his or her obligation to work for the support 
of the family as a general rule by taking care of the 
household.
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new law eliminated the concept of male head of household, and was 
based on the concept of partnership (Textor, 1991, p. 37; 
Kolinsky, 1989, pp. 49-50; Shaffer, 1981, pp. 28-33). According 
to the new Family Law, both spouses share the responsibilities 
in the household, and are equally entitled to take on paid 
employment (§1356). The married and family name can be chosen 
from either the husband's or wife's family name before marriage 
(§1355). If the gainfully employed wife alone supports the 
family, her husband is responsible for the household (§1360). 
Also the new Family Law abolished the guilt principle altogether, 
and allowed divorce on the ground of marital breakdown without 
a guilty sentence for either party.8 Equal rights within the 
family, which East German women obtained more than a decade 
earlier (1965), were finally granted.
In 1982, the Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition returned 
to government, and took several legislative steps to reaffirm 
motherhood. In 1984, the Bundestag passed a law to set up a 
"Mother and Child Foundation".9 Other laws improved tax 
reductions for single parents, raised child allowances, and 
reintroduced child benefit for unemployed adolescents up to the 
age of 21. In a 1986 legislation, housewives acquired pension
8 Marriage can be dissolved after a one-year separation if 
there is mutual consent, or a three-year separation without 
consent. Each partner is responsible for her and his own 
maintenance after divorce unless one partner has custody of 
children, can not find employment, or could not complete study 
or training because of marriage, or is disabled. All pensions and 
other entitlements acquired during marriage are divided, no 
matter which partner had earned through employment.
9 It was to receive an annual endowment of DM500 million in 
order to extend financial and institutional support to pregnant 
women in need.
78
rights in relation to the number of their children and their 
previous employment. However, women who never worked before 
childbirth were not included in the pension entitlement. Though 
much limited in scope, the legislation made a turning point in 
the recognition of child-rearing as a contribution which society 
should reward (Kolinsky, 1989, p. 69) . Ironically, from a 
conservative perspective, the legislation widened the scope of 
maternity leave to include fathers as well as mothers. Moreover, 
the legislation granted a longer additional time off (up to ten 
months in 1986/87, and up to twelve months from 1988) and 
increased payment to mothers or fathers, following the 
recommendation by EC directives.
3.2.3 Labour Law
In the FRG's market economy, the state did not guarantee 
employment to anyone; nor was there a general duty or obligation 
for anyone to work. Although the SPD was still concerned about 
the goals of the socialist women's movement, in particular the 
belief that sexual equality rested on women's gainful employment, 
it was by no means at liberty to effect a thorough reform. Most 
legislation on women's employment was concentrated on the 
protection of working mothers and pregnant women. Many of the 
laws simply place legal restrictions on women's employment; 
others provide for special privileges extended for their 
protection.10
10 For instance, the Law for the Protection of Working 
Mothers (Mutterschutzgesetz: MuSchG, 1952, 1979) meticulously
regulated pregnant women's or nursing mothers' employment. 
Pregnant women or nursing mothers could not be employed on jobs 
where they would be exposed to harmful effects of health
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Fundamental for the equality of the sexes in employment is 
the concept of equal pay for equal work. In the FRG, the 
principle was supposedly included in Article 3 of the Basic Law. 
However, since Article 9 of the Basic Law guarantees the autonomy 
of the two sides of industry — employers and employees—  and 
their right to co-determine the conditions of work and pay, the 
wage settlements assumed reduced rates for women. In 1955, the 
Federal Labour Court declared this practice unconstitutional, and 
suggested that wage groups should be specified in detail, and pay 
awarded accordingly. In response, the industries classified many 
posts, which were mainly occupied by women, as lower wage groups 
(Leichtlohngruppen) . Normally men's work was assigned to a higher 
wage group. The constitutional command of equality was thus 
circumvented.
In 1980, facing heavy pressure from the European Commission 
and the European Court of Justice,11 the FRG responded with a 
legislative package: the Labour Law to Comply with the European
endangering materials or rays, dust, gases, vapour, heat, cold, 
dampness, strong vibrations, or noise, or on jobs where they 
might be required to lift regularly over 5 kg, or occasionally 
over 10 kg of weight without mechanical aid, and so on. They were 
not allowed to work overtime, nights and holidays. This law also 
allowed women maternity leave, at full pay, during six weeks 
before and eight weeks after delivery. However, maternity leave 
was considerably shorter than in the GDR, which provided women 
with one year (Klndjahr) .
11 In 1975, the European Commission advised member states to 
revise their legislation to guarantee equal pay to men and women. 
One year later, the Commission requested member states to put the 
principle of equal treatment into practice and ensure that women 
and men enjoyed equal access to employment, training and 
promotion, and that working conditions were the same for both 
sexes. In 1978, the Commission ordered member states to commence 
the legislative process needed to guarantee sexual equality in 
all aspects of social security, notably insurance cover and 
pensions. Finally, the European Court of Justice opened 
proceedings against the FRG government in 1979.
80
Community Provisions (Gesetz ueber die Gleichbehandlung von 
Maennern und Frauen am Arbeitsplatz und ueber die Erhaltung von 
Anspruechen bei Betriebsuebergangz EG Anpassungsgesetz) . 
According to this lav, articles 611 and 613 of the Civil Code 
were rewritten. Equal treatment of men and women becomes 
obligatory for all aspects of appointment, promotion and 
dismissal; should a dispute arise, the employer has to prove that 
discrimination has not taken place (BGB §611a). All positions 
have to be open to men and women, and all advertising of posts 
has to remain gender-neutral (§611b). The principle of equal pay 
for equal work is once more confirmed, and the intentions of the 
Treaty of Rome are to be incorporated into the FRG legislation 
(§612b).
3.2.4 The Penal Code: Crimes against Women and Abortion
The German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch: StGB) distinguishes 
the crime of rape (§177) from the crime of forcing sexual 
intercourse (§178) . The crime of rape is concluded by the 
attacker's insuperable violence against a woman, while the crime 
of forcing sexual intercourse does not necessarily include 
violence and a female victim. Teubner (1988) critcised §177-178 
of the StGB for three reasons: first, §177 excludes marital rape 
by the spouse; second, §177 gives an impression that the absence 
of consent does not count unless there is severe violence or 
intimidation accompanied; and third, both §177-178 imply that 
rape means penile-vaginal penetration, excluding all other sorts 
of sexual assaults. There is no other provision related to crimes 
against women in the StGB.
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The Penal Code restricts abortion (Schwangerschaftsabbruch) 
severely in §2 1 8 .12 The §218 turned many women into illegal 
aborters, and caused unnecessary pains for them.13 As a result, 
§218 gave a new impetus to the women's movement. In 1971, the 
magazine Der Stern published a letter in which 347 women, among 
them well-known figures, all publicly announced "I have aborted.” 
In an another magazine, Der Spiegel, 329 doctors signed a letter 
that they had performed abortions, of course, illegally. In March 
1972 a women's congress was organised, which had an unexpected 
attendance of about 400 women. Mass demonstrations and a flood 
of publications on the abortion issue followed. Finally, the 
government, then the Social Democratic-Liberal coalition, worked 
very seriously for a repeal. In 1974, an abortion law was passed 
in the Bundestag against strong conservative opposition. It 
allowed women the right to interrupt their pregnancy at will 
during the first three months of pregnancy. However, in 1975, the 
Federal Constitutional Court declared this law unconstitutional. 
Facing the defeat, the SPD-FDP coalition introduced another more 
moderate law. In 1977, an amendment for abortion was accepted by 
the Bundestag, which allowed abortion by specific indications
12 The German Penal Code permitted abortions only when there 
was a "medical indication" — i.e., if, in the opinion of 
qualified physicians, continuation of the pregnancy would 
seriously endanger the life of the mother.
13 In 1969 alone, the number of illegal abortions was 
estimated to have been between 350,000 and one million (Kaplan, 
1992, p. 114). Katherina Focke, Minister for Youth, Family, and 
Health (1972-76), advocated the repeal of "the infamous Art.218" 
which "brought sorrow, desperation, and misery to countless 
German women" (Shaffer, 1981, p. 52).
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(Indication solution: Indikationsloesung) .14 The so-called
"indication solution" was very similar to the pre-1972 abortion 
law of the GDR. Thus a social, ethical, or medical indication 
could represent an allowable indication for an abortion. However, 
even in cases where the existence of social indication was 
certified, pregnant women in Southern Germany frequently faced 
difficulties in finding a physician, or a hospital, willing to 
perform the abortion.
By the 1980s, the laws concerning women in the two Germanies 
became almost identical, except on the matter of abortion. The 
process until then had formed a stark contrast. In the GDR, the 
SED-controlled government took initiatives in legal reforms. In 
the FRG, individuals took suits to the court, made an appeal to 
the parties, or agitated against the laws. The Federal 
Constitutional Court proved itself a guardian of the 
Constitution, but not a protector of women's rights. The European 
Commission and its directives were more influential in changing 
laws in the FRG. After faltering progress, women came to obtain 
equal rights, at least on paper.
14 The indication solution was vulnerable to further, and 
possibly reactionary, amendments. The threat became real when the 
amendment came under attack by the CDU. Also in 1979, the extreme 
right politician, and well-known misogynist, Joseph Strauss of 
the CSU was put up as a candidate for the federal Chancellor. 
This stirred women from the various factions of women's 
organisations into action. In the 1979 election, the CDU/CSU was 
defeated by the SPD.
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3. 3 Women in Education
As the Basic Law guaranteed the free development of the 
personality (Article 2), there was not a monolithic ideological 
object of education in the FRG like that of "moulding a socialist 
personality" in the GDR. Nor was there a specific programme for 
furthering women's educational opportunities. While GDR laws 
amounted to a thorough-going effort to legislate for the 
educational furtherance of women, there was no comparable law in 
the FRG. Only Article 3 of the Basic Law supposedly provides the 
principle of equal opportunity of education for all citizens 
irrespective of sex.
Education policy in the FRG was affected by many factors: 
by the parents' rights; by the Court; by party politics; and by 
external pressure from the European Commission.
3.3.1 Education System
The entire FRG education system was under close supervision 
of the Laender {Grundgesetz, Article 7, (l))15, and most schools 
and all institutions of higher education were state
15 In 1953, the Federal government agreed with the ministers 
of education, or culture, of the Laender and thereby established 
an Educational Advisory Committee, so as to coordinate Laender's 
educational policies. After the "Education Crisis" of the 1960s 
(Fishman and Martin, 1987, pp. 101-108; Kolinsky, 1989, p. 100), 
this Committee developed in 1965 and 1970 into the Educational 
Council (Deutsche Bildungsratz DBR) and Educational Planning and 
Research Commission (Bund-Laender-Kommission fuer Bildungsplanung 
und Forschungsfoederung: BLK) . The BLK in 1973 agreed the
Comprehensive Education Development Plan (Bildungsgesamtplan) 
which provided long-term educational planning goals and a clear 
picture of FRG education system (Kloss, 1990, pp. 140-142).
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establishments until the 1980s.16 Since the Basic Law stated 
explicitly that "the care and upbringing of children are the 
natural rights of the parents and a duty" (Article 6 (2)),
parents had the right to decide the course of education for their 
children.
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Figure 3.1 Education System
School attendance is compulsory from the ages of six to 
eighteen, for twelve years, during which full-time attendance is 
required for nine years and part-time attendance at vocational
16 Since the 1980s there are a small number of private 
universities.
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school thereafter. Primary school (Grundschule) lasts four years, 
in Berlin six. After that, pupils attend one of the junior 
secondary schools (Hauptschule), intermediate schools 
(Realschule) , or grammar schools (Gymnasium). The fifth and sixth 
school years are an "orientation stage” (Foerderstufe or 
Orientierungsstufe), when children and their parents can revise 
their choice of school.
Until the 1960s two thirds of children were educated in 
Volksschule;17 a tenth in Realschule; and a seventh in Gymnasium. 
However, along with improved living standards and changing 
attitudes towards higher education, the mapping of schools has 
changed: by 1989, a larger number of pupils were educated in the 
Gymnasium (37%) , than in the Hauptschule (31%) or the Realschule 
(20%) . The change was even more dramatic for girls. 
Traditionally, many parents considered it luxurious to educate 
girls beyond basic literacy and numeracy. However, the FRG 
experienced a ’'miracle of girls" (Fraeuleinwunder) in the 1970s 
(Kolinsky, 1989), and the proportion of female students in 
Gymnasium increased rapidly (Figure 3.2)18.
Anyone who left full-time general education, and did not 
attend a full-time vocational school or college was required to 
attend a vocational school (Berufsschule). Part-time vocational 
school pupils were required to attend on-the-job training (dual 
system) . Although a majority of young people went to the dual 
system, the shortage of training places in trade or industry led
17 In the 1960s, the old Volksschule was redefined into an 
elementary part, Grundschule, and a secondary part, Hauptschule.
18 Sources: StBA, Datenreport, 1983, 1987, 1990.
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Figure 3.2 The Proportion of Female Pupils in Secondary 
Education
many school leavers to full-time courses in one of specialised 
vocational schools (Berufsfachschule), senior vocational schools 
(Fachoberschule), extended vocational schools 
(Bernfsaufbauschule), or technical schools (Fachschule). More 
women than men entered full-time vocational schools, which 
offered less attractive prospects and did not teach the full 
range of qualifications (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Proportion of Female Participants
in Vocational Education (%)
Year Beruf-
schulen
Berufsfach 
-schulen
Berufsauf
bauschulen
Fachober
schulen
Fachschule
1955 44 71 34
1965 44 63 27 60
1975 40 66 25 33 57
1980 40 66 29 37 65
1985 42 66 30 36 66
1989 37 65 25 37 54
* Note: Proportion calculated by the numbers of total and female trainees in 
StBA, Statiatischea Jahrbuch 1957, 1967, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1990.
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A survey of 1981, repeated in 1985, explained why more women 
took full-time training courses than men: they were less likely 
to be offered in-plant training. In 1981, male trainees applied 
on average six times before they were offered a place; but female 
trainees had to apply eight times. This gender gap in getting a 
training place was aggravated in 1985. In 1985, male trainees 
applied seven times before they were admitted, female trainees 
thirteen times (Schweikert, 1989, p. 46) . The low acceptance rate 
for women in the in-plant training courses confined women to a 
narrow spectrum of work.
3.3.2 Women in Higher Education
In the FRG, as in the GDR, institutions of higher education 
were tuition-free. However, there were substantial differences 
in financial assistance and special aid to female students. In 
the FRG, the parents of most students paid at least part of the 
considerable living and study material expenses connected with 
a college education. This was disadvantageous for women and, in 
particular, for mothers who needed child-care facilities and 
extra money. The birth of a child was one of the main reasons why 
female students interrupted their studies much more frequently 
than men (Shaffer, 1986, p. 131) . There was no obligation on 
colleges and universities to minister to the particular needs of 
student-mothers.
Nevertheless, along with the Fraeuleinwunder, women's 
proportion in tertiary eduction — in colleges (Hochschulen), 
technical colleges (Fachhochschulen), and universities
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Figure 3.3 Proportion of Female Students by College Type
(Universitaeten)—  increased as well (Figure 3.3).19 However, 
there still remained differences in the subjects taken by men and 
women. Women tended to concentrate in the arts, medicine, 
language and literature, and pedagogy; men in electronics, 
mechanics, engineering, and information technology and computer 
science. Women composed 74 percent of students in English; 70 
percent in German; and 63 percent in psychology (Statistisches 
Jahrbuch 1990, p. 370) . By contrast, men composed 97 percent of 
students in electronics, mechanics and telecommunications; 90 
percent in physics and astronomy; and 89 percent in industrial 
relations.
Unfortunately, 'women's subjects' do not match with the 
changing demand of the labour market. Also, the number of 
university or college graduates is expected to rise to 3.7
19 Sources: "Studierende an den Hochschulen" in StBA,
Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1957-1990.
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million by the turn of the century. Though higher education has 
a bright prospect in the labour market, the recent trend towards 
graduate unemployment seems the likely scenario for the future. 
Therefore, the place of FRG women in higher education and their 
bids for advanced vocational qualifications have been
overshadowed by the mismatch between preferences and career
opportunities in the current economic environment.
3. 4 Women at Work
By the 1980s, the FRG had made progress in changing its laws 
and attitudes, albeit belatedly, towards equal rights and 
opportunities for women. Women were legally guaranteed to be 
treated equally in employment. The principle of equal pay for 
equal work was officially in force. Women had caught up with men 
as far as participation in all levels of the education system was 
concerned. In appearance, women had equal rights, and competence, 
to choose whether and where they work, and under what conditions. 
In practice, women's choice was still restricted by the labour
market. The labour market was segregated in line with sex:
women's access to certain occupations was limited; their status 
in employment was lower than men's; their chances to be promoted 
were slim. Worse, their earnings were far less than men's even 
when they had equal education and qualification. Nevertheless, 
women have expanded their economic activities, and cultivated 
self-confidence at work.
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3.4.1 Women in the Labour Force
The proportion of women in the labour force has changed less 
than 4 percentage points in four decades, remaining around 36-39 
percent. The temptation is to suggest that FRG women have been 
less active, or more reluctant, to participate in the labour 
market than their eastern sisters. However, at least three 
explanatory factors need to be taken into account. First, unlike 
in the GDR, there was no strong legal and political support for 
women's equal opportunity in the FRG, leaving aside the weak 
ideological pledge for women's emancipation. Secondly, since the 
1970s, West European societies have entered the 'post-industrial' 
era, and some socio-economic forecasters predicted an end of the 
'working society' with employment receding in importance for the 
individual (Kolinsky, 1989). For men, participation in the labour 
market has fallen. While the proportion of gainfully employed men 
between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five has fallen by 13 
percentage points, the proportion of women has been rising, from 
41 percent to 50 percent by the 1980s (Table 3.2).
Finally, whereas the GDR suffered from shortages of labour, 
the FRG suffered the opposite since the 1970s. In the mid-1980s, 
the unemployment rate was 9 percent, and women's unemployment 
rate was higher, over 10 percent. The so-called silent reserve 
(Stille Reserve) who were not registered as unemployed and did 
not appear in the statistics, but were looking for work was much 
larger.
91
Table 3.2 Women in the Labour Force
Year Proportion of women 
among the Employed
Women's Labour 
Participation Rate 
Aged 15-65
Men's Labour 
Participation Rate 
Aged 15—65
1950 36 41 94
1963 36 47 91
1973 37 48 87
1981 38 48 83
1985 38 47 84
1989 40 50 81
* Note 1). Calculation based on "Bevoelkerung nach dem Alter", "Erwerbstaetige
nach Altersgruppen und S tel lung im Beruf”, and *Wohnbevoelkerung und 
Erwerbspersonen nach Stellung im Beruf" in StBA, Statistlsches 
Jahrbuch, 1957; 1967; 1975; 1982; 1987; 1990.
* Note 2). Labour Participation Rate = (The Employed + The Recognised
Unemployed)/Working Age Population * 100 (in Percentage)
Considering these factors, the growth of women's labour 
participation rate appears rather impressive. In this light, it 
is of importance that many young women regarded work as 
indispensable. In a survey of 1985, to the question "if you had 
enough money, could you imagine a life without work (Arbeit)?" 
68 Percent of women and 60 percent of men answered "no" 
(Schweikert, 1989, p. 47). There were similar surveys, and 
similar outcomes, in 1979 and 1989 (Shaffer, 1981; BMFJ, 1992). 
More women than men among the young generation highly valued 
their work. Whether they were welcome in the work place, or 
whether they received rewards appropriate to their work, women 
continuously expanded their places in the FRG economy.
3.4.2 Vocational Qualifications of Women
Although young women on average had better marks in their 
school-leaving certificates than men, they ended up in a narrower 
spectrum of vocational training courses: 57 percent of women
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crowded in 10 out of 370 occupational training courses, while 36 
percent of men did so (Table 3.3).
Table 3.3 Distribution of Trainees in the Top
Ten Occupational Courses, Women and Men (1989)
Women's Courses Number of % in total
Female Trainees Female
in the Course Trainees
Office Worker 59,397 8.9
Hairdresser 51,814 7.7
Small Shopkeeper 46,657 7.0
Doctor's Receptionist 42,178 6.3
Industrial Saleswoman 40,012 6.0
Saleswoman in Food Industry 38,393 5.7
Dentist's Nurse 29,689 4.4
Bank Clerk 28,581 4.3
Buyer 24,873 3.7
Large/International Trade Assistant 21,273 3.2
Subtotal 382,867 57.3
Total Female Trainees 669,325 100.0
Men's Courses Number of % in total
Male Trainees Male
in the Course Trainees
Motor-Vehicle Mechanic 69,151 7.8
Electronic Installer 45,818 5.2
Industrial Mechanic 35,174 4.0
(Machine/System Technic)
Carpenter 28,017 3.2
Large/International Trade Assistant 27,962 3.2
Industrial Mechanic (Factory) 26,956 3.1
Bank Clerk 25,448 2.9
Painter 25,212 2.9
Small Shopkeeper 24,029 2.7
Gas/Water Engineer 24,106 2.7
Subtotal 332,282 37.6
Total Male Trainees 883,768 100.0
* Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1991, p. 392.
Among the ten largest occupational training courses, only 
three — small shopkeepers, bank clerks, and large and 
international trade assistants—  were shared by both men and
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women. Women's 'preferences' were apparent in nursing, caring, 
and assisting jobs, which were occupations with a higher 
unemployment rate after training, or occupations with more 
unfavourable working conditions (Schweiker, 1989).
In order to widen the narrow spectrum of women's vocational 
training opportunities, the Social Democrat-Liberal coalition 
government launched an initiative "Girls in Men's Jobs” (Maedchen 
in Maennerberufe) in 1976. The programme focused on those fields 
where traditionally 80 percent or more of the trainees had been 
men. As an incentive to take girls, the government covered the 
cost to companies of female trainees in a 'male' field. In 1976, 
2 percent of female apprentices in the dual system were trained 
in the 'male' fields; ten years later, so were 8 percent of women 
(Frauen in der BED, 1989) . Though the proportion of women in 
'male fields' is still very low, the degree of change —  
quadrupled in proportion—  seems significant.
As far as qualifications were concerned, the young women of 
the "Fraeuleinwunder" were well prepared for employment. In 1989 
women aged between twenty and thirty reached a near parity with 
men in vocational qualifications (Figure 3.4).20 Though both men 
and women have improved their qualifications during four decades, 
women's advancement has been more evident. Less than 40 percent 
of women aged fifty and above were qualified as skilled workers, 
while 60 percent of younger women were so qualified.
The driving force towards higher education was the 
expectation of better opportunities in employment and living
20 Source: ”Bevoelkerung im April 1989 nach Altersgruppen und 
Bildungsabschluss” in StBA, Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1991, p.383.
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Figure 3.4 Vocational Qualification by Age
conditions. Higher educational and vocational qualifications, in 
turn, motivated women to work, regardless of age. Women with 
higher qualifications were least likely to give up their work, 
and keenest to resume it if they did take a career-break 
(Kolinsky, 1989, p. 157; Shaffer, 1981). Despite these improved 
qualifications and enhanced expectations, however, women 
confronted in the labour market the invisible barriers that 
severed men's and women's work.
3.4.3 Women in Employment: Segregated Labour Market
In 1989, the total labour force in the FRG numbered close 
to 28 million; and just over 10 million were women. Though the 
proportion of female employees in the labour force grew little, 
the structure of women's employment changed more. In the 
immediate post-war era one in three women were engaged in
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agriculture; one in four worked in manufacturing and industry. 
In 1989, more than a third of employed women were working in the 
service sector. Also, women's status in employment has improved. 
In the 1950s, less than 8 percent of public sector employees 
(Beamte) were women. In 1989, one in every five women was running 
her own business; another one in five women was serving in the 
public sector. However, there remained stereotyping of men's and 
women's work and segregation in the labour market. The 
segregation of the labour market has four patterns: segregation 
by economic sectors; by status; by occupations, horizontally and 
vertically; and by part-time and full-time jobs.
First, women were well recruited in service and 
manufacturing sectors (Table 3.4). The segregation by economic 
sectors helped keep the labour market flexible. When the economy 
was prosperous, women were welcomed in almost every economic 
sector; in recession, however, female workers were more likely 
to be ousted than men where both sexes were competing.
The segregation of women by employed status is displayed in 
Figure 3.5.21 Most women were employed as low-paid 
workers (Ar be iter) ,22 and made up half of the work force. 
Otherwise, women joined the family business, while men tended to 
run their own business. Although the proportion of women in the 
public sector (Beamte) was growing, women's low proportion in the 
self-employed, and over-representation in family business sector
21 Sources : "Erwerbstaetige nach der Stellung im Beruf” in 
StBA, Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1958-1991.
22 The concept of worker (Arbeiter) here refers to unskilled 
or semi-skilled worker. In German, Angestellte refers to blue- 
colour employee, and Beamte to public sector employee.
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suggest that there was a 'glass ceiling' in big business. 
Table 3.4 Women's Employment by Economic Sectors
Women's Proportion in Each Economic
1950
Sector
1960
(%)
1970 1980 1989
Total 36 37 36 38 39
Domestic/Non-paid 52 84 70 63 61
Services 51 61 59 60 60
Commerce 42 54 54 56 56
Finance/Banking 44 44 48 47
Agr/Past/Fishery 55 54 53 49 44
Regional Service 23 24 28 32
Industry 29 32 30 29 27
Transport/Communication 10 16 17 21 24
Energy/Mining 4 5 7 10 11
Construction 3 3 6 8 10
* Note: Calculation based on "Erwerbstaetige nach Wirtachaftzweige* in StBA, 
Bevoalkerung und Wirtachaft 1872-1972, p. 146; and Statiatiachea 
Jahrbuch, 1980; 1990.
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The occupational segregation between the sexes in its 
horizontal form leads women to a narrow spectrum of choice; in 
1989, 67.2 percent of women employees were concentrated in ten 
occupations (Table 3.5).
More than a fourth of female employees were office 
assistants; one in eight women were large or small shop 
assistants. Men's and women's occupations were almost 
categorically differentiated. Further, 'men's occupations' had 
a stronger power of exclusion than women's. It has been argued 
that horizontally segregated, sex-typed occupations are least 
susceptible to change; once an occupation has been sex-typed, 
normative and other forces operate to maintain segregation 
(Murgatroyd, 1985).
Vertical segregation includes both the recruitment of women 
into permanent lower-level occupations and the exclusion of women 
from the occupations higher up in the hierarchy of occupations. 
A women's congress on economic power and women (1988, Berlin) 
established that less than 1 percent of women employees held key 
positions in private companies (Kaplan, 1992, p. 125).
In another pattern of sexual segregation, women composed 
nearly nine out of every ten part-timers. In 1989, one in every 
three employed women was working part-time; three fifths of them 
were working less than 20 hours a week (Table 3.6). For women, 
part-time work has one clear advantage: combining the family and 
employment: 82 percent of total female part-timers were married. 
Also, three in four women who would return after a career break 
preferred to work part-time (Kolinsky, 1989, p. 174).
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Table 3.5 Top Ten Occupations of Women and Men, 1984/89
Women's Occupations 1984 1989
% in Female % in the % in Female % in the
Labour Occupa­ Labour Occupa­
Force tion Force tion
Office Worker/Assistant 22 66 24 68
Sales Assistant 13 62 12 62
Health Care (Nurse) 8 86 8 85
Cleaner 5 84 4 84
Agriculture Worker 5 79 3 79
Data Processing 4 60 4 53
Teacher 4 48 4 48
Social Worker 3 82 4 80
Bank Clerk 3 43 3 43
Guest Service 3 61 2 62
Subtotal 68 25 67 21
Total Female Employees 100 38 100 39
Men's Occupations 1984 1989
% in Male % in the % in Male % in the
Labour Occupa­ Labour Occupa­
Force tion Force tion
Office Worker/Assistant 7 34 7 32
Land-Transport 5 97 5 96
Sales Assistant 5 38 5 38
Metal Worker 5 98 5 98
Electrician 4 92 4 94
Technician 4 93 5 93
Mechanic 4 94 3 96
Accountant/Auditor 3 79 4 79
Engineer 3 97 3 95
Builder/Constructor 3 99 2 99
Subtotal 42 65 42 62
Total Male Employees 100 62 100 61
* Note 1). The Ten Occupations of women and men are selected and ordered by
1984 basis.
* Note 2). Calculation based on "Erwerbstaetige in Juli 1984 nach Berufs-
gruppen", Statiatiachea Jahrbuch 1985, p. 104; and "Erwerbstaetige im 
April 1989 nach Berufsgruppen”, Statiatiachea Jahrbuch 1991, p. 123.
Despite its popularity among women, married women in 
particular, part-time work provides less job security, fewer 
promotion chances, and smaller pensions. It has consolidated the 
gender gap in the labour market and left the position of women
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at the less favoured end of status, prospects, and pay. By 1989, 
the gender gap between part-time and full-time workers became the 
most powerful pattern of the segregation of German labour market.
Table 3.6 Women in Part-Time Work
Year Weekly Working Hours
up to 20 Hsn 21-39 Hs2* 40-42 Hs3) 43 Hs more4*
Women's Proportion in Employees by Working Hours (%)
1966 68 50 70 25
1975 70 71 31 26
1980 90 88 31 26
1985 89 88 33 26
1989 88 85 32 23
Proportion in Total Female Work Force (%)
1966 12 23 31 33
1975 17 17 48 15
1980 16 14 55 12
1985 16 18 46 10
1989 17 13 53 8
* Note 1). In the case of 1966, up to 24 hours per week.
* Note 2). In the case of 1966, 24 to 42 hours per week.
* Note 3). In 1966, 42 to 45 hours per week; in 1989, 21 to 35 hours per
week.
* Note 4). In the case of 1966, 45 hours and above per week; in 1989, 36
hours and above per week.
* Sources: StBA, "Strukturdaten ueber Erwerbspersonen und Erwerbstaetige",
Statiatiachea Jahrbuch 1967; 1976; 1982; 1987; 1990.
3.4.4 Women'a Earnings
Although women extensively participate in the labour market, 
and although the Labour Law to comply with the European Community 
Provisions (EG Anpassungsgesetz) demands equal pay for equal 
work, women earn less money, have less prestige and less chances 
of promotion, even when they are engaged in the same work. For 
instance, female Arbeiter on average drew only 70 percent of 
their male colleagues' wage; and female Angestellte received less
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than 65 percent of males workers' salary (Table 3.7) a23 On 
average, German women's earnings were lower than men's; while a 
quarter of employed men received more than 3000 DM as net monthly 
income, so did 8.7 percent of employed women (Table 3.8). The 
largest proportion of women were distributed in the lowest income 
group. While the income disparity among men was reducing, the 
disparity between the sexes was growing.
Table 3.7 Average Earnings of Full-Time Arbeiter and
Angestellte in the Industry and Trade Sector (in DM)
Year Average Wage of Arbeiter Average Salary of
(Weekly) { Angestellte (Monthly)
Men Women B/A [ Men Women B/A
(A) (B) (%) (A) (B) (%)
I960 134 79 59 j 714 391 55
1970 294 180 61 ! 1,511 887 59
1980 597 404 68 | 3,377 2,129 63
1985 705 494 70 j 4,158 2,648 64
1989 811 571 70 I 4,824 3,108
X
64
* Source: Frauen in der BRD (1992) * PP- 50-51.
Table 3.8 Distribution of Monthly Net Income Group (%)
Income Groups 1981 1985 1989
(DM) Men Women Men Women Men Women
under 1000 10 44 10 37 9 30
1000-1800 40 44 28 44 18 41
1800-2500 31 9 35 13 36 20
2500-3000 7 2 9 3 12 4
3000-4000 7 1 10 2 13 3
4000 above 5 1 8 1 12 2
Employees 15,624 9,020 15,015 9,047 15,792 9,783
(1,000)
* Sources: StBA, "Erwerbstaetige nach Stellung und Nettoeinkommensgruppen", 
Statiatiachea Jahrbuch, 1982; 1987; 1990.
23 In the public sector, too, most women are found in the 
lower income class. While 18.9 percent of male Beamte earned 
4,000 DM and above a month, only 6.7 percent of female Beamte 
earned likewise in 1989 (Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1990, p. 99) .
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In a 1991 survey, 81 percent of women answered that women 
could perform as well as men in the 'men's occupations' 
(Maennerberufe); 82 percent of women recognised that women did
not receive equal pay for the same work as men; and 76 percent 
of women speculated that women needed more competence and better 
performance than men to reach the same top position (BMFJ, 1992, 
pp. 96-106). Also, 87 percent of women regarded women's economic 
independence from men as important, or very important, even when 
they were married (BMFJ, 1992, pp. 85-86).24 Their growing self- 
confidence and awareness led women to remain in the labour 
market, despite unfavourable market conditions.
3. 5 The Family and Work
The legal improvement in women's rights in the 1970s did 
not, in fact, make significant progress for women's lives. They 
still had to combine the family and employment mainly at the 
expense of their career; and child-care was the unchallenged 
domain of women. However, many women demanded partnership and 
shared responsibilities between the spouses, and became more and 
more aware of the importance of economic independence. As their 
expectations of married life and children changed, divorces 
increased, while child-births were declining. These changing 
family styles, in turn, altered the attitudes of women.
24 Total number of sample in the western part of Germany (the 
"old laendes") was 1554; among them 821 were women.
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3.5.1 Combining the Family and Employment
During four decades, the average age of first marriage 
changed very little. In 1950, the average age of first marriage 
was 25.4 for women, and 28.1 for men. In 1989, it was 25.7 and
28.2 respectively. Since their higher education increased, and 
their school-leaving age became higher, women had a shorter 
period of single life between school leaving and marriage. Also, 
women tended to remain in their jobs after marriage, or after 
giving birth to children. In 1961, the labour participation rate 
of married women was 28 percent; in the 1970s and 1980s, it 
increased to about 45 percent (Table 3.9).
Table 3.9 Labour Participation Rate of Women
by Marital Status (Aged 15-65)
Year Not-
Married
Married Divorced
Separated
Widowed Total”
1961 48 28 62 75 47
1972 70 41 71 30 47
1976 59 42 70 30 46
1981 52 40 59 10 49
1985 53 38 57 9 47
1989 63 45 68 31 50
* Note 1): Labour Participation Rate of women aged 15-65.
* Sources: "Erwerbstaetige Frauen nach Familienstand”, Statiatiachea
Jahrbuch, 1964; 1977; 1982; 1987; 1989.
As married women's labour participation increased, combining 
employment and family attracted much attention. In particular, 
working women with children needed special consideration, not 
only for the protection of motherhood, but also for the child's 
welfare (Kinderwohl; Textor, 1991) . More than 40 percent of women 
with children under the age of eighteen were working. However, 
the younger the children, the less the mothers participated in
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the labour force: 43 percent of mothers with children under
fifteen; 36.3 percent of mothers with children under six; 32.5 
percent of mothers with children under three were employed in 
1989 (Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1990, p. 100).
One of the main reasons that prevented mothers of young 
children from seeking employment was the cost and availability 
of kindergartens and creches. Though 80 percent of all three- to 
six-year-olds attended kindergarten in 1989, these facilities 
were largely private or church-owned and operated, and open only 
part of the day. Parents had to contribute to the cost. Worse, 
creches or nurseries for children under the age of three were in 
short supply.25
While the women's movement and trade unions demanded an 
increase in child-care facilities,26 the government sought 
solutions in expanding part-time work (Epstein et. al., 1986: 
Frauen in der BRD, 1991) and child-care leave.27 The FRG
25 Until the 1970s nurseries and kindergartens for children 
had been so insufficient that the Federal Ministry for Youth, 
Family and Health (BMJFG) introduced a centrally financed system 
of "day mothers". The day mothers took very young children into 
their homes during working hours, and took care of them together 
with their own children. These day mothers were paid not by the 
child's parents but out of social security funds. Despite the 
effort of the BMJFG to provide more creches and kindergartens, 
in 1987, only 1.6 percent of children under three were 
accommodated in creches (BMFuS, 1991, p. 36) .
26 In a survey of 1988, which questioned all mothers in the 
FRG, 58 percent of them responded that, first of all, getting a 
place in kindergarten or creche was of "critical importance" for 
the mothers. Also, 27 percent of mothers hoped that the child­
care hours of the facilities could be extended to an all-day 
basis (Textor, 1991, p. 154).
27 In 1983, the BMJFG published a report under the title of 
"Family-Friendly Formation of Work Life (Familienfreundliche 
Gestaltung des Arbeitslebens)", and motivated women to take part- 
time work. In the next year, the BMJFG published the "Family and 
Work World (Fami lie und Arbeitswelt) " which analyzed the aspects
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government proposed to reduce the work-day, extend child-care 
leave for any of the parents, and protect the legal status of 
part-timers (Frauen in der BDR, 1992; Textor, 1991) .28
The shortage of child-care facilities, with the opportunity 
cost of child-bearing and care, contributed to some extent to 
reducing family size. In the 1960s the first child on average was 
born less than two years after marriage; in the 1980s, it was 
almost three years after marriage (Kolinsky, 1989, pp. 80-81). 
Families also tended to have fewer children. In the 1950s, the 
annual birth rate per thousand was about sixteen; in the 1980s, 
it was eleven. Consequently, family size became smaller: in the 
1950s, the average number of household members was 3; in the 
1980s, it was 2.2. The reduced number of household members and 
the improved equipment of families saved women time spent on 
household work. In the 1950s, a housewife of a four-person family 
spent 284 hours per month doing household chores excluding child­
care; while a gainfully employed wife spent 168-243 hours per 
month on it. In the 1980s, a housewife was occupied for 6 hours 
per day (180 hours per month) in doing so; and an employed wife 
3 hours per day (90 hours per month: Gerhardt and Schuetze, 1988, 
pp. 260—264ff). However, most of the household chores were still 
the responsibility of the wife: the distribution of household 
chores between the spouses changed very little (Table 3.10).
and problems of combining employment and the family. In both 
reports, the FRG government basically conceived that reducing the 
work-day was essential.
28 Since 1984, many regulations restricting the legal status 
of part-timers have been repealed: for example, many part-timers 
in the public sector (Beamte) and lawyers (Richter) were allowed 
to apply for legally protected leave.
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Table 3.10 Distribution of Household Chores between
Husband and Wife, 1970 and 1986 (in %)
Household Chores Year Mainly responsible 
Wife Husband Both
Spouse
Equal
Cooking 1970 73 2 19 5
1986 68 1 27 4
Child-Bath and Clothing 1970 69 1 24 6
1986 61 1 31 7
Cleaning 1970 59 3 34 3
1986 58 0 38 4
Shopping 1970 45 2 48 4
1986 45 1 48 6
Helping Children's 1970 32 5 55 7
School Homework 1986 32 3 56 9
Family Income 1970 4 46 45 4
1986 2 44 48 6
Repairing 1970 3 48 43 5
1986 1 53 42 4
* Source: Textor (1991), p. 19.
3.5.2 Marriage and Divorce
While women's self-confidence and awareness were growing, 
they were less tolerant of family problems. The marriage rate was 
declining; while the divorce rate was increasing (Table 3.11).
By 1989, 
divorce
Table 3.
one in three married couples ended 
(Statistisches Jahrbuch 1990, p. 70).
11 Marriage and Divorce Rate
their marriage in
Year Marriage Divorce
in every 1,000 in every 1.000 in every 1,000
Population Population existing marriages
1950 10.7 1.7 6.8
1960 9.4 0.9 3.6
1970 7.3 1.3 5.1
1980 5.9 1.6 6.1
1989 6.4 2.0 8.5
* Source: StBA (1989), Bevoelkerung und Erwerbataetigkeit, p. 154; and
Statiatiachea Jahrbuch, 1990, p. 61.
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More women than men initiated divorce cases: more than half 
of all divorce cases were initiated by the wives (56.2 percent 
in 1989); a third by the husbands (34.7 percent), and 9 percent 
by both spouses (Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1990). Though most 
Germans considered marriage meaningful (87 percent in the 1991 
Survey), women's expectation to be in employment and independent 
from men made the family bond weaker than in the past.
3. 6 Women in Politics
The changes in the educational, vocational and occupational 
positions, and the changing expectations of women affected the 
role of women in political life. Though women's political 
representation in the Bundestag or Landtage had been consistently 
below that of their eastern sisters, the gender gap in political 
participation has to some extent been narrowed. Women's electoral 
turnout has been well over 80 percent, and sometimes around 90 
percent. Around a quarter of party members are women, and more 
than 30 percent in the Greens. Women's under-representation in 
the Bundestag or in the Federal and state governments, however, 
has not been altered very much. Nevertheless, women have 
organised themselves, and demanded equal rights despite many 
unfavourable circumstances.
3.6.1 The Women's Movement
After the war, the women's movement suffered from inertia 
and amnesia about the struggle for sexual equality before the
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war,29 The rejuvenation of the women's movement proceeded from 
the struggle against §218 of the Penal Code. Since 1972, many 
books that dealt with abortion and contraception have been 
published, and mass demonstrations have occurred. Abortion was 
finally taken up by the political parties, and a liberal 
amendment was passed in the Bundestag. In 1975, however, the 
amendment was ruled unconstitutional in the Federal 
Constitutional Court. Although §218 was finally modified in 1977, 
the new abortion law fell far short of women's demands for free 
choice, and the women's movement lost much of its force.30
Furthermore, the Radicals' Decree (Radlkalenerlass) of 1972 
daunted the women's movement.31 Although the women's movement 
never used violence, women's centres involved in organising 
abortion trips to Netherlands were regularly raided by police for 
'supporting criminal organisations'. Whenever they planned the 
civil rights protests, they had to make non-violence part of 
their platform.
Despite these circumstances, the women's movement entered 
a new phase and saw a dissemination of alternative activism in 
which women played a crucial role. In 1978, the army (Die 
Bundeswehr) announced that it took women's emancipation
29 In the 1960s, many young German feminists did not know, 
and were not informed in formal education, about the women's 
struggle for equal rights before the war (Kaplan, 1991, p. 108).
30 See the Law section of this Chapter (Footnote 14).
31 From the late 1960s, right and left extremist groups 
flourished, and committed numerous terrorist actions. In 1972, 
the government over-reacted to these terrorists with the 
Radicals' Decree, applied mostly to left-wing radicals, which led 
the FRG into a conspiratorial hysteria, like the McCarthy era in 
the United States.
108
'seriously' and intended to see women conscripted to the army in 
the same way as men — i.e., for a compulsory military service of 
eighteen months. This proposal resulted in a series of 
demonstrations in May 1979. It signalled, in fact, the beginning 
of a new movement towards a new alternative politics 
(Alternativen) on the left: anti-nuclear, anti-military
politics.32 This revitalisation of the women's movement was 
overshadowed in 1982 when the CDU was reelected to the 
government, and the trends towards right-wing values became 
apparent. However, the alternative movements, with ecological and 
feminist concerns, gathered to form the Green Party, and 
succeeded in entering the Bundestag. The programme of the Greens 
made it clear that all the leadership positions of the party 
should be composed of an equal proportion of men and women.
3.6.2 Women in Political Parties
Women composed around 14 to 33 percent of party membership 
in the four major parties, and three parties had women's 
divisions.33 In 1987, 42 percent of all female party members
32 Many women considered this proposal as yet another ploy 
for armament and militarisation of FRG society and as a 
purposeful misconstruction of women's fight for equality (Kaplan, 
1992). In Hamburg and Koeln (Cologne), large anti-military and 
anti-nuclear congresses of the women's movement were held and 
thousands of women pledged their solidarity.
33 The Women's divisions of the parties are: the SPD's 
"Working Team of Social Democratic Women" (ASF); the CDU's 
"Women's Association of the Christian Democratic Union of 
Germany"; and the CSU's "Women's Union of the CSU". The Greens 
did not need to have a women's division since its party programme 
obliged it to equal distribution of power between the sexes in 
all the party decisions and leadership positions. In 1985, the 
Greens' federal Party Congress decided to include a special 
section on the representation of women, and chose a 50 percent 
quota system of all electoral and organisational positions. The
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belonged to the CDU/CSU, and 44 percent to the SPD. While wom«n 
constituted 22 percent of the CDU membership, one in three new 
members were women in the 1980s.
In many senses, the SPD and Greens drew on the same segmeit 
of the electorate, and a strong appeal of the Greens might cause 
direct losses of party membership and electoral support to tie 
SPD. Thus, the SPD Party Congress of 1986 endorsed a three-stace 
plan of transition towards equality: by the 1990s women should 
be represented at all levels of the party organisation and in 
parliaments in proportion to their share of the population or ct 
no less than 40 percent.
Although the CDU drew on a different segment of tie 
electorate from the SPD or Greens, it also felt obliged to 
respond to the new challenge of the political climate. In tie 
1986 Party Congress, the CDU passed a resolution that women 
should be involved at all levels of party organisation, and have 
political representation in accordance with their share of the 
membership, but it ruled out the quota regulation. However, its 
more conservative twin, the CSU, did not show any change in its 
strategy towards women.
For the FDP, membership developments during the 1970s and 
1980s have been troubled by the aftermath of coalition changes. 
Further, the Greens came to challenge its third party position. 
As a response, the FDP endorsed a Plan for the Furtherance cf 
Women (Frauenfoerderplan: May 1986) , and promised to create an 
"Equality Office (Gleichberechtigungsstelle) " in the head office, 
and to further women's share in decision making functions in line
FDP does not have a women's division.
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with their share of membership (25 percent). Though it was not 
a quota solution, it certainly set the party on a path towards 
better opportunities for women.
3.6.3 Women in Parliaments: Federal and Laende Parliaments
Until the early 1980s, women comprised less than 10 percent 
of FRG legislators (Table 3.12). In the first Bundestag, 
relatively few women gained seats. The SPD, in the second 
election, brought veterans of the socialist women's movement into 
the Bundestag, and the number of female SPD parliamentarians rose 
despite the party's poor electoral performance. As a response, 
the CDU included more woman candidates, and contributed to 
expanding women's proportion in the Bundestag. In the 1960s and 
1970s, women's proportion in the Bundestag fell again. The SPD 
included even less women than the CDU in the parliamentary group. 
However, in the 1980s, the Greens contributed significantly to 
increasing the parliamentary seats of women: in 1987, more than 
20 percent of all women in the Bundestag belonged to the Greens.
Two women were elected as the President of Bundestag 
(Bundestagpraesidentin), which is the highest Constitutional 
office next to the President: Annemarie Renger from 1972 to 1976, 
and Rita Suessmuth since November 1988. Rita Suessmuth had served 
as Minister for Youth, Family, Women and Health (Bundesministerin 
fuer Jugend, Fami lie Frauen und Gesundheit) and received strong 
electoral support in 1987.
In the Landtage, a similar process has been evident, and 
access of women to the parliaments accelerated in the 1980s. In 
the first Lauid elections an average of 8 percent of the seats
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were won by women; in 1985-88, the share of women's seats rose 
to 16 percent. There are differences among the states; women's 
representation ranged from a third of parliamentary seats in 
Hamburg to 7 percent in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Although the SPD 
tends to have a large number of female members of parliaments, 
the Greens have an even larger proportion. In Hamburg, the 
regional Green party entered an all-women list in the last two 
Land elections.
Table 3.12 Female Members of the Bundestag
Year All CDU/CSU SPD FDP Others
No. % NO. % No. % No. % No. <fc
1949 28 7 11 8 13 10 0 0 4 5
1953 45 9 19 8 21 13 3 6 2 4
1957 48 9 22 8 22 12 3 7 1 6
1961 43 8 18 7 21 10 4 8 - -
1965 36 7 15 6 19 9 2 7 - -
1969 34 7 14 6 18 8 2 5 - -
1972 30 6 15 6 13 5 2 5 - -
1976 38 7 19 8 15 7 4 8 - -
1980 44 8 18 8 19 8 7 13 Greens
1983 51 10 17 7 21 10 3 12 10 36
1987 80 15 18 8 31 16 6 13 25 57
* Source: Kolinsky (1989), p. 222.
In many respects, the system of party candidate selection 
hampered women's capacity to enter the parliaments. In 
constituency nominations, the parties tended to assign women to 
the rather marginal, or hopeless, constituencies. In the list 
votes, the parties put the female candidates on the tail end. 
However, this situation, too, was changing. In 1987, women were 
more strongly represented as direct candidates than ever before. 
The SPD put up one woman candidate in three, the CDU one in four,
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and the Greens more than half. Though women's success in entering 
parliament was still far behind their numerical presence as 
direct candidates and on the party lists, the 1987 election 
showed a clear sign of improving women's representation in party 
politics and parliaments.
3.6.4 Women in Governing Bodies
During the four decades of the FRG, eleven women held 
ministerial offices, and there was at least one woman minister 
in every Federal government since 1961. Normally, women 
administered the traditional 'female sphere': health and family 
affairs. Only two women served as ministers outside of the 
traditional women's realms: in the mid-1970s, Marie Schlei became 
Minister for Economic Cooperation; in 1982, Dorothee Wilms was 
appointed to Minister for Education and Science, and in 1985, 
changed her position to Minister of Inner German Relations. As 
in the parliaments, women's offices in the government increased 
during the 1980s. Since 1985, the Federal government has had more 
than two woman ministers. In 1989 cabinet reshuffle, a third 
woman, Gerda Hasselfeldt from the CSU, was appointed Minister of 
Urban Planning and Housing.
Eight women held top political appointments just below 
ministerial level and served as parliamentary secretaries. Among 
them, the two most interesting appointments were those of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had a female parliamentary 
secretary in 1976, and the Ministry of Defence, which appointed
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a female parliamentary secretary in 1987.34
3. 7 Summary
Despite the legacy of the Three Ks, West German women have 
expanded their place in the labour market, higher education, and 
in politics. Their attendance and performance in education have 
improved remarkably. Vocational qualifications of the young 
generation had almost reached parity between the sexes. However, 
women were still confined in a small number of 'female subjects', 
which did not match the demand of the changing labour market. 
Consequently, their occupational spectrum was far narrower than 
men's. 57 percent of women were found in ten occupations, 
generally in the lower levels. Their economic position, though, 
has been improved with regard to earnings and status, but has 
fallen short of equal opportunities and rewards.
Contrary to the traditional notion of non-political female, 
women furthered their representation in politics, too. The 1980s 
was a memorable decade in women's advancement. Their proportions 
in party membership, in the Bundestag and Landtage, and in the 
government were increasing. Yet, women are still under­
represented in the parliaments, governments, and in the party 
leadership positions.
34 When the Bundeswehr proposed compulsory military service 
of both sexes, the women's movement, the SPD, and the Greens 
strongly opposed it. The appointment of a woman in the Ministry 
of Defence was regarded as an attempt to neutralise the 
controversy. Whatever the intentions might be, it seems that 
political leaders have become more and more obliged to recognise 
and take into account the presence of women.
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In the GDR, the government and the ruling communist party 
stood in the front line of the struggle for equal opportunities 
for women. By contrast, in the FRG, the government responded 
passively to the demands from women. Despite the lack of 
enthusiasm about sexual equality in the government, women's 
advancement in society was significant. When abortion was a 
punishable action, many women were brave enough to declare "I 
have aborted." Women also organised anti-military, anti-nuclear 
demonstrations and congresses in many cities. German women's 
initiative and contribution to the international peace movement 
were substantial (Kaplan, 1991) . Yet, by comparison with the GDR, 
some of the changes in gender relations were small, adding 
evidence to the communist claim that communism is the best 
vehicle for women's emancipation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
WOMEN IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
4. 1 Introduction
While the Federal Republic of Germany in the West had been 
successfully integrated into the Western world, the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East had become an essential 
part of the world of the Soviet bloc. For women, the GDR 
meticulously promoted women's labour participation, while the FRG 
only slowly responded to the demands of equality for women. In 
the West, women experienced opportunities and limitations in 
choosing between employment and family roles or combining the 
two; in the East, women's life was prescribed as encompassing 
both (Kolinsky, 1992, p. 264).
4.1.1 BED Dominated Politics and the Economy
GDR politics was dominated by the Socialist Unity Party 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands: SED) , in particular, 
by the Politburo of the SED.1 Placing itself above the 
government, the SED set itself the task of leading the GDR
1 The SED was formed through a merger of the Communist Party 
(Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands: KPD) and the Social
Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands: SPD) 
in April, 1946. Initially the SED assumed an ideological position 
much closer to the SPD than the KPD, espousing Marxist principles 
but omitting any mention of Leninism. Also, the leadership of the 
party showed a parity between social democrats and communists. 
However, after arrests and purges of former SPD members, 
communists predominated in the key organs of the party by early 
1949. After the purge of the social democrats, the SED 
transformed its organisation in the first Party Conference of 
January 1949, and the Soviet-style Politburo became the locus of 
power.
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towards communism. Although there were four other parties — CDU, 
LDPD, NDPD and DBD2—  as well as the mass organisations — Free 
German Labour Union, Free German Youth, Democratic Women,s 
Federation, and Culture Federation—  they were dependent on 
subsidies from the SED. In fact, those were largely regarded as 
"echoes" of the SED (Childs, 1969, p. 104). These four parties, 
the SED, and the mass organisations were together included in the 
National Front. In elections, the nine constituent organisations 
were coordinated in the nomination of candidates, and proposed 
a Unity List for representatives. During the nomination, the SED 
was in control. The People's Congress (Volkskammer) of the GDR 
was composed of the delegates elected from this Unity List.
There was formally a dual set of hierarchies, one in the 
state — with its formal head, the Council of State; its 
government, the Council of Ministers; its national parliament, 
the People's Congress; and regional and local representative 
bodies—  and one in the party. In practice, however, the 
hierarchy of the state was shadowed and dominated by the parallel 
hierarchy of the SED. The SED, with its puppet parties and mass 
organisations, clearly dominated the state and was the guardian 
and articulator of official ideology, the definer of orthodoxy, 
heterodoxy and heresy (Fulbrook, 1991, p. 38). Every aspect of
2 The Christian Democratic Union {Christlich Demokratische 
Union: CDU) and the German Liberal Democratic Party (Liberal 
Demokratische Partei Deutschlands: LDPD) were founded after the 
war, and were very similar to their sister parties in West 
Germany at that time. The National Democratic Party (National- 
Demokratische Partei Deutschlands: NDPD) and the Democratic
Farmers Party (Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands: DBD) were 
set up later partly as counterweights to the CDU and the LDPD, 
and partly to win new groups for the regime (Childs, 1969, p. 
104; Turner, 1991, pp. 16-17 and pp. 50-51).
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GDR society, therefore, reflected the perception and 
determination of the Marxist-Leninist party.
In line with the Marxist commitment to a classless society, 
leaders in the SED effected public policies in pursuit of 
economic socialisation, formation of the socialist personality 
in the people, and enhancement of the working people's quality 
of life. Under the slogan of "the unity of economic policy and 
social policy," all public policies were linked with the economy. 
Education policy was directed to shape all the people into the 
working class. Housing was exceedingly cheap, though in short 
supply. Health-care and education were free. It is disputable 
whether these public policies were exploitative, and whether the 
population was forced to work. However, the people at least were 
free from the fear of unemployment, and from illness without a 
source of protection.
4.1.2 The Women Policies (Frauenpolitik)
The SED took the Marxist-Leninist view that women's 
oppression was another aspect of class oppression, and hence, 
that women could be emancipated only through joining with men in 
the struggle against capital (Schubert, 1980; DDR Handbuch, 
1985). Equality as "workers" (Werktaetige) was declared the 
precondition and the guarantor of equal opportunities.
The women policies (Frauenpolitik) in the GDR was primarily 
directed to promote and protect women's employment (Schubert, 
1980; Berghahn and Fritzsche, 1991). The Labour Law 
(Arbeitsgesetzbuch: AGB) declared that women as well as men had 
the right to work (Arbeltsrecht) . The AGB provided a special
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protection for women in pregnancy, or with children. Also it 
assured women's rights to return to their job after giving birth 
or child-care leave, as well as the state's responsibility to 
provide child-care facilities (Klnderbetreuungseinrichtungen). 
Expanding women's access to higher education was another aspect 
of guarantees for the women's right to work. To institute equal 
chances for women, the GDR made professional or vocational 
training obligatory for both men and women, along with equal 
opportunities for higher education. Either because of the need 
to have an expanded labour force or because of its ideological 
presuppositions, or both, the fact that the GDR was making a 
great effort to change existing gender relations in the society 
is undisputed.
4. 2 Women under the Law
From the feminist point of view, many laws in the GDR were 
more favourable for women than in the FRG. In keeping with the 
constitutional guarantee of sexual equality, the Family Law 
(Familiengesetzbuchz FGB, 1965), the Labour Law
(Arbeitsgesetzbuch: AGB, 1977), and the Education Law (Gesetz 
ueber das Einheitliche Sozialistische Bilungs system, 1965) 
provided women with full equal rights and special considerations 
for education and maternity protection. Besides equal rights to 
work and education, abortion was fully legal and considered as 
a right of women since 1972 (Gesetz ueber die Unterbrechung der 
Schwangerschaft) .
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4.2.1 Sexual Equality in the Constitution
The first constitution of the GDR in 1949 proclaimed that 
men and women had equal rights before the law (Article 7) , and 
that all laws and decrees forming an obstacle to equal rights for 
women were revoked (Article 7, (2)). Article 30 again provided 
for equal rights within the family. Article 33 revoked all laws 
and decrees discriminating against unmarried parents and the 
children born outside of wedlock.
The GDR revised its Constitution in 1968, and the new 
version contained a statement which provided not only for equal 
rights, but, in some respects, for preferential treatment for 
women: "Men and women have equal rights and have the same legal 
position in all spheres of social, political and private life. 
The promotion of women, particularly in vocational qualification, 
is a social and governmental objective" (Article 20, (2)).
Unlike the first Constitution, the Constitution of 1968 did 
not have to provide a precedence clause because by then the new 
Family Law and the Law of Labour (Gesetz der Arbeit: GB1) had 
replaced the old Civil Code in toto. In addition to the right to 
work, the Constitution of 1968 added the duty to work. Socially 
useful activity is an honourable duty for every citizen. The 
right to work and the duty to work form a unity (Article 24, 
(2)).3 This right to work was effected through central economic 
planning. In 1974, the GDR altered the Constitution again, but
3 It had been disputed whether or not the word "duty" meant 
an obligation. Though it was not an obligation, every woman and 
man in the GDR, in effect, was assigned a job by the central 
economic plan, and carried out that duty. However, as far as I 
could meet with and interview former East German women, they said 
they accepted their job with the feeling of being accepted and 
considered an important individual (March 1993, Berlin).
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left the equal rights paragraph unchanged.
4.2.2 The Family Lav
Prior to the legislation of the Family Law, the GDR had made 
several laws concerned with one or a few aspects of family 
relations such as marriage, divorce, or child custody. In early 
1949, during the time of the drafting of the first Constitution, 
a commission set up to propose necessary legislation published 
a brochure entitled "Proposals for the New German Family Law" 
(Vorschlaege zum neuen deutschen Familienrecht) . Its proposals 
were accepted as Article 30 of the Constitution (equal rights 
within the family) . The Thesis on the Effects of Marriage in 
General (Thesen ueber die Wirkungen der Ehe im allgemeinen), 
adopted in 1949, spelled out clearly that all matters that 
affected their common life in marriage were to be settled by the 
spouses in mutual agreement. In 1950, the Law for the Protection 
of Mother and Child and the Rights of Woman (Gesetz ueber den 
Mutter- und Kinderschutz und die Rechte der Frau) reiterated that 
the hitherto prevailing right of the husband to make all 
decisions in all aspects of conjugal life was to be replaced by 
the joint right of both spouses to make decisions (§14). It 
denied the husband's right of .decision whether his wife could be 
employed, or whether his wife could join vocational education 
(Berghahn and Fritzsche, 1991, p.135). It also stated that 
parental care which included the right and duty to care for the 
children and their property, as well as the right to represent 
the children, was vested jointly in both parents (§16) . Equal 
rights of unmarried parents and children born outside of the
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wedlock were once again confirmed (§17). In the Marriage and 
Divorce Decree (Verordnung ueber die Ehes chi ies sung und 
Eheaufloesung) of 1955, the process of separation became simpler, 
and the "guilt principle" (Verschuldensprinzip) in divorce cases 
was abolished and replaced by the "irreparable breakdown 
principle" (Zerruettungsprinzip) .4
The Family Law (Familiengesetzbuch: FGB) of 1965 was the 
first comprehensive law on familial relations in the GDR (Shaffer 
1981, p. 30; Berghahn and Fritzsche, 1991, p.135), and rescinded 
Book 4 of the old Civil Code. It abolished male supremacy in 
marriage and urged that marriage be engaged in for life and be 
based on mutual love, respect, faithfulness, understanding, 
trust, and unselfish assistance for each other (§5, (1)) . The FGB 
was apparently keen to strengthen the marital ties. It proclaimed 
that state and society contribute to the strengthening of 
relations between husband and wife and between parents and 
children as well as to the development of the family (§1) . Apart 
from state institutions to strengthen the familial relations, 
such as social organisations, labour collectives, and parents' 
counselling services, it also provided marriage and family 
counselling services (§4). In addition, since in the GDR gainful 
employment was greatly encouraged for both spouses, husband and 
wife were supposed to share in household chores, and to support
4 Under the old Civil Code, marriage could be dissolved only 
if at least one of the spouses was found guilty of severe 
matrimonial transgressions such as adultery or desertion. As a 
result, the party who was found guilty of the break-up of the 
marriage was to pay support payment to the other party. In the 
new Decree, support and alimony payments were abolished except 
in hardship cases (Shaffer, 1981, pp. 38-39).
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each other's educational and career goals (§10).5
The minimum age of marriage was 18 (§5, (4)); the spouses
should have the same last name, but they could choose either the 
husband's or the wife's name (§7) ; the children followed that 
chosen family name; the one whose name was not chosen could 
append it to the family name only when, for instance, a spouse 
had become especially well known to the public by his or her 
previous name and had achieved special respect (FGB-Kommentar); 
all commodities, property rights, and savings accumulated during 
the marriage through the work or work income of one or both 
spouses belonged jointly to both spouses (§13).
In the case of divorce, society and the state were assigned 
a great role in determining causes for the breakdown of marriage 
and in bringing about reconciliation (§24-27).6 Marriage of long 
duration in which the spouses had grown old together were deemed
s §10 of the FGB reads as follows:
§10 (1) Both spouses do their share in the education and care 
of the children and the conduct of the household. The 
relations of the spouses to each other are to be so shaped 
that the wife can combine her professional and social 
activities with those of motherhood.
(2) If the spouse who hitherto had not been gainfully 
employed takes a job, or if a spouse decides to continue 
his or her education or engage in socially useful work, the 
other supports with comradely consideration and assistance 
the intentions of the spouse (Gesetzblatt, 1966, p. 5) .
6 §24 of the FGB reads:
§24 (1) A marriage may be dissolved only when the court has
determined that such severe reasons prevail that it is 
clear that the marriage has lost its purpose for the 
spouses, the children, and therefore also for society.
(2) If divorce proceedings have been initiated by one of the 
spouses, the court is to undertake a careful investigation 
of the development of the marriage. In this investigation, 
judges find out whether interests of young children would 
be adversely affected by a divorce, and whether the divorce 
would constitute unreasonable hardship for one of the 
spouses.
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to be in particular need of protection; judges were admonished 
to investigate their breakdown with special care and to explore 
all possibilities for the reconstitution of longstanding ties 
(FGB-Kommentar). This court's investigation seemed an undue 
interference into the intimate details of family life. However, 
the GDR family court claimed considerable success in that divorce 
petitions were withdrawn in one out of four cases (Shaffer, 
1981) .
The property of the spouses was divided equally in the 
proceedings of divorce (§39). However, a spouse could claim a 
larger share because of greater need, or could be excluded from 
property sharing because he or she had not contributed to the 
creation of the common property by either gainful employment or 
participation in household chores (§39, (1))* Because both
spouses were assumed to participate in the labour force, one 
party's claim of rights to pensions and other retirement income 
of the other party was deemed irrelevant. So was the claim of 
support payment or alimony. Support payment, if any, was based 
on need only, and was temporary in nature.
4.2.3 The Labour Law
Not only because of its ideological imperative of making its 
citizens working people (Werktaetige) , but also because of the 
need to have a large and flexible labour force, the GDR made a 
great effort to mobilize all able men and women into paid work. 
The laws relating to labour had reflected the government's 
ideological intention and economic concerns. On 19 April 1950, 
the GDR adopted the Law of Labour (Gesetz der Arbeit: GB1, S.
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349) , in which the principle of equal pay for equal work was 
declared. With the constitutional right to work, this law 
guaranteed employment to all citizens. This law developed into 
the Law of Labour of 1961 (Gesetzbuch der Arbeit: GBA, GB1, I,
S. 27), and was merged with the Law of Protection for Mother and 
Children into the Labour Law (Arbeitsgesetzbuch: AGB, GB1, I, S. 
185) of 1977. In this merger, the GDR's intention to pull all 
women into the labour force was fully realised through the 
provisions of rights and protection of working women, especially 
working mothers, and enabled women to combine both employment and 
the family.
In the AGB, many sections stipulated rights and protection 
of working women: the state was assigned the responsibility for 
promoting and protecting women, youth and certain groups of 
persons (§3); work managers and trade union committees should lay 
out and conclude together promotion plan for women (§30) ; women 
were granted special considerations for training and further 
education (§148); the health and working capacity of women and 
young people under eighteen years of age were under special 
protection (§210).
In particular, the AGB devoted much attention to 
facilitating the combination of employment and motherhood: fully 
employed women having a household of their own were given an 
additional monthly day off during which standard wages were paid 
(§185); working parents could get leave of absence for their ill 
children and receive 90 percent of their net monthly earnings for 
up to two working days (§186) ; expectant and nursing mothers as 
well as mothers with children of up to one year of age were not
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assigned night work, overtime, or specific tasks listed in 
regulations (§242-243).
Maternity leave was granted for six weeks before delivery 
and twenty weeks after giving birth. In the event of more than 
one baby being born, and in the event of a complicated delivery, 
maternity leave was extended to twenty-two weeks (§244); during 
maternity leave, women received grants equivalent to their net 
average earnings from social security (§244, (4)); if mothers
wanted to take care of their new born children, they could stay 
home up to the first birthday of the child at full pay, or when 
mothers could not find a creche for their baby, they could be 
released from work up to the third birthday of the child (§246) . 
This maternity leave, called the Baby Year (Kinderjahr) , provided 
for women the right to social care by their enterprise, and could 
be applied to other working people when they looked after and 
brought up a child in place of the mother (§246, (3)).
To enable mothers of preschool and schoolchildren to accept 
outside employment, the AGB imposed on the state and all 
enterprises the responsibility for providing necessary child-care 
facilities (§233). The law also required the enterprise to take 
up any opportunity for providing the children of their personnel 
with cultural, social, and sports facilities which were open free 
of charge to schoolchildren for extra-curricular activities and 
leisure pursuits (§234-235).
Unlike in the West, women in the GDR were required in 
principle to be employed full-time, and could take part-time work 
only temporarily for reasons of special family obligations 
(§161). Instead, the AGB provided a shortened work week at full
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pay for women taking care of large families, or for mothers of 
two or more children, the normal working week was reduced by 
three and three quarter hours, from 43 3/4 hours to 40 hours a 
week (§160) . Yet, in practice, a third of female workers made 
their work contracts part-time (See Section 4.4.3 of this 
chapter).
4.2.4 Abortion
Until 1968, the old Penal Code of 1871 had been in force, 
hence the infamous §218 that had outlawed abortion was also 
valid. The Law for the Protection of Mother and Child of 1950 
declared a pregnancy could be legally interrupted if there was 
a medical, ethical, or social ”indication” (Indikation).7 Though 
the social indication was very liberally interpreted, the 
necessity to justify the abortion before a committee of 
physicians and representatives of the social authorities drove 
some women to have illegal abortions — 60 percent of abortions 
were illegal (Berghahn and Fritzsche, 1991, p. 197) . Further, the 
Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB; GB1. I, S. 1) of 1968 added 
up to three year imprisonment for illegal abortion (§153). In 
March 1972, however, the GDR passed the Law on the Interruption 
of Pregnancy (Gesetz ueber die Unterbrechung der 
Schwangerschaft), declaring women's right to abortion. Under the 
law, pregnancy could be legally interrupted by any qualified 
physician at any gynaecological institute or hospital department,
7 In this indication solution, an ethical indication 
referred to the pregnancy as a result of rape or incest; social 
indication referred to situations where parents were not able to 
properly care for the child-to-be, or where it would have been 
unreasonable to impose such a burden on them.
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during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, with no questions 
asked. No matter what the rights and wrongs of abortion, the 
liberalisation of abortion had at least one highly desirable 
effect: maternal death-rates dropped sharply after 1972 (Table 
4.1) .
Table 4.1 Maternal Death Rates (per 100,000 live births)
Year 1968 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Rate 52.0 42.0 44.0 32.0 26.6 20.0 23.1 22.0
* Source: Statiatlachea Jahrbuch der DDR, 1979.
4. 3 Women in the Education System
Educational policy in the GDR centred on mixing mental and 
manual labour, linking education and employment, and combining 
theory and practice as in other communist countries (Childs, 
1969, pp. 173-199) . It was set to open higher education to those 
social groups which had been unable to benefit from it in the 
past — working people and women (Mertens, 1993, p. 113). Since 
1958, the GDR made vocational training from the seventh class in 
all general school obligatory (Politechnische Unterricht). In 
addition, there were wide open opportunities of higher education 
for working class and women in the GDR. Beginning with 
instituting the Workers' and Peasants' Faculties (Arbeiter- und 
Bauernfakultaeteni ABF)8 in the late 1940s, the GDR had advanced
8 In 1946, in line with its denazification policy, the 
Soviets established the German Administration for Education, 
which was responsible for all rules and regulations governing the 
schools of the Soviet zone. This Administration issued many
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a system of women's promotion in universities (Frauenfoerderung) 
and the Special Programme for Women's Studies 
(Frauensonderstudium) during the 1960s. By the mid-1980s, women 
had gained almost equal treatment in higher education as far as 
access and the number of students were concerned (Mertens, 1993, 
p. 113).
4.3.1 The Law on the Integrated Socialist Education System
The Law on the Integrated Socialist Education System (Gesetz 
ueber das Einheitliche sozialistische Bildungssystem: GEB, GB1, 
I, S. 83)9 of 1965 declared its objectives as 1 a high educational 
standard for the whole people, the formation and education of 
all-round and harmoniously developed socialist personalities who 
consciously shape social life, change nature, and lead a 
fulfilled, happy life as human beings should1 (SI) • It guaranteed 
all citizens equal rights to education (§2, (1)). The integrated 
socialist education system comprised the institutions of pre­
decrees and rules to eliminate Nazi influence and re-orient 
higher education. It regulated the type of students who could be 
admitted and given first preference in higher education. It also 
established pre-universities (Vorstudienanstalten) which offered 
matriculation courses for adult students who had not had the 
chance to gain their university qualifications in the normal way. 
It started in 1947 to help particularly those of working class 
background, ex-servicemen, some ex-prisoners, and women. In 1949, 
they were transformed into the ABF (Childs, 1969, p. 178; 
Martens, 1993, 113).
9 Before the Integrated Socialist Education System, 
communists adopted the Law for the Democratisation of the German
School (Gesetz fuer die Demokratisation der deutsche Schule) in
1946, which was to be the basis of a new school system. Under 
this law, all children were obliged to attend the eight-year 
elementary school (Grundschule). After this, children went on to 
four-years of secondary school or received vocational training. 
With other decrees and laws relating to education, this law 
developed into the Integrated Socialist Education System in 1965.
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school education, the ten class general polytechnic school, the 
institutions for vocational training, the educational 
establishments leading to university entry, the engineering and 
specialist colleges, the universities and colleges, and the 
institutions for training and continuing education for working 
people (§2, (2)). This education system was set up to apply the 
principle of the integration of education and life, the 
integration of theory and practice, and the integration of 
learning and study with practical activity (§4). It also implied 
the integration of education and vocational training (§5, (1)).
This education system included creches and kindergartens, 
for those whose mothers were either employed or studying. Creches 
were open to babies aged from three weeks to three years; 
kindergartens for the children from three year old to school age 
(§10-11) . Providing creches for student mothers encouraged women 
to continue their education or vocational training. This system 
contributed greatly to women's qualification, or re-training for 
the new technology.
A higher level of education was provided by the technical 
or engineering schools (FachIngenieurschulen; §41-49), which 
were narrowly defined institutions more or less operated by 
specific economic and government ministries to produce highly 
skilled employees. Other higher educational institutions included 
art colleges (Kunsthochschulen) which trained socialist artists 
and art workers in close connection with artistic practice (§50) . 
The highest level of education, universities and colleges 
(Universitaeten and Hochschulen), were to "train and educate 
academically highly qualified personalities with a socialist
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consciousness" (§52), and provided for its students the most 
likely chance of success in society. All the educational 
institutions were tuition-free, and the students on a large scale 
received monthly stipends. Though there was severe competition 
for entry to university, women were much more encouraged to enter 
higher education than in other countries, with creches and
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kindergartens for their children.
There were also life-long opportunities for further 
education. In particular, the Work Academies (Betriebsakademie) 
carried out the training and continuing education of working 
people in accordance of the needs of the enterprises and branches 
of the economy (§39) . With the promotion provision for women in 
the Labour Law, all these further education institutions were 
wide open to women.
4.3.2 Women in Vocational Education
When recruiting women to a higher level of jobs, the first 
barrier came from women's lack of qualifications. Therefore, in 
addition to the obligatory vocational training in general school, 
the Constitution of 1968 made professional and vocational 
training mandatory for general school leavers. Ten Year general 
school leavers who did not immediately pursue further studies in 
a Fa.chschule or work towards a college or university degree 
started to prepare themselves for at least a skilled worker's 
certificate in the on-the-job vocational training courses 
(Berufsausbildung). These vocational training courses were also 
open to those who did not finish the general school. Parts of the 
vocational training courses provided for participants the 
possibility to take the Abitur for universities and colleges. 
Almost 99 percent of general school leavers who did not enter 
higher education institutes went on to the on-the-job training 
courses. It was called apprenticeship {Lehrlingi Helwig, 1982, 
p. 19), and after this vocational training, pupils obtained the 
certificate of specialist (Table 4.2). However, the word
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"specialist" (Facharbeiter) meant in fact only a skilled worker 
—  i.e., a typist (Facharbeiter fuer Schreibtechnik) or a dress 
maker (Kleidungsfacharbeiter) was qualified as a specialist. In 
the vocational training courses, there clearly was segregation 
of labour between men and women. For example, almost 100 percent 
of trainees in typing courses were women, while in electric 
fitting courses 95 percent of trainees were men (Frauenreport, 
'90, p. 44).
Table 4.2 Participants in Vocational Training Courses
Year Total Students Women Students % of Women
1965 183,603 83,760 45.62
1970 193,984 89,155 45.96
1975 206,837 90,585 43.80
1980 231,450 102,585 44.32
1985 186,777 81,237 43.49
1989 135,640 55,895 41.21
* Source: Statistischea Jahrbuch der DDR, 1990, pp.337-338.
To further women's vocational education, from the mid-1960s 
onwards, special Fachschule classes were provided for working 
wives and mothers.10 They could keep their jobs but work only two 
or three days a week and went to school two to four days, while 
earning their full, regular wage. Or they could attend school for 
three years on a full-time basis and draw 80 to 90 percent of 
their average net wage as a stipend (Table 4.3). In this 
Fachschule system, too, there was a strong tendency towards
10 Fachschule was similar to a British Polytechnic. It 
required registration for three years, on a full-time basis. 
Graduates could get a diploma in medicine, engineering, 
electronics etc. Until 1974, medical Fachschule was not included 
in the vocational Fachschulen system. After the medical 
Fachschulen were included, the proportion of women in the 
Fachschulen rose up to 70 percent.
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sexual segregation. In Medicine/Health-care Fachschulen the 
female proportion of students reached up to 96 percent, while in 
technology Fachschulen the proportion of female students was only 
27 percent (Table 4.4).
Table 4.3 Students in Fachschulen
Year Total Students Women Students % of Women
1960 126,018 36,000 28.57
1970 167,158 81,176 48.56
1975 156,384 102,210 65.36
1980 172,825 123,549 71.49
1985 162,221 117,695 72.55
1989 152,700 107,397 70.33
* Note: Since 1974, Medicine Fachschulen included.
* Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR, 1990, p.341.
Table 4.4 Women Students by Subjects (in Fachschulen)
Year 1971 1989
Subjects Number of % of Number of % of
Women Women Women Women
Students Students Students Students
Medicine/Health-care 1,602 91.7 40,784 95.5
Education 25,843 85.6 21,148 88.6
Public Service/Library 1,554 73.8 1,975 78.5
Economics 39,854 70.5 27,093 85.9
Arts 1,005 51.0 651 60.8
Agriculture 4,401 32.6 4,223 44.3
Culture/Sports 265 29.5 815 46.4
Technology 15,027 20.9 10,708 27.0
* Source: Frauenreport '90, p. 46.
4.3.3 Women in Higher Education
The GDR government also encouraged women to enter university 
or college. In addition to free tuition, over 90 percent of
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students, male and female, received monthly stipends. In 
particular, single parents were guaranteed the stipend, which 
benefited mothers who in most cases had custody of minor children 
(Shaffer, 1981, p. 132).
The Women's Promotion Programme (Frauenfoerderungspiaen) 
assured qualified women that their college education would be 
adequately funded. In the 1970s, the GDR initiated special 
provisions for mothers to enable them to pursue their studies: 
they received maternity grants and child allowances, just as 
working mothers.11 The Special Programme for Women's Studies 
(Frauensonderstudium) ran in colleges and Fachschulen 
(Frauenreport, p. 236) . As a result, on the eve of the 
unification in 1989, 48.6 percent of East German university or 
college students were women. However, in university or college, 
women had a tendency to take "female subjects." In the education 
department, female students occupied more than 70 percent of 
seats. On the contrary, only one quarter of seats were taken by 
women in technology department (Table 4.5). Though still much 
concentrated in female subjects, women in university showed less 
segregation than in vocational education or in the Fachschulen. 
It is worth noting that GDR women had penetrated more widely at 
a higher level of education than at the lower level — i.e., there 
was less segregation in universities than in Fachschulen, and
11 Since 1972, mothers studying full-time were given an extra 
50 Mark per child per month; for single parents or parents whose 
spouses were also students and who were unable to find a place 
in a nursery for their children, the extra subsidy was raised to 
125 M for one child, 150 M for two children, and 175 M for three 
or more children, by the Decree on the Promotion of Women 
Students with a Child and Expectant Mothers Studying at Colleges 
and Technical Schools (Anordnung ueber die finanzielle 
Unterstiitzung von Studentinnen mit Kind: GB1, II, p.321).
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less in Fachschulen than in the Berufsausbildung. Despite the 
sexual segregation in the education system, GDR women's 
advancement into higher education was enough for the GDR 
government to claim their success in establishing sexual equality 
in education.
Table 4.5 Proportion of Women Students by Subjects
Year 1971 1975 1980 1985 1989
Total 37.1 48.2 48.7 50.1 48.6
Education 62.2 72.7 74.4 73.2 73.0
Economics 38.4 48.4 59.8 68.2 66.7
Literature 63.4 72.3 71.6 65.0 62.2
Medicine 70.0 66.5 56.3 56.0 55.2
Agriculture 35.1 49.2 48.8 48.7 46.4
Theology 41.4 48.3 44.3 51.3 46.1
Math/Natural
Science
33.2 41.5 46.5 51.0 46.0
Arts 40.8 38.4 41.0 44.3 44.6
Culture/Sports 31.5 32.5 35.4 36.2 40.3
Phil/History/Law 36.0 37.9 37.6 39.3 39.8
Technology 15.8 28.8 26.9 27.4 25.3
1 Source: Die Frau in der DDR, 1989, pp. 69-70.
4. 4 Women at Work
Responding to the government's support for promotion of 
women in education and economy, GDR women participated to a great 
extent in the labour force. They composed 48 percent of the total 
employed population; 82.34 percent of working-age women were 
employed, and this proportion rose up to 91 percent when full­
time students are counted. Official GDR statistics presented the 
situation of women as one of decreasing disadvantage (Kolinsky,
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1992, p. 268). However, as in education, a gender gap remained 
in employment. Women were concentrated to a large extent in 
"female work" such as light industry or in social services —- 
i.e., health care and education. Also, their access to leadership 
positions and high earnings was more constrained than officially 
claimed.
4.4.1 Women in the Labour Force
One peculiar demographic feature of the GDR was the small 
proportion of women of working age. In 1989, working age women 
composed 47.7 percent of the total working age population, while 
the female population was 52 percent of the total population. 
22.8 percent of women were sixty year old or above (Frauen in der 
DDR, 1989, p. 11). This relative shortage of working age 
population led the GDR to record a high level of labour 
participation rate of women (Table 4.6).
In 1989, women formed about 40 percent of the labour force 
in industry and manufacturing, more than 70 percent in trade and 
social service, and around 37 percent in agriculture and fishing. 
Two thirds of female employees were engaged in either industry, 
including textile industry, or the social service sector (Table 
4.7) .
Considering the highly industrialised GDR economy, a large 
number of women in industry seemed normal. However, the 
disproportionately large number of women working in the social 
service (a third of total women employees) suggests that social 
services were regarded as female work. Less than 12 percent of 
total male employees were engaged in social services, composing
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less than 30 percent of social service workers. Social services 
are certainly an expanded version of mothering, which echo the 
Three Ks. Massive labour participation of women, therefore, 
failed fundamentally to transform gender stereotyping.
Table 4.6 Women in the Labour Force
Year Working Age Population 
(Aged 15-65)
Labour 
Participation Rate
Proportion 
of Women
Total
(1,000)
Female
(1,000)
F/Total*100
(%)
Hen
(%)
Women
<%>
among 
the Employed 
<%)
1950 11,546 6,451 55 83 45 40
1960 10,542 5,581 53 85 62 45
1970 9,866 5,005 51 83 75 48
1980 10,581 5,257 50 77 78 50
1989 10,649 5,204 48 78 82 49
* Note: Labour Participation Rate = (The Employed + The Recognised
Unemployed)/ Working Age Population * 100 (%)
* Sources: Calculation Based on "Bevoelkerung” and "Weibliche Beachaftigte”
in Statlatiachea Jahrbuch der DDR, 1955-1989.
4.4.2 Women's Vocational Qualification
As the GDR took pains to further women's education, women's 
vocational qualification were greatly enhanced. At the lower 
level of qualification was the "specialist” or skilled worker 
(Facharbeiter) . Facharbeiter composed 67 percent of total 
employees, of which women amounted to 47 percent. At the middle 
level of vocational qualification was mastership (Meister) and 
Fachschule graduation. The proportion of women Meisters dropped 
to 14 percent, while women received a preference in Fachschulen, 
of which 70 percent of students were female.
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Table 4.7 Women's Labour Participation by Industry
Proportion of Women in Each Industry
1950 1960 1970 1980 1985 1989
Total 40 45 48 50 49 49
Social Services 52 62 70 73 73 73
Industry 20 40 43 43 43 41
Commerce 50 65 69 73 73 72
Agr/Min/Fishery 53 45 46 42 39 37
Transport 31 33 36 37 36 35
Mfg/L-Industry 55 34 40 38 37 37
Construction 9 9 14 16 16 17
Others 65 54 55 56 56
Composition of the Female Labour Force
1950 1960 1970 1980 1985 1989
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Social Services 18 24 25 29 31 32
Industry 13 32 32 33 32 31
Commerce 9 16 16 15 15 15
Agr/Min/Fishery 35 18 12 9 9 8
Transport 6 5 5 6 5 5
Mfg/L-Industry 18 4 4 2 2 2
Construct ion 1 1 2 2 2 2
Others - - 3 4 3 3
Composition of Male Labour Force
1950 1960 1970 1980 1985 1989
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Social Services 11 12 10 11 11 12
Industry 35 39 41 43 44 43
Commerce 6 7 7 6 6 6
Agr/Min/Fishery 20 17 13 12 13 13
Transport 8 8 9 9 9 9
Mfg/L-Industry 10 6 6 4 4 4
Construct ion 9 10 12 12 11 11
Others — — 2 3 3 3
* Note 1). Calculation of proportion and distribution is based on
"Weibliche Beschasftigte nach der Stellung im Betrieb und nach 
Wirschftsbereichen", "Beschaeftigte nach der Stellung im Betrieve und 
nach Wirschaftsbereichen," in Statlatiachea Jahrbuch der DDR, 1955- 
1989.
* Note 2). Each industrial sector in this table appears by descending order 
of the composition of female labour force in 1989.
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Fachschule graduates made up 16 percent of the total 
employed population.12 At the highest level of qualification was 
the graduate holding a university or college degree. Less than 
10 percent of employees were educated in university, among which 
40 percent were female (Table 4.8). As a whole, women's 
vocational qualifications appeared highly balanced, except in 
Meister13 category. Since Meisters composed the managerial and 
administrative bodies, the shortage of women Meisters indicated 
that women's high qualifications did not guarantee a fair 
representation of women in management and administration.
Table 4.8 Proportion of Women by Qualification
Year Total College
Graduate
Fachschule
Graduate
Master Facharbeiter
1970 40 27 36 - 40
1975 43 31 43 9 46
1980 46 35 57 11 47
1985 47 38 62 12 47
1989 47 40 64 14 47
* Note: Calculation is based on Statlatiachea Jahrbuch der DDR, 1990, p. 138.
12 Female dominance in Fachschule partly resulted from the 
characteristic of the school itself. Fachschule was half- 
professional, half-vocational school, and provided its students 
with practically applied disciplines, most of which were 
conventionally regarded as female subjects, like nursing, 
education, and social service. In communist regimes, medicine was 
also a female subject because doctors were less professional, 
less prestigious than in western societies.
13 According to the Five-Year Plan of 1976-1980, the GDR re­
launched the traditional German system of mastership test 
(Meisterpruefung) . Masters were to be in charge of management and 
administration in each industrial sector — i.e., industry, 
transportation, construction, manufacturing, etc.—  and were 
called, for example, "Master of Industry" or "Master of 
Manufacture." It was a certificate of an advanced skill and 
managerial ability. The low proportion of women in mastership 
resulted in the shortage of women in administrative bodies.
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\4.4.3 Women's Earnings
Considering the principle of equal pay for equal work, and 
the fairly balanced qualifications between men and women, women 
should have earned equal amounts of money with men. In practice, 
however, women were poorer (Table 4.9). Women's lower income was 
brought about by three employment patterns: women's assignment 
to lower wage groups; women's slimmer chances of getting pay 
rises, and the large proportion of women in part-time work.
Table 4.9 Average Monthly Earnings of Full-Time Employees
Average Monthly 
Earnings
Number of 
Men in the 
Income Group
Number of 
Women in the 
Income Group
Proportion of 
Women in the 
Income Group (%)
400-600 35,771 112,605 76
600-800 228,780 660,023 74
800-1000 833,513 920,784 53
1000-1200 1,051,510 562,592 35
1200-1500 898,419 352,589 28
1500-1700 287,247 59,031 17
1700 above 221,895 41,243 16
Total 3,557,135 2,708,867 43
* Source: Frauenreport '90, p. 88.
First, women were more likely to be assigned to the lower 
levels of wage groups in both 'productive' economy and social 
services. In the 'productive' economy — i.e., industries 
excluding social services—  women were concentrated in the fifth 
wage class (43.3 percent of total women workers), while men were 
over-represented in the sixth and seventh classes (67.8 percent). 
Women in the seventh and eighth classes composed only 13.8 
percent of total female workers, while men in the same groups 
made up 43 percent of total male workers (Frauenreport '90, p.
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91). As a result, women's average wage class was 5.46, but men's 
was 6.29 (Table 4.10).
Table 4.10 Composition of Wage Classes
in the Productive Economy
Wage Composition Composition Difference Female to Male
Class of Men (A) of Women (B) (B-A) Wage Ratio
(Men-100)
4 3 13 + 10 406
5 18 43 + 25 235
6 35 29 - 6 84
7 33 12 - 21 36
8 10 2 - 8 19
* Source: Frauenreport '90, p. 91.
Disparity in earnings appeared in the education sector as
well. 47 . 5 percent of total female university and Fachschulen
staff were assigned to the tenth salary class, while 46.5 percent
of male staff were in the eleventh class (Table
Table 4.11 Composition of Salary Classes
in Universities, Colleges, and
4.11). 
Fachschulen
Salary Composition Composition Difference Female to Male
Classes of Men (A) of Women (B) (B-A) Salary Ratio
(Men=100)
9 5 18 + 13 357
10 29 48 + 19 165
11 47 29 - 18 61
12 18 6 - 12 33
13 1 0 - 1 25
* Source: Frauenreport '90, p. 92.
Secondly, women's chances of getting shift (rise in wages) 
in industry fell short of the level of men's. In the GDR,
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industry and construction sectors had a three level shift system. 
As a whole, two thirds (62.4 Percent in 1989) of workers were in 
the first level, one eighth (11.8 percent in 1989) were in the 
second level, and one fourth (26 percent in 1989) were in the 
third level (Sozialreport '90, p. 108). The second level workers 
earned an average of 113 percent of the first level workers' 
gross wage, and the third level workers 124 percent of that 
(Ibid., p. 122) . In 1988, 30.8 percent of men got wage rises, but 
only 9.4 percent of women did so (Die Frau in der DDR, 1989, p. 
47) . Also, while 22.7 percent of male workers were shifted to the 
third level, only 5.8 percent of female workers were shifted 
—  i.e., men were four times more likely to get shifted to the 
third wage level. Therefore, women's opportunity to get a wage 
rise was slimmer than men's, leading women to earn less money 
than their male counterparts.
Thirdly, although all the workers were assumed to work full­
time, many women were engaged in part-time work. About 27 to 32 
percent — one third—  of total employed women had part-time job 
contracts (Table 4.12). Women often had to choose part-time jobs 
either because of young children, or because of other familial 
constraints. In spite of the government's effort to support 
working wives and working mothers, women's household chores 
restricted women's economic activities considerablly.
Neither the communist pledge of sexual equality, nor women's 
full-scale labour participation, nor their vocational 
qualifications, established sexual equality in income. 
Nevertheless, women's penetration of all the economic sectors 
made them visible, and provided a significant amount of
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independence from their husbands and fathers.
Table 4.12 Proportion of Part-Time Workers
in Total Women Workers
Economic Sector Year
(in %) 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989
Total in Economy 32 33 29 27 27
Industry 24 28 26 26 26
Manu f actur ing 46 49 50 47 45
Construct ion 30 31 28 28 30
Agr/Min/Fishing 25 35 31 29 27
Transportation 22 24 22 21 21
Communication 53 52 49 47 46
Trade 41 41 37 33 33
Other Production 33 32 29 28 29
Social Service 36 33 28 25 24
Under this: __ ................ ...-— ..— _....
Health-Care 29 30 28 25 25
Education 37 30 26 23 20
* Source: Frauen in der DDR, 1989, p. 43.
4.4.4 Women in Leadership Positions in the Economy
As they earned less money than men, GDR women were less 
likely to be found in leadership positions. Women working in a 
female dominated economic sector — i.e., education, health-care, 
and trade—  reached to leadership positions more easily, but not 
in proportion to their numbers and vocational qualifications 
(Frauenreport '90, p. 94) . In the education sector where 82 
percent of the employees who graduated from Fachschule or 
university or College were female, about 25 percent of top 
administrative positions were occupied by women, which was the 
highest female proportion at the top level of any economic 
sector. By contrast, in the health-care sector where 75 percent 
of the highly qualified employees were women, less than 3 percent
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of top positions were assigned to women, which was the lowest 
female proportion at the top level. In agriculture, where less 
than 30 percent of highly qualified employees were female, 40 
percent of middle range managerial positions, 20 percent of high 
level managerial positions, and about 5 percent of top level 
administrative positions were occupied by women. Therefore, 
irrespective of vocational qualifications, women were more likely 
to be found in the lower level or middle level of management, and 
much less likely to be found in the top positions.
4. 5 Women, Children, and the Family
GDR laws and decrees prescribed that both spouses should 
share all the responsibility for household chores, bringing up 
children, and financial matters. The previous custom of husband's 
right to familial decisions and to the headship of the family was 
denied. Also GDR laws and decrees provided for child-care 
facilities as the responsibility of all the enterprises and 
society. However, there still remained heavier burdens on women 
than on men in child-caring, in household chores, and in managing 
the home.
4.5.1 Motherhood and Child-Care
The GDR government endeavoured to combine women's employment 
and motherhood. A long maternity leave and the Baby Year, the 
provision of time-off to take care of a sick child (AGB §186), 
and the provision of a day off for household chores (AGB §185)
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enabled women to accommodate both motherhood and work outside the 
home. The fully provided child-care facilities and care for 
younger pupils after school hours also helped women to combine 
the family and work. Many creches and kindergartens were provided 
for the working or studying mothers free of charge. In 1989, 80 
percent of babies up to three years of age were cared for in 
creches (Kinderkrippen), and 95 percent of young children between 
three to six years of age were accommodated in Kindergartens 
(Table 4.13). Community child-care was subsidised by the state 
and parental contributions were minimal (Alsop, 1992, p. 191).
As a result, the fertility rate increased again after a 
short period of sharp drop, and remained stable until the mid- 
1980s. The birth rate in every 1,000 population of the GDR became
larger 
Table 4
than that 
.13 Child
of the FRG after the 
-Care Facilities
1970s (Table 4. 14) .
Year Number of 
Facilities
Number of 
Nurses
Total
Capacity
The Accepted 
per 1,000”
C/N2*
1955 8,527 21,575 350,332 345 16.24
1965 12,921 36,636 555,472 528 15.16
1975 12,218 52,986 701,809 846 13.25
1980 12,233 56,605 664,478 922 11.74
1985 13,148 69,612 788,232 940 11.32
1989 13,452 73,383 717,140 951 10.18
* Note 1). Accommodated Children in every 1000 Children aged three to six.
* Note 2). Children/Nurses Ratio
* Source: Statlatiachea Jahrbuch der DDR, 1990, p. 329.
By protecting and privileging motherhood, and providing full 
child-care facilities, the GDR achieved both stabilisation of the 
fertility rate and women's participation in the work force on a 
large scale. However, a retrospective survey of 1991 reported
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that, under the guise of privileged motherhood, GDR full-time 
employed mothers tended to spend more time on their children than 
FRG working mothers (Table 4.15).
Table 4.14 Birth Rate in the GDR and the 7RG
Year GDR FRG Birth Rate3
Fertility Rate3 Birth Rate3
1960 83.9 17.0 17.4
1970 70.1 13.9 13.4
1980 67.4 14.7 10.1
1989 57.4 12.1 11.0
* Note 1). Fertility Rate: the number of children born to every 1,000 women
aged from 15 to 45.
* Note 2). Birth Rate: the number of children born to every 1,000 population.
* Sources: for the Fertility Rate of the GDR, Statlatiachea Jahrbuch der DDR,
1990; the Birth Rate of the GDR is calculated by the number of children 
and the total population; for the Birth Rate of the FRG, StBA (1991) 
Statlatiachea Jahrbuch.
Table 4.15 Time-Distribution of GDR and FRG Women
Spent Hours
Women's Job Unemployed Part--Time Full-time
Position
GDR FRG GDR FRG GDR FRG
paid work - - 6.8 4.6 9.3 9.1
Household work 6.3 5.2 5.2 4.3 4.2 2.3
Child-care 4.9 6.3 3.1 5.1 2.6 2.5
F ix ing/Garden 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6
Total Housework 12.4 12.5 9.4 10.3 7.5 5.4
* Source: Jasper, Gerda (1993) nWie stand es In der DDR um die
Oleichberechtigung von Frau und Mann?", unpublished MS.
4.5.2 Marriage and Divorce
When women are economically independent and motherhood is 
protected, irrespective of marital status, increasing numbers 
of divorces are predictable. While the marriage rate in every
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1,000 population was in decline, the divorce rate was increasing 
(Table 4.16). The divorce rate of the GDR was higher than that 
of the FRG by one point per 1,000 population (See, Chapter 
Three). Though the Family Law attempted to reconcile couples and 
prevent the breakdown of marriages, the young generation became 
more demanding, and one third of married couples ended in 
divorce.
Table 4.16 Marriages and Divorces
(per every 1,000 population)
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1985 1989
Marriage 11.7 9.7 7.7 8.0 8.0 7.9
Divorce 2.7 1.4 1.6 2.7 3.1 3.0
* Source: for Marriage, Frauenreport '90, p. 106; for Divorce,
Statlatiachea Jahrbuch der DDR, 1990, p. 417, and Die Frau in der DDR,
1989, p. 29.
Regarding divorce, 45 percent of couples wanted divorce 
within three years of marriage, 20 percent between three and five 
years of marriage (Frauenreport '90, p. 110). In 1989, spouses 
without children filed for 31.9 percent of divorce cases, spouses 
with one child 40.7 percent, and spouses with two children made 
up nearly a quarter of divorce cases (Die Frau in der DDR, 1989, 
p. 29) . Those who with three or more children were reluctant to 
divorce (3.9 percent of cases). However, the number of children 
appeared less influential than the age of spouses: if either both 
spouses, or one of the spouses were younger than 25 years of age, 
the possibility of marriage break down was very high — 29.3 
percent of total divorce cases were taken by them (Ibid., p. 30) .
More women initiated divorce than men. One third of divorce 
cases was initiated by husbands, and the rest by wives. The fact
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that the majority of divorce cases was initiated by women 
suggests that women became less tolerant of conflicts within the 
family. In the past, they had to brace such problem, because they 
were economically dependent on husbands, or because they were 
afraid of the stigma of divorce which was once fatal for women. 
Yet, women still faced more burdens in child-care, household 
chores, and familial relations.
4.5.3 Household Work
Time distribution of household work largely depended on the 
family's economic position, especially on vocational 
qualifications. The workers' families (Arbeiter) spent a lot more 
time in household work, while the intellectual families — i.e., 
both spouses graduated university or college—  spent the least 
time in household work (Frauenreport '90, p. 127) . On average, 
two or three hours per day were assigned to household work by 
both spouses. In the typical family of workers — i.e., consisting 
of husband, wife, and children—  wives spent twice as much time 
as their husbands in household chores (Table 4.17).
Table 4.17 Distribution of Household Chores in the Family
Year 1965 
H,M/Week0 %
1970
H,M/Week %
1985 
H,M/Week %
Wife 37,42 79.4 37,06 78.7 26,43 58.7
Husband 5,30 11.6 6,06 13.0 11,54 26.3
Others 4,18 9.0 3,54 8.3 6,53 15.0
Total 47,30 100 47,06 100 45,30 100
* Note 1). H,M/Week: Time spent in Hours, Minutes per Week.
* Sources: for 1965 and 1970, Shaffer, (1981), p. 145; for 1985,
Sozialreport '90, p. 269.
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In 1988 there was an interesting survey about the division 
of household chores between spouses (Sozialreport '90, pp. 270- 
273; Frauenreport '90, pp. 127-131). The result eloquently shows 
that traditional notions of different male and female roles still 
survived. Both men and women answered cleaning and washing were 
predominantly wives' work, and weekend shopping and crockery 
washing-up could be shared (Table 4.18). Ironically, a larger 
proportion of men thought more work could be shared than women. 
While 44 percent of women thought daily shopping could be shared, 
56 percent of men were willing to share. In the same token, while 
79 percent of women answered that laundry was the wife's job, 67 
percent of men thought so. Overall, more women regarded most of 
household work as their responsibility than men.
Table 4.18 Which Household Work should be Shared 
between the Spouses?
Household Work that should be shared. Women's Answer Hen' s answer
(%) (%)
Weekend Shopping 61 60
Daily Shopping 44 56
Dish Washing 51 55
Vacuum Cleaning 44 51
Going to Bank etc. 44 51
Preparing Heals 36 38
Cleaning 31 32
Household Work that is Wife's Job. Women's Answer Hen' s Answer
(%) (%)
Laundry 79 67
Cleaning 59 50
Preparing Heals 53 43
Small Reparation 42 36
Dish Washing 36 22
Daily Shopping 34 24
* Source: Sozialreport, '90, p.270 and 272. Two tables are combined.
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Consequently, despite their heavier burden in household 
work, a majority of women were satisfied with the division of 
household chores (Table 4.19), which resonates the legacy of the 
Three Ks. After all, the kitchen was the women's sphere. Despite 
women's labour participation, traditional gender relations were 
still prevailing in the family, though weakening as a matter of 
fact.
Table 4.19 Satisfaction over Sharing Household Work
The Extent of Satisfaction 1982 1988
Women Men
Very Satisfied 12 11
Satisfied 55 64
Half and Half 34 31 23
Unsatisfied 3 2 2
* Source: Sozialreport, '90, p. 271.
4. 6. Women in Politics
Though still under-represented, GDR women became visible in 
politics. Women composed nearly a third of delegates in the 
People's Congress (Volkskammer). A few women became ministers and 
played important roles in the party committees. However, women 
were more likely to be found at the local level or at a lower 
level of politics than at the centre. The only women's 
organisation in the GDR was a mere echo of the SED. Yet, GDR 
women's political representation, at least formally, was in far 
better shape than that of their western sisters.
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4.6.1 Women in the People's Congress (Volkskammer)
In the Constitution, the People's Congress was bestowed all 
the powers expected of an elected parliament. However, this 
Congress was only a rubber-stamp, opening for less than one month 
during its five year term, and confirming all the proposals and 
laws initiated by the SED controlled government. It is 
implausible to assume that the proportion of women among the 
delegates gave a genuine picture of women's political 
representation. However, the proportion of women in the 
parliament was higher (on average 29 percent), and women were 
better-represented, than in the FRG (Table 4.20).
Table 4.20 Women Delegates in the Congress
(in Percentage)
Session Total
Delegates
Women
Delegates
% of 
Women
Opening 
Days 1}
1950-1954 466 1112* 23.8 49
1954-1958 466 128 27.5 36
1958-1963 466 114 24.5 27
1963-1967 434 115 26.5 27
1967-1971 434 129 29.7 20
1971-1976 500 159 31.8 18
1976-1981 500 168 33.6 13
1981-1986 500 162 32.4 -
1986-1989 500 161 32.2
* Note 1) Total opening days of the Congress for the whole term.
* Note 2) According to Gast (1973), there were 92 women delegates in the first
Congress. However, the record in the DFD-Archives wrote 111 female 
delegates, of whom 107 delegates were named. I follow the DFO record.
* Sources: from the first to the third, a record in the DFD-Archive in
Berlin; from the fourth to the ninth, Statiatischea Jahrbuch der DDR, 
1964, 1968, 1972, 1978, 1982, 1986.
Women representatives were more easily found in local 
assemblies: in 1981 around 35 percent of community assembly
delegates, 42 percent of District assembly delegates, and 39
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percent of county assembly delegates were women (Edwards, 1985, 
p. 99) . Women were better represented in urban than in rural 
areas, and better at the local than at the national level.
4.6.2 Women in Governing Bodies
The highest organ of GDR government was the Council of 
Ministers (Ministerrat), composed of 45 ministers with a five 
year term. Of more than one hundred of ministers ever appointed 
to the Council of Ministers, only six were women, including two 
ministerial officials (Ministerrang)14. The four women ministers 
were Else Zaisser, Hilde Benjamin, Margarete Wittkowski, and 
Margot Honecker;15 and the two ministerial officials Greta 
Kuckhoff and Elli Schmidt. All six women were members of the 
former KPD, and then the SED. Since Zaisser and Benjamin had 
studied law and education, respectively, and had been zealots of 
the KPD since 1920s, their position in the government could be
14 Ministerial officials (Ministerrang) were members of the 
Ministerrat, but did not have an independent responsibility over 
a specific ministry.
15 Else Zaisser was minister of education from 1952 to 1953. 
Her husband Wilhelm Zaisser was also a minister, in charge of the 
notorious Stasi (Staatssicherheit) until 1953. Both of them were 
zealots of the KPD since 1926. She studied pedagogy.
Hilde Benjamin was in charge of the ministry of Justice, 
form 1953 to 1967. She joined in the KPD in 1927 as a law student 
and worked as a public prosecutor (Staatsamraeltin) • Her husband 
was murdered in 1944 by the Nazis.
Margarete Wittkowski was not minister in title, but 
President of German Bank from 1967-1974, and became regular 
member of the Council of Minister from 1972 to 1974. Therefore 
I put her in a ministerial position.
Margot Honecker was minister of education since 1963 till 
the end of the Honecker government. She was the second wife of 
Erich Honecker. Before she joined in the KPD in 1945, she was a 
shorthand typist. She got married in 1954, and since then had 
been a head of department in the ministry of education until 
1963, when she formally took the seat of minister.
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regarded as a reward for their contribution and competence in 
building the communist regime. Wittkowski was an expert in 
banking. All of them were cadre members of the SED (Gast, 1973) .
At the local level, women began to be elected as mayors 
shortly after the war. However, at that stage their number was 
very small (approximately 1 percent in 1947: Edwards, 1985, p. 
100) . In the 1950s and 1960s women became mayors in a large 
number of the cities and larger towns. In 1981, 23.6 percent of 
total mayors were women. Mayors in the GDR were not merely 
representative figures but had many tasks and responsibilities 
in local government, and hence were required to have higher 
qualifications. Therefore, the existence of many women mayors 
reflected the possible acceptance of the political significance 
and competence of women in the GDR. However, in the governing 
bodies, too, women were better represented at the local level 
than at national level.
4.6.3 Women in the SED
Despite having a high and growing female membership, the SED 
also revealed women's under-representation. In 1981, women 
composed 33.7 percent of total party members (Helwig, 1982, p. 
113),16 but had never been elected as regular members to the 
locus of power, the Politburo of the Central Committee. Only four 
women had been elected as candidate members: Elli Schmidt, Edith 
Baumann (Edith Honecker until 1954), Margarete Mueller, and
16 The proportion of female membership in the SED varied: it 
was 21.5 percent in April 1946; 23.9 percent in May 1947; 20 
percent in April 1954; 26.5 percent in December 1966; 28.7
percent in June 1971; and 31.3 percent in March 1977 (Edwards, 
1985, p. 106).
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Inge(borg) Lange.17 Since the Politburo consisted of twenty-one 
regular members and four candidates (after 1973, before there 
were 5 regular members and 2 candidates), four women candidates 
during four decades were disproportionately low, particularly 
compared with the rather high proportion of women in the 
Congress. Outside the Politburo, women held nineteen regular 
seats (out of 189 total seats: 10 percent) and five candidate 
seats (out of 24 total seats: 20 percent) in the Central 
Committee (in 1981: DDR Handbuch II, p. 1541) . Therefore, in the 
SED as well, GDR women were consistently found at a lower level 
and at the local level of politics, where less responsibility and 
less political power were bestowed.
4.6.4 The Democratic Women's Federation of Germany
The Democratic Women's Federation of Germany (Demokratische 
Frauenbund Deutschland: DFD) was the only women's organisation, 
and one of the nine constituent organisations in the National 
Front. It was established in 1945 as the Anti-Fascist Women's
17 Elli Schmidt was journalist, and member of the KPD since 
1927. During 1946-1953, she was elected in the Party Committee, 
and 1950-1953 candidate member of the SED Politburo. She was also 
minister rank official in the Commission for Trade and Supply.
Edith Baumann was the first wife of Honecker, and acted in 
the SPD before its merger into the SED. She held the post of 
Secretary of Central Committee of the SED, during 1950-1953 and 
1961-1963. She was candidate member of the Politburo from 1958- 
1963.
Margarete Mueller was a party functionary, and became 
candidate member of the Politburo in 1963. She held the post 
until 1989.
Inge(borg) Lange studied sociology, and edited party 
pamphlets. She joined the KPD in 1945, and became a member of the 
SED since its merger. She had been in charge of women policy, and 
was head of the Department of Women in the SED Central Committee. 
She also held the post of Secretary of the Central Committee.
Of the four, three women held the post of Secretary of the 
Central Committee.
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Committee, and changed its name into the DFD.
It was organised in accordance with the model of the SED, 
the same number of local organisations and a similar structure. 
Its highest organ was the Federal Congress, which was assumed to 
open every four years. The Federal Committee of the DFD was 
equivalent of the Central Committee of the SED, and was 
responsible for its programme, organisation, financial affairs, 
and normal administration in between the Congresses. The 
Presidency of the DFD was held by only one person, Use Thiele, 
who was a functionary of the SED, and a member of the Central 
Committee. The objective of the DFD was to "bridge the party 
(SED) policies and women through the DFD, and to build socialist 
consciousness (sozialistisches Bewusstsein) in women” (Helwig, 
1982, p. 117). It also pursued the enhancement of women's 
vocational qualifications. In 1967, it established a "Women's 
Academy" (Frauenakademie), and provided a highly political adult 
education. In 1982, it gathered 1.4 Million members, of which 
66.5 percent were younger than 35 years of age.
Though it was an echo of the SED, the fact that the DFD was 
one of the constituent organisations of the National Front and 
sent many women to the People's Congress allowed GDR women easier 
access to national politics. However, the lack of critical 
discussion of existing gender relations and its absolute 
compliance with SED policies limited its role and influence in 
politics.
As a whole, GDR women in politics were in appearance more 
visible than those of the FRG. Many women delegates in the 
People's Congress and local assemblies, women as heads of public
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administrative bodies, and the existence of women's mass 
organisation did not fall short of statistical comparison with 
any other countries. However, women were better represented at 
lower levels and in local politics. The sharp drop of female 
figures at the top level of politics reveals a de facto under­
representation of women. Also, women figures in politics repeated 
the intention of the SED in unison. The absence of women's own 
voice was one of the main targets of the Western criticism.
4. 7 Summary
GDR women enjoyed better life-chances than their western 
sisters in many respects. The law guaranteed them a full array 
of equality between the sexes; women and men had rights and 
duties to work, rights to education and employment; the law 
imposed on the state and society the responsibility of protection 
and promotion for women; the law revoked husbands' rights which 
traditionally restricted women's activity outside the home; 
furthermore, the law articulated that household chores should be 
shared between the spouses. GDR women, at least under law, 
received in some instances preferential treatment. Accordingly, 
they made certain progress in improving their conditions.
In education, they obtained an almost equal position and 
enhanced qualifications: in the Fachschule, women overshadowed 
men; women penetrated more widely in the university than in other 
school systems, and composed 48.5 percent of university and 
college students. At work, women composed 48.8 percent of the
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labour force, and contributed to the economy. Women provided 47 
percent of total skilled workers, 64 percent of total Fachschule 
graduates, and 40 percent of total university and college 
graduates. In politics, they became visible as delegates and 
administrators. They comprised 32 percent of the People's 
Congress delegates and approximately 40 percent of local assembly 
delegates; many women also took responsibility as mayors.
However, there remained persistent sexual inequality. In 
education, women were still concentrated in the "female 
subjects." At work, women were assigned to lower levels of 
responsibility, and to lower levels of wage/salary class; also 
there remained "female jobs" in the work place. Women still 
suffered slim opportunities to get wage rises and to reach top 
posts. In politics, women were less represented at the higher 
level of politics. Also, at home, women still shouldered a double 
burden, and did household chores twice as long as their husbands. 
Therefore, many feminists fell into deep despair because they 
found a lack of critical voice and impetus towards sexual 
equality in GDR women. Many of them perceived the formal equality 
in the GDR as a mere tokenism, or, at best, "a gift from above."
Nevertheless, GDR women's achievements in education, 
employment, and in politics, though much limited and slow, were 
paving the way towards sexual equality. The collapse of the GDR 
deprived them of opportunities to take advantage of the socialist
N
ideology of women's emancipation, and to widen their confidence 
and ability in employment. However, their encounter with their 
questioning sisters in the West will give them a new chance to 
rethink what they achieved, and how they could secure their past
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achievement. In this regard, the establishment of the Independent 
Women's Association (Unabhaengige Frauenverband: UFV) in 1989 
demands attention, since GDR women began to advance again to 
improve their situation by their own demands and struggles.
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CHAPTER FIVE
WOMEN IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
5. 1 Introduction
Since the end of World War Two, the Republic of Korea (ROK: 
South Korea) has encountered a full array of political changes 
— e.g., division of its nation; a three-year civil war; a 
dictatorship based on charismatic mass popularity; a students' 
uprising which defeated the dictatorship; two military coups and 
military governments; and nine Constitutional modifications and 
alterations. Despite political instability, its economy has grown 
rapidly, propelling it into the ranks of the industrialised world 
and the status of twelfth largest trading state (The Financial 
Times, 29, Oct. 1991) .
The strict norm of women's confinement at home in the Korean 
tradition lost much of its control during Japanese colonisation 
and the Korean War (1950-1953) . More and more women participated 
in the labour market, at first for the war effort, and later for 
economic growth. However, there remained many feudal and 
patriarchal social relations, to which the legislature and 
government paid only meagre attention. The moderate, but 
persistent, women's movement has strived to establish sexual 
equality, and had induced many legal reforms by the late 1980s.
5.1.1 Authoritarian Government and Controlled Economy
The Republic of Korea maintained the appearance of liberal
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democracy since the war: a multi-party system has been sustained, 
though the opposition parties have never succeeded in winning 
power; and people have participated in the political process 
through elections on regular basis. In reality, however, the 
authoritarian executive and the President were in full control 
of ROK politics until the mid-1980s. The domination of the 
executive was the result of three factors: the low level of 
institutionalisation of the parties; traditional elitism and 
supremacy of the bureaucracy; and, most of all, the need of the 
military leaders for economic achievement.
First, despite their commanding might in the National 
Assembly, the ruling parties have been dependent upon Presidents 
for their viability, and have collapsed with the Presidents. The 
opposition parties have also relied on the popularity and 
characteristics of their leaders. The splits among the opposition 
parties in many cases were the outcome of factional power 
struggles among their leaders, not of ideological differences.
Secondly, governmental officials in the Chosun Dynasty 
cherished elitism, which, combined with deference, left behind 
the legacy of an authoritarian bureaucracy. Japanese colonial 
rule and the military coup after independence fortified the 
elitist, supremacist, but efficient bureaucracy.
Thirdly, the military government concentrated on economic 
development, as the junta of 1961 claimed to have come to power 
to save the country from 'communist threat and poverty'. Its 
developmental strategy empowered the executive to interfere with 
the market and society to a great extent. The military modified 
the market economy with comprehensive national economic plans —
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the Five-Year Economic Development Plan. To achieve its planned 
economic growth,1 the government provided thick protection and 
privileges for industries, while oppressing the labour movement 
and controlling the consumer prices of most basic goods.
Behind the successful economic growth, labour's rights and 
social welfare were impaired: industrial action was severely
restricted; industrial disasters passed by unnoticed; and 
national health insurance and national pension schemes did not 
cover all the populace until as late as 1988, and are not yet in 
full force (Choi Sook-Hee, 1992).
The challenge to the authoritarian government sprang up 
forcefully during the mid-1980s, however. Despite oppressive 
military control and severe restrictions on election campaigns, 
the opposition parties, which had been banned in 1980 and rebuilt 
only months before the national election of 1984, won enough 
seats in the National Assembly to voice popular demand for 
democratisation. The parliamentary opposition tallied with the 
citizens' and students' anti-military demonstrations, forcing the 
President to promise democratisation. The 1987 Constitution was 
the first amendment achieved through government-opposition 
collaboration. The new Constitution and the heightened citizens' 
power kindled hopes of a democratic political order.
1 During the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan 
(1962-66) the average GNP growth rate was 7.8 percent per year; 
in the Second (1967-71), 9.6 percent; in the Third (1972-1976), 
9.7 percent; and in the Fourth (1977-1981), 5.8 percent. From the 
Fifth Plan onwards, the government added an adjective "socio-" 
to the plan. During the Fifth Socio-Economic Development Plan 
(1982-86), the average GNP growth rate was 8.6 percent a year; 
and during the Sixth, 7.3 percent (Yeon Ha-cheung, 1988).
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5.1.2 Marginalised Women's Issues
As most parties have been conservative or liberal, the party 
programmes have not shown significant differences either among 
the opposition parties, or between the ruling and opposition 
parties.2 All radical parties failed to win seats in the National 
Assembly, and consequently disappeared.
The conservatism of Korean parties, along with the 
authoritarian political order, hampered the changes in social 
relations. Even when the authoritarian bureaucracy took the 
initiative on a social issue — e.g., the modification of the 
Civil Code—  the National Assembly rejected it on the ground that 
it 'defied traditional values'. Women's issues were at best 
incorporated into family issues, or left untouched. Legal reforms 
for sexual equality, therefore, were initiated, supported, and 
fought for by the women's movement.
5. 2 The Status of Women Under the Law
Until as late as 1989, ROK women were discriminated against 
under the law: the Civil Code hindered sexual equality in the 
family; and the Labour Standards Law did not provide the 
principle of equal pay for equal work. While the alterations of 
the Constitution were plentiful, amendments of the Civil Code or
2 The Korean War and Confucianism shaped Korean political 
culture. Mass killings during the War led many elderly South 
Koreans to abhor communism, while Confucianism instructed people 
to obey the authorities without question. Confucianism and anti­
communism have inhibited the prospects of socialist and radical 
parties (Academy of Korean Politics, 1986, pp.270-297; Kim Untae 
et al. 1989, pp.232-275).
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Labour Law were processed slowly and noisily. Not until the 1987 
Constitution specifically stated women's rights in the family and 
employment did the struggle of the women's movement fare well.
5.2.1 Constitutional Promises of Sexual Equality
The first Constitution of 1948 promised sexual equality 
unconditionally: all citizens, men and women, had equal rights 
(Article 5) ; and any previous law remained in force unless it 
contradicted the provisions of the Constitution (Article 127). 
These provisions were supposed to revoke many laws that infringed 
on women's equal rights. In reality, however, laws discriminating 
against women remained valid.3 The National Assembly passed the 
bill for the Civil Code in 1958, which came into force in 1960, 
fifteen years after independence.
Despite the ups and downs of human rights provisions by 
alterations of the Constitution, the equal rights provision did 
not show much variation, except in the 1987 Constitution. The 
1987 Constitution, in addition to the general provision of equal 
rights (Article 11, (1)), provided that female labour shall be 
protected, and that women shall not be discriminated against in 
employment, wages, and working conditions (Article 32, (4)).
Also, Art.34 obliges the state to improve women's welfare and 
equal rights. Marriage and family life are based on the 
individual's dignity and sexual equality, and the state takes 
responsibility to protect maternity (Article 36) . Accordingly the
3 In 1954, wives' ability to initiate a legal case was 
denied, and in 1955, the restriction on mothers' parental 
authority was declared constitutional by the Supreme Court (Pae 
Kyung-Sook, 1993).
164
Sexual Equality Employment Law was promulgated in 1987, and 
amended in 1989. Modification of the Civil Code followed in 1989.
5.2.2 The Family Law
Before a written civil code was first implanted by the 
Japanese colonial government in 1912 (The Regulation of Civil 
Relations in Chosun: Chosun Minsaryung), private relations in 
Korea were regulated by common law —  i.e., Confucian instructions 
(Chung Gwang-Hyun, 1968). Though the Regulation contributed to 
improving women's legal status, by coding women's status on 
paper, it denied wives' legal capacity and restricted women's 
rights far more than the German Civil Code.
The 1960 Civil Code was an amendment of the colonial 
Regulation rather than a promulgation of a new code. Immediately 
after the legislation of the Civil Code, the women's movement 
issued the "Ten Points Programme”, protesting against ten 
discriminatory aspects of the Civil Code (Lee Tae-Young, 1989):
1. The family register, the headship of a family system, and 
its succession through paternal lineage (§778-799; §980-996)
reinforced the patriarchal social order.4 The family register 
provided a tangible entity for a paternal lineage; and the head
4 To understand Korean family law, it is essential to 
recognise the importance of the family register and clan. All 
members of a clan share the same surname and origin, and are 
assumed to be related by blood, or, to belong to a family. Each 
clan has an original family register, and each family has a 
branch family register. The relative relationship, sometimes even 
several tens of times removed, can be recognised by the original 
family register. Though the Civil Code does not recognise the 
original family register, it still uses many expressions derived 
from the original family register — e.g., in the wording of 
"legal setting-up of a branch family", "compulsory setting-up of 
a branch family" and so forth.
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of a family was the archetypal patriarch. The headship of the 
family was part of inheritance (Sangsock), not a simple object 
of succession or continuation (Seunggye) . The heirship (Sangsock- 
Gif on) of the family headship was a duty, since renouncing the 
heirship was prohibited (§991). The largest legal portion of 
property for the heir of the family headship was ensured (§1009) . 
In addition, when the head of a family died without a son, the 
Civil Code allowed adoption of a son, so that the son should 
succeed to the headship (§867).
2. The definition of relatives that held legal efficacy was 
inequitable: maternal relatives by blood were recognised up to 
four times removed, compared with paternal relatives by blood who 
were recognised up to eight times removed; and husbands' 
relatives, paternally and maternally, were fully recognised, but 
wives' relatives, except their parents, were not regarded as 
relatives in legal terms.
3. The prohibition of marriage between the parties whose 
surname and origin are the same (§809) caused a ridiculously 
wide-ranging restriction on marriage.5
4. The Civil Code ignored wives' contribution to obtaining 
property, either through their employment or dowry, or through 
(unpaid) household work: any property of which the title was 
uncertain, whether it belonged to the husband or wife, was 
assumed to be the property of the husband (§830, 2).
5 The Korean "surname" represents an original legendary 
ancestor, and the "origin of surname" means the place where the 
ancestor first settled down more than a millennium ago. In Korea, 
about 220 surnames are recognised as distinguishable clans among 
the alleged 70 million population, including North Koreans and 
Korean descendants abroad.
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5. Housewives' economic prospects after divorce were 
threatened because the Civil Code did not provide a spouse's 
right to claim a share of property in the case of divorce.
6. The Civil Code did not provide a proper procedure for 
divorce by agreement (§834-835). §834 read very simply: "husband 
and wife may effect divorce by agreement." As a result, many 
illiterate women found themselves divorced with empty hands 
without their genuine agreement, or by fraud.
7. The Civil Code gave the sole parental power to the father 
(§909). If a child had no father, or the father was unable to 
exercise parental power for any reason, the child's mother with 
whom the child was residing exercised parental power (§909, 2) . 
If a divorced woman or a widow remarried, she was not granted 
parental authority over the children born to her during her 
previous marriage, even after the father of the children died 
(§909, 5). The Civil Code was also silent on the parental right 
to contact their children in the case of divorce. These 
provisions led many women to give up any hope of divorce or 
remarriage, and to exert themselves to remain in (the first and 
must-be-only) marriage for the sake of the children, echoing the 
traditional Rule of the Three Obediences.
8. The Civil Code forced women to be in a mother and child 
relationship with their husbands' children, while distinguishing 
lawful mothers from stepmothers. Wives entered a mother and child 
relationship with their husbands' children born outside of 
wedlock, when their husbands recognised the children, regardless 
of their opinion (§773: Juckmo-Soja gwangye: lawful mother-
illegitimate child relationship) . Also, women by marriage entered
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a mother and child relationship with the (legitimate) children 
of their husbands (§774: Gyemo-Ja gwangye: stepmother-legitimate 
child relationship). Stepmothers, however, were not allowed 
parental authority over the children, unless they were appointed 
as guardians after the death of their husbands (§912). By 
contrast, men were not regarded as the fathers of the children 
born to the previous marriage of their wives: the children and 
stepfather were relatives by affinity (§777).
9. The provisions of succession were obviously 
discriminatory: women could not succeed to the headship of a 
family (§981); sons and male descendants took precedence over 
daughters and female descendants in inheritance rights (§1000); 
and the legal portion of female relatives for inheritance was 
smaller than that of male relatives (§1009).
10. The provisions concerning succession lacked a reserve 
system. A compulsory legal portion of inheritance for the family 
of the deceased was deemed necessary, in case husbands abandoned 
their wives and children, and left nothing for them.
In 1973, the women's movement stood together in union, and 
initiated a draft bill which focused on these Ten Points. It took 
two years for female parliamentarians to propose the draft in the 
National Assembly, and another three years to debate. In 1977, 
the National Assembly passed the bill, amending five out of the 
ten points: the family property of which the title is uncertain 
is assumed to be the joint property of the spouses (§808: the 
fourth point); divorce by agreement requires confirmation 
procedure by the Familial Court (§836, 1: the sixth point); both 
parents share parental power (§909, 1-2: the seventh point); an
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inheritance shall be divided by equal proportion among the heirs 
who have the same precedence, regardless of sex (§1009: the ninth 
point); and a legal portion of inheritance for the family of the 
deceased is reserved (§1122-1118: the tenth point).
The remaining five points were debated for the following 
decade, until the Civil Code was modified again in 1989. Though 
the new Civil Code did not abolish the headship of family system 
(the first point) , it made the headship of a family an object of 
continuation (Seunggye) . The successor ship (Seunggye-Kwon) of the 
family headship is renounceable (§991) , and open to women. The 
adoption of a son to succeed the headship of a family was 
repealed. The scope of relatives is now decided by the same 
computation between men and women (the second point) : both
paternal and maternal relatives by blood are within the eighth 
degree of relationship; relatives by affinity are within the 
fourth degree of relationship from the husband and wife. In 
divorce cases, both spouses have the right to claim a share of 
property regardless of whether he or she contributed to the 
accumulation of property by paid employment (§839, 2: the fifth 
point) . Custody of the children is to be decided by the divorce 
agreement (§837, 1), and a parent who does not reside with the 
children has the right to contact their children (§837, 2). The 
forced mother and child relationship between the wife and the 
children of her husband is abolished (the eighth point). The 
prohibition of marriage between the parties whose surnames and 
origins are the same, however, remained intact (the third point) . 
Yet, this third point was not sexually discriminating. Therefore, 
the Civil Code nearly reached sexual equality in the family.
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5.2.3 Labour Laws
The first Constitution of 1948 obliged the state to 
legislate labour standards and to protect female and minor labour 
(Article 17) . Accordingly, the Labour Standards Law (1953) 
provided for the protection of female and minor labour,6 but it 
missed the principle of equal pay for equal work. The principle 
was assumed to be included in the general equal treatment 
provision (§5): an employer shall not discriminate among workers 
by sex, and shall not discriminate among their working conditions 
by their nationality or creed or social status. However, the law 
allowed employers a wide range of freedom to determine the 
working conditions by agreement with the employees. In the work 
contract, many employers inserted such clauses as women's early 
retirement and dismissal upon marriage, and assigned women to 
low-paid jobs, paying them less than half of men's wages. Also, 
this Law dealt only with working conditions in the work place, 
not with equal opportunities to be employed. The Labour Standards 
Law was amended six times, but not until the Sexual Equality 
Employment Law (1988) came into force was the practice of women's 
earlier retirement challenged.
The Sexual Equality Employment Law was to secure equal
6 Neither females nor minors under eighteen years of age 
were authorised to engage in any work detrimental to morality or 
harmful to health (provided by a Presidential Decree: §51) .
Neither females nor minors were authorised to perform overnight 
or holiday work, unless there was approval from the Bureau of 
Labour (later the Minister of Labour) . Females' overtime work was 
limited (§57), and females could not be placed inside a pit 
(§58). Maternity leave was guaranteed for sixty days during 
pregnancy, another thirty days after giving birth, with pay (§60, 
1). Pregnant female workers were to be transferred to light and 
easy work upon request (§60, 2) . A female worker with an infant 
under one year of age was allowed twice a day for nursing for not 
less than thirty minutes on each occasion (§61).
170
opportunity and treatment for employees regardless of their sex, 
to protect the maternal role of women, and to develop the 
capabilities of female employees and, thus, to enhance the status 
of females and to promote their welfare (§1) . As soon as it was 
passed in the National Assembly, however, this law came under 
fire because it still missed the principle of equal pay for equal 
work and a definition of discrimination against female labour. 
Not least this law was criticised because it presumed women's 
foremost role as mothers (RCKW et. al., 1991; Kim Elim, 1989). 
As a result, the law was amended in the next year.
The amended Sexual Equality Employment Law of 1989 provided 
a definition of the term "discrimination" and the principle of 
"equal pay for work of equal value."7 The term "discrimination" 
refers to when an employer unreasonably differentiates between 
workers with respect to recruitment or working conditions, or 
takes a disadvantageous action because of gender, marital status, 
status in a family, or pregnancy (§2-2, 1). Equal opportunities 
and treatment for males and females are guaranteed in recruitment 
and employment (§6), wages (§6-2), education, placement and 
promotion (§7), and in retirement, resignation and dismissal 
(§8) . The criteria on "work of equal value" are technique, 
endeavour, responsibility, working conditions, or others required
7 Instead of the common phrase of "equal pay for equal 
work", the Sexual Equality Employment Law provides the principle 
of "equal pay for work of equal value." The law defines the 
criteria of work of equal value as "technique, endeavour, 
responsibility, working conditions or others which are required 
in the process of work"(§6-2,(2)). The Ministry of Labour claims 
that the term "work of equal value" is more precise and clearer, 
and hence more protective of women, than the term "equal work." 
However, there is little difference between the two terms in 
principle. Therefore, I use the two terms interchangeably.
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in the process of work (§6-2, 2). For maternity protection, the 
Sexual Equality Employment Law provides leave of absence for 
female employees with an infant under one year old, upon request 
(§11, 1) . The leave of absence, including the maternity leave of 
the Labour Standards Law (90 days), should not exceed one year, 
but is included in the length of service (§11, 2-3).
Though more advanced than ever before, the Sexual Equality 
Employment Law has many problems. The principle of equal pay for 
work of equal value may well match with the wage system by job- 
specification, or job-analysis. However, Koreans have long been 
paid by occupation and seniority and hence lacked the experience 
of job-analysis by collective agreement. Therefore, many critics 
expect rows from both sides of industry (Cho Soonkyung, 1991; Kim 
Elim, 1991) . More critically, the law is based on the traditional 
sexual division: it provides maternity protection on the ground 
that 'women are responsible, and need to be allowed time, for 
household work' (Kim Elim, 1991; Lee Hyo-Je, 1989); and it 
provides leave of absence for child-rearing only for mothers, 
unlike the GDR and the FRG.
5.2.4 The Penal Code
Four provisions in the Penal Code attract attention: the 
crime of sexual intercourse under pretext of marriage (§304) ; the 
crime of extra-marital affairs (§241 and 242); the crime of rape 
(§297); and the crime of abortion.
The public interventions in privacy, by incriminating sexual 
intercourse under pretext of marriage, or extra marital affairs, 
reflect women's vulnerability to the stigma of losing their
172
virginity before marriage and of divorce resulting from the 
common practice of husbands' adultery. A middle-aged housewife 
had no prospect of employment, and very limited means of living, 
while the Civil Code and legal aid system were insufficient to 
support them in divorce cases. Thus the women's movement has 
supported these interventions as the last resort.
Similar to the FRG Penal Code, the Korean Penal Code defines 
rape as perpetration of sexual intercourse, bv means of violence 
or intimidation, with a female (§297). Therefore, there is no 
rape without violence or intimidation regardless of dissension 
or resistance. Also, men cannot be rape victims. In legal 
practice, the rape victim has to give proof of violence, and 
judges tend to decide in favour of the alleged rapist,8 on the
ground that the victim's resistance to the violence seemed not
strong enough, or the victim's behaviour was improper, or the
victim had many sexual experiences. In the case that the victim
was unconscious or unable to resist, the sexual intercourse 
constitutes "constructive rape" (§299). Although the Penal Code 
does not distinguish rape and constructive rape in punishment, 
judges normally inflict lenient punishment on constructive rape.
The Korean Penal Code prohibits abortion without exception 
(§269-270) . However, the Law concerning the Health of Mothers and 
Children takes precedence over the Penal Code, and allows 
abortion exceptionally on medical, eugenic, and ethical grounds
8 The Korean court does not use the jury system. A judge, or 
a bench of judges decides the case. In Korea, 99 percent of 
judges are male.
(§14).9 Unlike in Germany, Korean women and the women's movement 
have rarely paid attention to the restriction of abortion because 
abortion has in practice been easily available. The discrepancy 
between the law and the practice of abortion can be attributed 
to four factors: first, the high density of the Korean population 
(the second highest in the world next to Hong Kong) , and the 
urgent need of population control turned the Korean government 
to neglect enforcing the law; secondly, the highly practical 
Confucian instructions emphasized human beings, already born, and 
loyalty to parents at the expense of the children, which freed 
Koreans from religious condemnation of abortion; thirdly, for 
unmarried women, the stigma of having children was too grave to 
force them to give birth; and finally, the underdeveloped social 
welfare system failed to provide support for single mothers and 
their children. Child benefits or child allowances have not been 
introduced yet.10 Although a few legal scholars and feminists 
demanded the liberalisation of abortion recently, abortion is not 
a crucial interest for the women's movement, compared to the task 
of improving social welfare, legal reforms, or providing child­
care facilities.
In short, during the late 1980s, there was a flood of
9 An abortion can be legally allowed when the mother or her 
spouse has a hereditary disease (named in a Presidential Decree); 
when the mother or her spouse is infected with a contagious 
disease; when the pregnancy is the result of rape or constructive 
rape; when the pregnancy comes from the relationship between the 
relatives by blood or by affinity who are not allowed to marry 
by law; and when the continuation of the pregnancy may severely 
damage the health of the mother.
10 In 1989, the Law for the Welfare of Mothers and Children 
was promulgated to support the single mother family, but it has 
not been fully supported by the budget.
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legislation and amendments for sexual equality, including the 
amendment of the Civil Code, promulgation of the Law for the 
Welfare of Mothers and Children, amendment of the Law concerning 
the Health of Mothers and Children, and promulgation of the 
Sexual Equality Employment Law. However, there still remains 
sexual inequality in many laws. Sexual equality under the law, 
therefore, requires further endeavours by the women's movement.
5. 3 Women in Education
During the Japanese colonisation, the nationalists perceived 
education as a part of the independence struggle. Under the 
slogan of "knowledge is power", the nationalists and socialists 
appealed to educate women as well as men, and organised many 
night and adult schools to raise national consciousness. When 
Korea regained its sovereignty, universal education was easily 
accepted as a basic principle.
The ultimate goal of South Korean education derives from the 
traditional ideal of "Benefits for all Human Beings (Hongik- 
Ingan)." While the DPRK perceived education as an instrument to 
mould socialist personality, and prescribed objectives 
specifically, the ROK considered education to benefit all human 
beings, and provided rather vague, idealistic objectives. As in 
the FRG, no specific effort has been made to further women's 
education.
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5.3.1 The Education System
The Education Law of 1949 provided a 6-3-3-4 four-stage 
education system, and specified six years of elementary education 
as compulsory, from six years of age to eleven. Secondary 
education is divided into two schools, three years of middle 
school and another three years of high school. Unlike the FRG, 
the ROK does not provide compulsory vocational training courses.
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Figure 5.1 Education System
Primary and middle schools provide for the pupils general 
knowledge and basic humanities. Though middle school education 
is not compulsory, and requires tuition and other costs related
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to study, almost 99 percent of elementary school leavers advance 
to middle school. In 1975, 74.7 percent of middle school leavers 
went to either academic or vocational high school; in 1980, 84.5 
percent; in 1990, 95.7 percent (KSA, 1992, pp. 174-175). By 1990, 
schoo 1-enrolment ratio from six to seventeen year olds became 99 
percent, comprising almost all the school age population. Also, 
the sexual gap in school enrolments was reduced to such an extent 
that in 1990, girls' ratio came to be bigger than boys' (Table 
5.1). Consequently, the average years of educational attainment 
of the populace have increased: in 1960, the average years of 
schooling was 3.86; in 1990, it became 9.54. Also, in the 1980s, 
the generation aged six to nineteen had the same length of 
schooling in both sexes (KSA, 1992, p.169).
Table 5.1 School Enrolment Ratio, Aged 6 to 17 (%)
Year Average Boys (A) Girls(B) B/A*100 (%)
1970 76.7 80.5 72.6 90.2
1975 80.8 84.3 77.0 91.3
1980 91.6 93.3 89.8 96.2
1985 97.1 97.4 96.7 99.3
1990 99.3 99.1 99.5 100.4
* Source: KSA (1992), pp. 172-173.
5.3.2 Sexual Segregation in the Education System
A large number of secondary and higher educational 
institutions in the ROK are single-sex schools. During the late 
nineteenth century, the traditional instruction that "males and 
females over the age of seven may not be seated in the same room" 
was the gravest obstacle in providing formal education for women. 
Therefore, forerunners of women's education established women- 
only schools, as the most acceptable, if not the only, pattern
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of women's education. The rapid expansion of women's education 
and weakening of traditional instructions increased the 
proportion of coeducational schools, and changed sexual 
segregation in secondary education, though not in full scale: in 
1989, 34.5 percent of academic high schools and 43.9 percent of 
vocational high schools were coeducational (Statistical Yearbook 
of Education, 1989).
Women-only schools have contrasting effects. On the one 
hand, women-only schools have provided women with better 
opportunities to cultivate independence and leadership, whilst 
in coeducational schools, a female student may at best be 
elected, or appointed, as vice-chairperson. By separation, female 
students enjoy better opportunities of leadership training. On 
the other hand, single-sex schools reinforce traditional sex- 
stereotypes. Most girls' schools take home management or domestic 
science in the compulsory curricula, while most boys' schools 
take skills training. Female students in the home management 
course learn how to cook, make dresses, and embroider, while in 
the skills training male students learn the principles of 
machinery and vocationally-oriented knowledge. It also has been 
pointed out that female schools' facilities are smaller, and 
their equipment for laboratories and other practice rooms are 
poorer than male schools (White Paper for Women I and II, 1984 
and 1991). Sexual segregation in education, therefore, brings 
about not only different curricula, but also unequal 
opportunities of educational achievement.
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5.3.3 Women in Higher Education
Women's advances in secondary education have not affected 
their proportion in higher education very much. Also, fields of 
study are differentiated by sex (Table 5.2). Nonetheless, women 
students' fields of studies have diversified towards a less sex- 
stereotyped pattern. Women's advancement in the social sciences 
has been remarkable, and women became increasingly interested in 
highly employment-oriented courses: the proportion of women in 
engineering grew by a factor of six, and tripled in agriculture 
or marine fields for three decades. However, the proportion of 
women has never been over thirty percent, and their 
disproportionately strong preferences in arts, education, and 
linguistics/literature and humanities narrowed their spectrum of 
vocational training, and aggravated competition among women in 
employment.
5. 4 Women in Employment
During the rapid economic growth, ROK women participated in 
the labour force on a large scale. In particular, married women's 
employment outpaced single women's, in the labour participation 
rate, in the composition of the female labour force, and in 
numbers by the mid-1980s. However, women's employment structure 
embodied many problems that curtailed women's economic 
independence. First, a large number of women were engaged in the 
family business, farming, or small fisheries, which did not 
reward women in proportion to their labour, if at all. Secondly,
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almost three quarters of women were employed in small factories 
or trade, where the Labour Standards Law was not applied, and 
where their working conditions were never enviable —  i.e., low 
wages, long working hours, no paid leave, and no job security. 
Thirdly, female workers' working hours were, unlike in the two 
Germanies, longer than that of male workers'. Fourthly, 
occupational segregation between the sexes, horizontally and 
vertically, was all too clear. Until the early 1980s, women were 
rarely found in professional or administrative occupations. 
Finally, women's average income remained less than half of men's 
average income.
5.4.1 Women in the Labour Force
In appearance, ROK women's labour participation showed a 
better performance than in the FRG: women composed 40 percent of 
total employees by the end of the 1980s; and women's labour 
participation rate grew by 20 percentage points during three 
decades. Including the school attending population, women's 
activity rate was boosted by 30 percent (Table 5.3).
During 1965 to 1970 when the military government introduced 
the Five-Year Plan, women's labour participation rate increased 
by 11 percent. The growth rate of women's labour participation 
overtook that of men's in the 1980s. In particular, among the 
prime age group of economic activity, aged between 25 and 54, 
women's labour participation rate increased, while men's rate 
reduced. Since a majority of women aged between 25 and 54 are 
married, their increased labour participation implies an increase 
of married women's economic participation. However, the
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numerically strong presence of women in the labour force did not, 
in fact, enhance women's economic situation appropriately —  
female labour is still secondary, and less rewarded.
Table 5.2 Women Students in Higher Education
Distribution of Men Students (in %, Total’=100)
Year 1965 1975 1983 1989
Social Science 33.1 22.2 27.6 31.4
Engineering 21.4 28.7 31.5 28.3
Literature/Humanities 14.1 9.1 12.4 14.4
Agri/For/Fish/Marine 11.3 8.6 7.4 6.6
Medical Science 7.6 6.9 4.0 3.4
Natural Science 7.1 5.2 7.3 8.2
Arts/Sports 3.1 2.5 2.4 3.6
Education 2.4 9.5 7.2 4.2
General 0.0 7.3 0.2 0.0
Distribution of Women Students (in %, Total=100)
1965 1975 1983 1989
Literature/Humanities 32.4 12.2 25.0 30.0
Arts/Sports 16.7 15.8 13.5 13.1
Natural Science 16.2 13.1 15.1 9.7
Medical Science 13.3 11.1 5.2 5.0
Education 10.2 29.8 27.7 14.2
Social Science 8.1 6.0 9.7 24.0
Agri/For/Fish/Marine 2.5 2.5 2.0 4.2
Engineering 0.6 1.0 1.4 4.5
General 8.5 0.4
Number of W-Students 23,761 55,439 199,449 284,493
Proportion of Women Students in Each Field
1965 1975 1983 1989
Literature/Humanities 40.0 32.7 41.4 43.9
Arts/Sports 61.6 69.8 65.7 57.8
Natural Science 40.0 47.3 41.8 30.6
Medical Science 33.8 36.5 31.4 35.3
Education 55.1 52.9 57.1 56.1
Social Science 6.7 8.9 10.9 22.2
Agri/For/Fish/Marine 6.0 9.3 8.6 19.1
Engineering 0.9 1.3 1.5 5.6
General 29.7 37.7
Variance 0.0476 0.0514 0.,0484 0.0292
Proportion of Women 22.5 26.5 25.8 27.9
* Note: Calculation based on numbers of students by field, Statistical
Yearbooks of Education, .1965, 1970, 1983, 1989.
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Table 5.3 Women in the Labour Force (in %)
Year % of Women 
in Working 
Age Popul­
ation 1)
% of Women 
in the 
Employed
Female 
LPR 2)
Male 
LPR 2)
Female 
Activity 
Rate 3)
Male 
Activity 
Rate 3)
1965 52.78 27.90 27.16 67.42 41.72 90.82
1970 51.73 36.72 38.50 75.10 50.07 90.23
1975 50.77 36.69 39.60 74.50 53.24 91.84
1980 50.98 38.25 41.60 73.60 55.92 91.66
1985 51.31 38.91 40.60 69.60 58.03 93.19
1989 51.33 40.67 46.50 73.30 61.75 93.78
* Note 1). During 1965-1985, proportion of women in the population aged 14-
65; after 1986, proportion of women in the population aged 15-65.
* Note 2). LPR (Labour Participation Rate) = (the Employed + the Recognised
Unemployed)/Working Age Population * 100; in percentage.
* Note 3). AR (Activity Rate) * (Labour Participating Population + School
Attendants + Other Non-Economic Service Persons)/Working Age Population 
* 100; in percentage.
* Sources: Calculation of proportion and Activity Rate based on the
numbers in EPB, Statistical Yearbooks of Korea, 1972-1989; EPB, Annual 
Reports on the Economically Active Population Survey, 1983-1989.
5.4.2 Women's Vocational Qualifications
Among the groups aged 45 and above, more than 90 percent of 
female employees attained less than nine years of schooling. Only 
a minuscule number of female employees ever went to university. 
The gender gap in educational attainment has narrowed rapidly. 
Among the group aged 15 to 24, female employees' educational 
attainment became bigger than males' in 1989. A larger proportion 
of women advanced to high school than men, to some extent because 
women can hardly find a job with a middle school leaving 
certificate,11 but for whatever reason, this remarkable
11 Male middle school leavers can get a job as a production 
and related worker, or as a manual labourer: 41 percent of male 
employees with middle school leaving certificate are production 
workers, equipment operators, and manual labourers (Report on the 
Employment Structure Survey, 1989, p. 188). While jobs open to 
men with low educational attainment are holding their importance 
in the national economy, jobs for women with meagre education are 
reducing. 43 percent of female workers with middle school 
education were found in the agricultural sector which is 
declining. Therefore, many women turned to clerical jobs, which
182
improvement of educational attainment enabled women to compete 
with men for better employment. In formal education, the 
qualifications of female labour have been improving remarkably 
(Figure 5.2) .12
Since formal education is not specifically vocational, the 
ROK economy required another paths to produce skilled workers. 
The ROK government introduced a vocational training system in the 
Second Five Year Economic Development Plan of 1967, and later 
obliged the state and large companies to conduct vocational
EmpIoyees FemaIe EmpIoyees
15-24 30-34 40-44 50-54 60 above
25-29 35-39 45-49 55-59
Age Group
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Figure 5.2 Educational Attainment of Employees by Age Group 
(1989)
training by the Basic Law for Vocational Training of 1976. This 
Basic Law for Vocational Training provides three kinds of 
vocational training institutes (§2) : public vocational training; 
in-plant (company) vocational training; and authorised vocational
in general required high school leaving certificates.
12 Source : EPB (1989) , Report on the Employment 
Structure Survey, pp.74-75.
training. These institutes provide short-term training, ranging 
from three month to two year courses.
Of the skilled workers trained in these courses women 
composed a meagre 20 percent (Table 5.4). Surprisingly, the 
public training courses have provided the smallest number of 
places for female trainees: of the trainees in the public
training courses, women composed 5 percent. In 1989, only 21 of 
the 74 public training institutes were open to women, while 58 
of 110 in-plant training, and 47 of 97 authorised training 
institutes accepted women (White Paper for Women II, 1991, p. 
153) . The ROK government did not even attempt to pose as a 
guarantor of sexual equality in vocational training.
Table 5.4 Female Trainees by Training Places
Training
Places
Female
Trainees 1978-81
Periods
1982-86 1987-90
Public Numbers 6,289 5,487 4,260
Proportion (%) 4.7 5.0 4.8
In-Plant Numbers 99,051 23,335 21,696
Proportion (%) 32.1 20.3 29.7
Authorised Numbers 11,462 18,540 16,985
Proportion (%) 34.2 49.7 28.9
Total Proportion (%) 24.6 17.3 19.5
* Note 1). Calculation based on the data provided by the Ministry of
Labour, Vocational Training Bureau.
* Note 2). Composition of men and women before 1978 is not available.
However, the Ministry of Labour designated twenty-two 
training courses as ’’vocational training courses for women”, 
which included eight courses in the textile industry, six courses 
in food-processing, and four courses in electric and electronics. 
These courses are clearly sex-stereotyped. The traditional men's 
jobs — i.e., metal and steel work, equipment operating, machinery 
or chemistry—  are reserved for them. This designation curtails
184
women's choice in vocational training to twenty-two occupations. 
In 1989, two thirds of total female trainees in public training 
institutes concentrated in only three courses: hairdressing,
dressmaking, and electronics courses (Women in Employment, 1989) . 
In authorised institutes, too, four fifths of female trainees 
were crowded into three courses: hairdressing, information
processing, and typing (Shin Young-Soo, 1991). In-plant 
institutes offer thirteen courses mainly in textiles (36.8 
percent), electronics (27.5 percent), shoemaking (16.2 percent), 
and food-processing industries (10 percent).
Throughout this vocational training system, women face a 
restricted range of courses. The government's designation of 
vocational training courses for women is state-authorised sexual 
segregation of training.
5.4.3 Segregated Labour Market
Like in the FRG, the ROK labour market is sexually 
segregated in economic sectors, occupations, employed status, and 
full-time or part-time jobs. Though both men and women depended 
heavily on agriculture in early stage of economic development, 
agriculture has been of a higher importance in women's employment 
than in men's: in 1963, 69 percent of female employees were
concentrated in agriculture, compared with 56 percent of males. 
Even in 1989, 21 percent of female employees, but 17 percent of 
male employees, remained in agriculture. The proportion of 
females became higher than that of males only in sales and 
commerce since the 1980s (Table 5.5).
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Table 5.5 Female Employment by Economic Sector
Proportion of Female Employees in
1963
Each Economic 
1970
Sector
1980 1985 1989
Agriculture 39.5 42.3 44.5 44.6 46.2
Fishery/Marine - - 28.0 19.0 20.5
Industry 30.3 33.8 39.1 38.6 42.5
Energy/Mining - - 8.9 3.2 9.7
Construction - - 8.5 7.1 9.7
Sales/Commerce 32.9 34.5 48.6 51.8 52.6
Service - - 27.2 31.7 33.5
Distribution of Female Employees to Each Economic Sector
1963 1970 1980 1985 1989
Agriculture 68.7 57.3 37.7 27.2 21.2
Fishery/Marine - - 1.2 0.6 0.4
Industry 6.9 12.2 22.1 23.2 28.9
Energy/Mining - - 0.2 0.1 0.1
Construction - - 1.4 1.1 1.6
Sales/Commerce 24.4 30.6 24.4 30.0 27.7
Service - 12.6 17.9 20.1
Distribution of Male Employees to Each Economic Sector
1963 1970 1980 1985 1989
Agriculture 56.1 45.0 29.1 21.5 16.9
Fishery/Marine 3.9 1.5 1.9 1.6 1.1
Industry 8.5 13.8 21.3 23.6 26.8
Energy/Mining 1.1 1.8 1.3 1.6 0.8
Construction 3.9 4.6 9.1 9.3 9.9
Sales/Commerce 26.6 33.4 16.0 17.8 17.1
Service 21.4 24.6 27.3
* Note 1). Calculation based on the numbers provided by Korean Labour
Institute Database and Database of National Statistics Office.
* Note 2). The labour force data are available only after 1963, when the
Korean Bank began to conduct survey on national economy.
Sexual segregation by occupations was clearer than in 
economic sectors: 76 percent of female employees were crowded 
into ten occupations, of which only one occupation was shared by 
both men and women —  office assistants (Table 5.6).
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Table 5.6 Top Ten Occupations of Hen and Women, 1984/1989
Women's Occupations 1989 1984
% in Female % in the % in Female % in the
Labour Occupa­ Labour Occupa­
Force tion Force tion
Electronic Assembler 10.3 74.9 8.9 79.4
Office Assistant (Typist) 10.1 38.4 5.5 34.7
Cashier 9.1 73.7 9.1 66.4
Dressmaker (Tailor) 9.0 94.1 12.6 95.9
Shoe-production Tailor 5.5 71.0 4.1 75.5
Spinner 4.9 90.2 5.6 86.5
Weaver 4.0 88.5 6.3 90.6
Electric/Mechanic Fitter 2.1 26.3 1.5 27.5
Cook 2.1 73.8 1.1 65.4
Assembly Line Worker 1.9 68.3 2.4 73.5
Subtotal 59.6 76.0 57.1 68.5
Total Female Employees 100.0 40.7 100.0 38.4
Male Occupation 1989 1984
% in Male % in the % in Male % in the
Labour Occupa­ Labour Occupa­
Force tion Force tion
Public Transportation 11.6 99.7 10.6 99.6
- Operator/Driver
Office Worker 9.7 98.1 7.5 98.6
Office Assistant 8.0 61.6 6.0 65.3
Manager (Non-Specific) 5.6 98.0 5.5 98.9
Production Manager 3.3 88.4 3.2 81.1
Blacksmith 3.0 73.7 2.4 72.5
Security Guard 2.4 99.9 2.5 99.4
Mechanic 2.1 95.1 2.1 96.0
Machinery Fitter 1.9 96.4 2.0 95.3
Machine Installer 1.9 83.7 1.2 92.8
Subtotal 45.5 87.0 43.0 88.9
Total Male Employees 100.0 59.3 100.0 61.6
* Note 1). Occupations are selected and ordered by 1989 basis.
* Note 2). Selection and Calculation based on the numbers in KLI Data Base,
Average Wage by Occupation, 1983 and 1989; Ministry of Labour, Survey 
Tape on Wage and Salary by Occupations, 1983 and 1989.
* Note 3). The survey of the Ministry of Labour targeted establishments
employing more than 10 persons. Therefore, employees in small business 
and domestic service, mainly maids, are not included.
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Men's and women's largest occupations are obviously 
differentiated: women are concentrated in textile and assembly 
line work; men in mechanics and managerial work. Even in this 
horizontal occupational grouping, women's secondary position is 
obvious: a majority of women were only office assistants, mainly 
typists. Women made up only 1.9 percent of regular desk-workers 
who held their own work responsibilities.
Vertically, ROK women have been excluded from the highest 
rank of occupations to a worse degree than women in the FRG. In 
1984, 98.2 percent of female employees were rank-less or the
lowest ranking workers, while 86.8 percent of male were rank- 
less. In boards of directors or executives, women filled only 1.7 
percent of the seats. A meagre 0.05 percent of female employees 
ever reached membership of a board. Men had 34 times as much 
chance as women: 1.7 percent of male employees were members of 
boards (Women in Employment, 1985, p. 75) . After half a decade, 
the proportion of women on boards of directors or executives 
increased to 2.5 percent in 1990, a negligible 0.1 percent of 
total female employees (Women in Employment, 1991, p. 68) .
In employed status, Korean women shared a very similar 
pattern with Germany. Women had rarely self-employed status, but 
were abundant in family-business (Figure 5.3).13 During the 1960s 
and 1970s, more than half of employed women were family workers. 
This disproportionately high focus on family business can be 
explained by two factors: the distribution of women in
agriculture has been higher than that of men, while three
13 Sources: "Employed Persons by Status of Workers", in EPB, 
Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey, 1963- 
1989.
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quarters of family workers belonged to farm households in the 
1960s, and two thirds in the 1980s; and, if there is a family 
business, the husband or father is taken as self-employed, and 
the wife and daughters are regarded as family workers. Though the 
family workers' share of the female labour force is dropping, the 
proportion of women in family business is growing because of the 
overall increase of women's employment (Statistical Yearbooks of 
Labour, 1960-1990).
MaIe EmpIoyees
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Figure 5.3 Composition of Male and Female Employees by Status
In Korea, the proportion of self-declared part-time workers 
in the labour force is very low. The low rate of part-time 
workers has resulted from the abundant supply of labour and the 
lack of jobs suitable to part-time work (Kim Young-Mi, 1992, p. 
121). Instead of part-time work, Koreans took daily or seasonal 
work. In many cases, particularly in construction and 
agriculture, work contracts were settled on a daily or seasonal 
basis. As the daily or seasonal workers often work more than 44 
hours a week, like regular workers, they have been differentiated
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from part-time workers. For these reasons, many Korean women's 
studies concluded that the composition of part-time workers in 
the female labour force was very low, around 3.2 percent (White 
Paper for Women II, 1991).14
However, irregular workers, daily or seasonal, are as 
disadvantaged as part-time workers in western society. Their 
employment is temporary, and in general, unprotected. They do not 
receive extra employment benefits such as paid leave, leave of 
absence, or pension scheme. If these irregular workers were taken 
as part-time workers, women's part-time work ratio would rise 
very sharply (Table 5.7). Nearly two out of every ten female 
workers were partially employed; women composed 64.5 percent of 
partially employed workers. Moreover, while the proportion of 
part-time workers in the total labour force reduced, women's 
proportion in the partially-employed increased by 10 percentage 
points during five years. Many studies are expecting that more 
and more women will enter the labour force as part-timers (Kim 
Young-mi, 1991; KWDI, 1992; White Paper for Women II, 1991).
As a whole, like in the FRG, ROK women confront a sexually- 
segregated labour market, in economic sectors, occupations, 
status, and in part-time and full-time work. This segregation is 
compounded by women's concentration in the low wage-occupations, 
threatening women's economic independence.
14 According to the ILO (1989), the proportion of part-timers 
in Korea was 0.2 percent. Compared to the United States (7.3 
percent), Germany (13.6 percent), and the United Kingdom (24.7 
percent), the Korean labour market is based on an extreme full­
time work system.
190
Table 5.7 Partially Employed Workers, 1989 and 1984
1989
Average Male Workers Female Workers % of Composi
Weekly Women
Work H.° 1,000 % a 1,000 % »
tion
<%>
1-26 293 2.7 574 9.0 66.2 5.1
27-35 375 3.5 640 10.0 63.1 5.9
36-44 1,808 16.9 1,416 22.1 43.9 18.9
45 above 8,142 76.2 3,756 58.6 31.6 69.6
Temporary 73 0.7 24 0.4 24.7 0.6
absence
(100.0) (100.0)
(100.0)
1984
Average Male Workers Female Workers % of Composi
Weekly Women
Work H. 1} 1,000 % 3 1,000 % ®
tion
(%>
1-26 548 6.0 690 14.8 55.7 9.0
27-35 513 5.7 565 12.1 52.4 7.8
36-44 1,723 19.0 976 20.9 36.2 19.6
45 above 6,221 68.6 2,418 51.8 28.0 62.9
Temporary 66 0.7 16 0.3 19.5 0.6
absence
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
* Note 1). In the case of irregular workers, Average WH * (Total Working
Hours of the Year)/52 weeks
* Note 2). The share of the group in total male/female employees (in
percentage).
** Sources: Calculation based on numbers in EPB, Reports on the Employment 
Structure Survey, 1984; 1989, Because of differences in period and 
survey methods, the numbers of total employees are not consistent with 
the statistics of EPB, Annual Reports on the Economically Active 
Population Survey.
5.4.4 Longer Working Hours, Smaller Earnings
In Korea, female workers in paid employment worked longer 
than male workers (Table 5.8).15 Yet, women's average monthly
15 As far as the ILO is concerned, Korea is the only country 
to do so. Amongst 24 countries that informed the ILO of male and 
female weekly working hours, during 1980 to 1989, Korea alone 
reported women's working longer hours than men's. ILO, Yearbook
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wage has been far smaller than men's, around 43 to 53 percent of 
men's wage (Table 5.9) . Half of female employees are found in the 
occupational groups that provide the second lowest level of 
wages, while a large number of men were working in the 
occupations that paid a higher level of wages.
The occupations that recorded low wage indices had high 
proportions of female labour, while occupations that marked high 
wage indices were nearly male-only. Among the top twenty 
occupations that had the highest wage indices, during 1973 to 
1988, more than half have been virtually male-only. Among the 
bottom twenty occupations, women's proportion averaged 75 percent 
in 1988. When the wage index is applied to Table 5.6 — i.e., the 
Top Ten Occupations of Men and Women—  women's top ten 
occupations are revealed to be paid at far under-average rates 
(Table 5.10): 9 out of the 10 women's occupations were paid at 
under-average rates, compared with 6 out of the 10 men's 
occupations.
Table 5.8 Average Weekly Work Hours for Regular Employees
Year South Korea West Germany
Men (A) Women(B) B/A*100(%) Men(A) Women(B) B/A*100(%)
1974 50.0 50.4 100.8 - - -
1977 56.2 56.9 101.2 - - -
1980 52.6 54.4 103.4 42.2 40.0 94.8
1985 51.9 53.2 102.4 41.1 39.5 96.1
1989 50.4 50.8 100.7 40.2 38.7 96.3
* Sources: For Korea, Ministry of Labour, Survey Reports (and Tapes) on 
Wages and Salary by Occupations, 1974-1989; for West Germany, ILO, 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1989-1990, p. 696.
of Labour Statistics, 1989-1990, pp. 693-699.
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Table 5.9 Average Monthly Wage, Men and Women
Year Total
Average
Male (A) Female (B) Female Ratio 
(B)/(A)*100
1975 46,019 81,937 35,431 43.2
1980 176,058 223,825 99,380 44.4
1985 324,283 397,265 189,845 47.8
1987 386,536 467,286 234,071 50.1
1989 540,611 639,578 336,879 52.7
* Note: Average Monthly Wage = Contract Monthly Wage + Overtime Work Pay
+ (Bonus*l/12)
* Source: Ministry of Labour, Monthly Reports on Labour Statistics, 1975-
1989, December
Table 5.10 Wage Indices of Top Ten Occupations by Sen
Rank Women's Top Ten Occupations Men's Top Ten Occupations
1989 W-Index 1983 W-Index 1989 W-Index 1983 W-Index
1 62.1 47.4 88.7 100.4
2 102.7 116.2 168.0 199.4
3 79.4 98.5 102.7 116.2
4 47.9 39.6 231.8 279.1
5 53.1 44.3 109.2 99.7
6 52.7 46.3 71.2 57.6
7 54.2 43.7 75.2 87.0
8 71.2 57.6 86.7 76.0
9 73.8 70.1 104.7 90.9
10 94.9 42.5 89.9 81.1
* Note 1). Rank of the occupations are identical with Table 5.7.
* Note 2). Wage Index = (Average Wage of the Occupation)/(Average Wage of
Total Occupations)*100
* Sources: Calculation and ranking based on the numbers of employees in
Ministry of Labour, Survey Tapes on Wage and Salary by Occupations, 
1983; 1989.
Uh Soo-Bong (1991) incisively points out that, ceteris 
paribus, men received 30 percent higher wages than women; when 
men and women have the same qualifications and performance except 
the length of service, then men with a 64 percent shorter length 
of service than women receive the same wage as the women. This 
means that explanations based on women's time lost in child-
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rearing do not have any empirical support. This research proves 
empirically that the reward for length of service is different 
between the sexes; and there exists sexual discrimination in the 
labour market. Therefore, women's apparently strong existence in 
the labour market has not, in reality, been followed by 
appropriate rewards that might enable women to be as independent 
as men.
5. 5 The Family and Work
Korean women have invariably shouldered the sole 
responsibility of household chores regardless of whether they 
have been employed. Nevertheless, married women's employment has 
increased steadily because of women's increased advances in 
higher education.
5.5.1 Marriage and Employment
As in many other countries, the Korean divorce rate has been 
increasing, but it is still very low by western standards. The 
marriage rate per 1,000 population has risen by one point (Table. 
5.11), making a stark contrast to the FRG. The divorce rate per 
1,000 population has quadrupled during three decades, but it is 
a quarter of the rate of the FRG, and the divorce rate per 1,000 
existing marriage is a third of that of the FRG.
While married women in the FRG have never recorded higher 
labour participation rates than never-married women, ROK married 
women have always been the largest group in the female labour
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force; and since the early 1980s, married women's labour 
participation rate has been higher than that of unmarried women, 
and it is still growing (Table 5.12). In 1970, the proportion of 
married women in the female labour force, including the divorced 
and widowed, was 71 percent. Excluding the widowed and divorced, 
married women's proportion in the female labour force was 62.6 
percent in 1989 (KSA, 1992, p. 113).
Table. 5.11 Marriage and Divorce
Year Average Age of Marriage Divorce per 1,000
First Marriage per 1,000
Male Female
Population
Population Existing Marriage
1960 25.4 21.6 8.23 0.26 0.74
1970 27.1 23.3 9.56 0.40 1.15
1980 27.3 24.1 10.84 0.66 1.73
1985 27.8 24.8 9.38 1.00 2.44
1990 28.6 25.5 9.25 1.05 2.40
* Note 1). Population and numbers of existing marriage (married couples):
"marital status of the Population 15 years old and over” in EPB, 
Population and Housing Census, 1970-1990,
* Note 2). Numbers of marriage and divorce case: for 1960-65, "Family
Register Case", in Statistical Yearbooks of Korea, 1960-65; for 1970- 
90, NSO (1991) Marriage and Divorce Statistics,
Table 5.12 Employment Rate of Women by Marital Status,
Aged 14 and over
Year Single Married Widowed Divorced
1970 39.5 29.9
1975 50.4 42.9
1980 43.5 34.6 31.1 57.3
1984 31.9 34.1 31.6 65.3
1990 39.8 48.1 39.7 67.2
* Note 1). for 1984, percentage calculated by the number of employees; for
1990, percentage calculated by the proportion of population by marital 
status and the composition of female employees by marital status 
(Female Employees * 100).
* Note 2). For 1970-75, married women included divorced and widowed women.
* Sources: for 1970-75, Population and Housing Census, 1970-75; for 1980,
White Paper for Women, I, p. 118; for 1984, EPB (1984) Report on the 
Employment Structure Survey, pp. 46-47; for 1990, KSA (1992) Social 
Indicators of Korea,
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Despite their employment, Korean women,s household 
responsibilities have not been reduced. In a survey in 1985, 86 
percent of married working women took sole responsibility for 
household chores. It was almost the same in 1991 (KWDI, 1992). 
A meagre 2 percent of working women questioned shared household 
works with their husbands or children, and others resorted to 
female relatives and house maids with pay.
5.5.2 Employment and Child-Care
Considering the married women's labour participation rate, 
child-care facilities in the ROK are wholly inadequate. In 1989, 
less than 3 percent of all children aged three to six were 
enrolled in kindergartens. Creches for infants up to three year 
old were almost non-existent (Table 5.13).
Table 5.13 Child-Care Facilities
Year Number of 
Facilities
Enrolled 
in Number 
(A)
Children 
per 1,000 
Children
Child- 
in Number 
(B)
■Carer
B/A*100
1965 423 19,566 1.0 1,402 14.0
1970 484 22,271 1.3 1,660 13.4
1980 901 66,433 4.1 3,339 19.9
1985 6,242 314,692 18.9 9,281 33.9
1989 8,246 410,824 30.1 14,886 27.6
* Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of Korea, 1960-1990.
In the FRG, as women's labour participation increased, the 
birth rate fell, and child-care facilities accommodated 80 
percent of three to six year olds. The Korean birth rate, 
similarly, has been lowered: the crude birth rate per 1,000 
population was 29.5 in 1970, and 15.5 in 1990 (KSA, 1992, p. 65),
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but it was still twice as high as that of the FRG. The average 
number of household members, too, was larger than that of the 
FRG: 5.2 in 1970, 3.7 in 1990 (KSA, 1992, p. 304).
In a 1985 survey, 60.7 percent of employed mothers with 
children under the age of six answered that they alone took care 
of their children. This situation has not changed very much: in 
1991, 58.6 percent of employed mothers said the same. The second 
largest proportion of working mothers relied on either the wives' 
or the husbands' parents (around 20 percent). Also, 3 percent of 
mothers committed their children to the care of relatives, and 
another 1.5 percent to house maids (KWDI, 1986 and 1992). 
However, 3 percent of working mothers replied that they abandoned 
their children during their working hours (KWDI, 1992, pp. 99-
100). In a 1991 survey, 45 percent of economically non-active
women answered that they chose not to be employed because of 
child-care or child education, revealing that the lack of child 
care facilities has been the gravest obstacle to their
employment.
5. 6 Women in Politics
ROK women's presence in politics has been much worse than 
in education or employment: an average 2 percent of legislators 
have been women. Women in public administration have not fared 
any better: in 1989, only 1.2 percent of senior government
officials were women. Though women composed around 20 to 40 
percent of party membership in the 1980s, women's proportion in
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decision-making bodies of the parties was at best 4.5 percent. 
The higher the rank, the smaller women's proportion, proving the 
"iron law of andrarchy" (Aberbach et.al., 1981). Nevertheless, 
the women's movement remained a relatively strong social force, 
owing to the eminence of a small number of leaders.
5.6.1 The Women's Movement
The Korean women's movement succeeded to the tradition of 
the women's independence movement, and thus was accepted and 
justified by Koreans. In 1990, there were 75 registered women's 
organisations with 9.8 million members (Ministry of Health and 
Social Affairs, 1991). Like in Germany, the Korean women's 
movement have had a central organisation: the Korean National 
Council of Women (KNCW), which comprised 26 organisations and a 
half-million membership. Born in 1959 through an agreement of 10 
women's organisations, the KNCW joined the International Council 
of Women (ICW) in 1960, and represented the united voice of the 
women's movement. However, after experiencing a forced 
dissolution and reorganisation by a military junta, the KNCW 
reverted to being a conservative, strongly anti-socialist, and 
submissive organisation, distancing itself from full-scale sexual 
equality. This tendency subjected the KNCW to the criticism of 
collaboration with the military government, but succeeded in 
winning the cooperation of the government in return.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the key issues of the women's 
movement were legal reforms, women's vocational training, 
protection of women from violence, and national unification. 
Among legal reforms, the amendment of the Family Law was the
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foremost imperative. The YWCA (with 3 million members, the 
largest single organisation), the Legal Aid Centre for Family 
Relations (LAFA: 1900 members), and the Women's Research
Association (WRA: 300 members) organised the Pan-Women's
Association for Modification of the Family Law in 1973, and 
battled until 1989.
Since democratisation in the mid-1980s improved citizens' 
accessibility to formerly forbidden information and political 
procedures, women's organisations have moved forward to the issue 
of national unification. The Korean Women's League (KWL), a 
cooperative body of progressive groups, demanded entry into the 
South-North dialogue, assuming itself as the counterpart of 
Korean Democratic Women's League (KDWL) of North Korea. The KNCW, 
opposing the KWL, also asserted its legitimacy as the 
representative organisation of Korean women. This has led the 
women's movement into a split between the conservative and the 
progressive groups. Although the diversification of women's 
movement is not necessarily harmful, the categorical opposition 
between the KNCW and KWL may enfeeble the women's movement, like 
the division of the BDF and socialist movement in the 1890s of 
Germany. Yet, this division leads to a clarification of 
ideological goals and strategies, and contributes to the 
understanding of sexual inequality.
Since the late 1980s, the women's movement has endeavoured 
to enhance women's representation in the National Assembly: 
trying to pressurise political parties for better women's 
representation; and running research centres to develop election 
campaign strategies, and to exchange information and experiences
199
for women politicians (White Paper for Women II, 1991).
5.6.2 Women in the National Assembly and Political Parties
While the women's movement was concentrating its forces on 
legal reforms, women's representation in the National Assembly 
lingered at around 2 percent of total legislators (Table. 
5.14).16
Table 5.14 Female Members in the National Assembly
Term Election
Year
Total
MPs
Total Female 
No.
MPs
%
Female MPs by 
Constituency 
No. %
1 1948 200 1 0.5 1 0.5
2 1950 210 2 0.9 2 0.9
3 1954 203 1 0.5 1 0.5
4 1958 233 3 1.3 3 1.3
5 1960 233 1 0.4 1 0.4
6 1963 175 2 1.1 1 0.6
7 1967 175 3 1.7 1 0.6
8 1971 204 5 2.5 0 0.0
9 1973 219 12 5.5 2 0.9
10 1978 231 8 3.5 1 0.4
11 1981 276 9 3.3 1 0.4
12 1984 276 8 2.9 2 0.7
13 1988 299 6 2.0 0 0.0
Total 2,934 53 2.0 16 0.5
* Source: Shin Myung-Soon (1990), p. 26.
16 The Korean electoral system varied with the Republics. In 
the First and Second Republic (1948-1960), all parliamentarians 
were elected by the first-past-the-post system. The Third 
Republic (1962-1972) combined constituency elections and 
proportional representation which assigned a third of seats to 
the parties in proportion to votes won in national elections. In 
the Fourth Republic (1972-1979), a third of parliamentarians were 
appointed by the President, and made up the Yusin-Jongwoo-Hoe 
(Group of Restoration Politics). In the Fifth and Sixth Republic 
(1980—), the system resembled that of the Third Republic, 
combining constituency election and proportional representation, 
though it was not the same.
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Women's under-representation in the National Assembly stems 
from three factors: the patriarchal and male-dominated Korean 
culture; money-dominated and blackmail-prone Korean election 
campaigns, which have easy tactics at their disposal to wound the 
chastity- and reputation-oriented Korean women; and the 
obstruction by the "old-boys' network". In a survey of 1990, 91.3 
percent of men and 59 percent of women answered that, other 
things being equal, they would vote for a male candidate (White 
Paper for Women II, 1991) . Women's lower turn-out rate in 
elections and referendums also strengthened the notion of non­
political females (CKWP, 1990a): while women's proportion in the 
electorate has been constantly higher than men's by around 3 
percent, women's turnout rate has been persistently lower than 
men's by an average 4.5 percent (KWDI, 1986, p. 441). In 
addition, the "old boys network" obstructed women from being 
nominated to important constituency elections, or led to female 
candidates being put at the tail-end in the party list for 
proportional representation (Youn Jongsuk, 1992).
Women's proportion in party membership, similar to the FRG, 
ranged from 20 percent to 40 percent. During the 1960s, women 
made up to 20 percent of the ruling Korean Democratic Republican 
Party membership, and about 30 percent of the opposition New 
Democratic Party. In the ruling Democratic Justice Party of Korea 
(DJPK) , women came to compose 40 percent of membership during the 
mid-1980s, the highest level proportion of females amongst the 
major political parties.
Yet, women have been almost non-existent in party 
leadership. In the offices of party secretary or central
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committees, women gained only one or two seats. In 1983, the 
ruling DJPK appointed only one female member to the 28-member 
central committee; and two opposition parties had none (National 
Assembly, 1983). The situation has not changed: all the parties 
had one woman each in the central committees (CKWP, 1990a).
5.6.3 Women in the Executive and Judiciary
Five out of 410 ministers in the ROK government were women 
during four decades (1948-1987). Among the five women ministers, 
Rim Youngs in took charge of Ministry of Trade and Industry, and 
Kim Hwallan of the Office of Public Relations. Others were 
responsible for education, health and social affairs, or 
political affairs on women's issues, all of which were regarded 
traditionally as female spheres.
The increase in the number of woman ministers was brought 
about by the democratisation of Korean politics.17 After the 1987 
election, President Rho entrusted the office of the Second 
Secretary for Political Affairs with responsibility for women's 
issues, and from 1988 onwards, recruited women into the job, 
adding three names to the list of women cabinet members (1988- 
1992) .
Of the government employees and civil servants, 21.4 percent 
were women in 1983, 23.7 percent in 1989. When teachers are
excluded, the female proportion fell to 13.4 percent, which 
includes 56.4 percent of typists or office assistants. The female
17 During his election campaign of 1987, Mr. Rho promised to 
enhance women's status in society. After voting analysis, Mr. Rho 
was reported to attract the largest number of female votes, 
although their motive was not clear.
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proportion of mid- and high- administration officials (Grade V 
and above) was 1.6 percent in 1989, up from 0.5 percent in 1983 
(MOGA, 1985).
The proportion of women in the judiciary was no better, 
composing 1.2 percent of total judges, state prosecutors, and 
lawyers in 1991. Until 1985, it was 0.46 percent (two women out 
of 477 state prosecutors; eight women out of 722 judges; and 
three women out of 1,179 lawyers).18 Only one woman judge has 
ever been appointed to the High Court. In the Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Court, women have not taken any seat so far.
18 This miserable performance of women stems from the 
recruitment system of the Korean judiciary. In Korea, even to be 
a lawyer, one has to pass the (so-called Highest) Test for the 
Judiciary, or the test for law officers for the army. Army law 
officers are open to men only. Therefore, women have to pass the 
so-called Highest Test for the Judiciary. Three kinds of so- 
called Highest Test have been the core gateway to success in the 
leadership positions: one for senior government (executive)
officials (Grade V), one for career diplomats, and the other for 
the judiciary. All the three tests are held once a year for a 
small number of seats on offer. Until the end of the 1960s, the 
number of successful applicants were a few tens. Although a new 
quota system increased the numbers of successful applicants in 
the 1970s and 1980s, passing the test is extremely difficult. In 
the case of women, they have to overcome many obstacles even 
before they enter the competition: many parents are sceptical, 
and reject supporting a daughter for a highly competitive test, 
which in general takes several years of intensive study; and it 
is very hard to find a place to study, while men share many 
places to discuss and exchange information related to the tests. 
During five decades, from 1948 to 1993, the numbers of successful 
female applicants were 38 in the executive, 10 amongst diplomats, 
and 57 in the judiciary. Their proportion remained at 1 percent.
203
5. 7. Summary
It may sound sarcastic if one says that ROK women have been 
amazing, but in a sense, they have been: amazing in their ability 
to combine all the responsibilities in the family and employment 
alone. They composed 40 percent of national labour force, and 
worked longer than men, while earning half of men's wages. They 
were employed mainly in low paid work, with a grim prospect for 
promotion and low prestige. In enterprise board rooms, women 
filled only 1.7 percent of seats.
Their maternity leave was short —  90 days before or after 
the birth. A majority of female workers were not granted leave 
of absence for child-care. If they wish to stay with their 
children a little longer, they may give up their job altogether. 
Nevertheless, women have combined employment, child-bearing and 
child-care. Of the working mothers, 60 percent took care of their 
children without a contribution from either their husbands or 
others. Despite this inordinate double burden, the marriage rate 
was far higher and the divorce rate lower than in any other 
country in the industrialised world.
In the state structure — i.e., in the executive, 
legislature, or the judiciary alike—  women were almost non­
represented. Written promises for sexual equality in the family 
and employment were only given as late as 1989. It is too soon 
to evaluate the effects of these legal reforms.
Despite all these conditions, ROK women, little by little, 
expanded their domains: in education, politics, and in the upper 
echelons of the government structure. During 1989 to 1991, for
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three years, 27 women newly entered into the justice system, 14 
women into senior executive officialdom, and 4 women into the 
career diplomatic circle —  as large a number as the whole that 
had done so in the four decades before 1989. Though later than 
FRG women, who made a new trend in the 1980s, ROK women began to 
speed up ther participation in power, expanding their realm and 
demanding their rights. It is quite probable that ROK women will 
create a new history of their own in the 1990s. Yet, painstaking 
struggles have to be continued.
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CHAPTER SIX
WOMEN IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'8 REPUBLIC OF KOREA
6• 1 Introduction1
In contrast to the Republic of Korea, the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has managed to maintain an 
apparently stable political order —  a communist dictatorial 
system. The Worker's Party of Korea (WPK) has been in power for 
nearly five decades, under the unchallenged leadership of Kim II 
Sung and his son. Although its communist ideology has been
1 In writing this chapter, I faced a grave problem in 
getting materials about DPRK women. In addition to the principal 
difficulty in obtaining DPRK statistics, most research reports 
on the DPRK focus on economy and trade, and military force. Even 
when Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister estimated the North 
Korean population and social indicators (1990), they could not 
figure out the proportion of women in the social sector — e.g., 
in the education system or in the medical system. Therefore, I 
more often than not rely on interviews with refugees from the 
DPRK. In 1989, I performed a series of interviews with refugees, 
as part of a research project for the National Unification Board. 
Interviewees included: 11 members of the Kim Manchul family,
escaped North Korea by sea (1987); Kim Jongmin, a cadre member 
of the WPK who fled to Seoul (1987); Im Jonghee, a nurse who 
crossed the border river between the South and North by swimming 
(1989) —  the only woman who has escaped the DPRK in that way;
Kim Namjoon and Kim Gangchoon who came with Im Jonghee; Suh 
Yongchul a secret serviceman (1989); Kim Unhak and Cho Sungkoon, 
university students studying in the GDR who fled first to the 
FRG, and then ROK (1989); Ko Unkee, an attache of the DPRK 
Embassy in Mozambique (1989) ; Park Myungwha, a housewife (1970) ; 
Oh Eeshup, a vice captain of a fishing ship (1979) ; Kang 
Deukhoon, the captain of an ocean liner (1982); and Han Heeback, 
a farm worker who crossed over the frozen border river between 
the DPRK and China in 1987, reached Peking in 1989 by working as 
assistant cook or daily labourer, and then fled to Seoul (1989). 
Among the 23 refugees I interviewed, 5 were women aged between 
seventeen and sixty. I am aware that stories of the refugees can 
not be taken at face value. Nevertheless, as those interviews 
were focused on the aspects of daily life, social and cultural, 
rather than political, a large part of interviewees' accounts 
seems safe to quote.
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tainted by the idolisation of the Kim family, and its economy has 
tumbled into decades-long depression, the DPRK has claimed that 
it has emancipated women completely: it guaranteed full
employment of women; it provided sexual equality at work and in 
the family; and it socialised education and child-rearing. This 
chapter examines whether, or to what extent, the communist regime 
in practice has succeeded in changing gender relations, 
abolishing the Rule of Three Obediences, and establishing sexual 
equality.
6.1.1 Under the Chuche Thoughts
Like other communist regimes, DPRK politics is under full 
control of the communist Worker's Party of Korea (WPK).2 The 
Politburo of the WPK holds the nucleus of power in policy-making, 
while the legislature — the Supreme People's Assembly—  performs 
the limited function of giving ex post facto approval to Party 
decisions. This familiar communist party-dominated political 
system has taken a deviant path by upholding the Chuche Thoughts 
as its guiding ideology.3
2 Similar to the SED, the WPK was formed by the merger of 
the North Korean Worker's Party and the Korean Worker's Party. 
The North Korean Worker's Party was organised in 1946 under the 
tutelage of the Soviet Union's occupational authorities, while 
the Korean Worker's Party had a longer history of resistance and 
labour movement during Japanese colonisation. Since the Korean 
Worker's Party had its headquarters and most of its membership 
in Seoul, the partition of Korea deprived the domestic communists 
of their power base. From the merger onwards, the domestic 
communists (the Home Sect) were gradually persecuted and driven 
out by Kim II Sung and his partisan colleagues.
3 Until the mid-1950s, the WPK had been faithful to Marxism- 
Leninism. However, as Kim II Sung secured his power through 
purging many communists who had their power base in the Korean 
Peninsula (the Home Sect), in Siberia or Vladivostock (the 
Russian Sect), or in Manchuria (the Yan'an Sect) one by one, the
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The Chuche Thoughts incorporate in its concrete policy 
expressions four dimensions: self-reliance in thought;
independence in politics; self-subsistance in economy; and self- 
defence in national security. These apparently immaculate 
thoughts have functioned to further Kim II Sung's personality 
cult and supported the hereditary succession of power to his 
son.4 The gist of the Chuche Thoughts lies in the quest for 
people's loyal obedience to the leader and his "revolutionary" 
family. The slogan "To Be Loyal For Generations," which has been 
loudly recited by the press, is the sublime expression of the 
Chuche Thoughts. The 1972 edition of Dictionary of Political 
Terminologies, published by the Academy of Social Science, 
deleted the entry "hereditary succession” which had been defined 
as a "reactionary custom of exploitative societies" in the 1970
WPK gradually moved away from Marxism-Leninism (Scalapino and 
Lee, 1972; Suh Dae-Sook, 1988). In 1970, the Fifth Congress of 
the WPK announced the Chuche Thoughts to be its only (unitary) 
guiding ideology (WPK Documents, 1972) . The Sixth Congress of the 
WPK (1980) adopted a new Party Programme proclaiming that "the 
WPK is guided by the Great Leader Kim II Sung's Chuche Thoughts, 
his Revolutionary Thoughts alone." Chuche literally means self- 
reliance and independence.
4 According to Shuhachi Inoue (1984), a Japanese apologist 
for the DPRK, the Chuche Thoughts arise from the proposition that 
humans are masters of all creation, and are uniquely endowed with 
three special attributes: Chachusong (the spirit of independence 
and self- reliance), creativity, and consciousness of their own 
identity and potential. The doctrine is based on four "socio- 
historical principles": (1) the popular masses are the subjects 
of social history; (2) human history is the history of the 
struggle of the popular masses for Chachusong; (3) the socio-
historical movement is the creative movement of the popular 
masses; and (4) independent thought and consciousness of the 
popular masses perform the decisive role in the revolutionary 
struggle. However, the masses can not succeed in their struggle 
without a unicruelv qualified leader to interpret and shape their 
aspirations and to direct their efforts (Inoue, 1984, p. 30). 
Inoue states that Kim II Sung is such a leader, and his son is 
uniquely qualified to succeed him, because of his total loyalty, 
careful training, and personal traits.
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edition. Under the banner of Chuche Thoughts, therefore, the DPRK 
politics has returned to a dynastic dictatorship.
In economic policy, the DPRK has indeed relied on the 
principle of self-reliance, and pursued an inward-looking 
development policy. Until 1984 foreign trade and investments were 
neglected to the extent of autarky. Although the striving for 
autarky was a common phenomenon in most communist economies, the 
prescription in the Chuche Thoughts more effectively shut out 
foreign investments (Hwang Eui-Gak, 1993). With scarce natural 
resources, the autarkic economy resorted to mass labour —  and 
women's economic participation was consequently encouraged.
6.1.2 Revolutionization and Proletarianization of Women
Like other communist regimes, the DPRK has emphasized 
women's emancipation through making women the working class, with 
reference to Marxism. Even before the DPRK officially came into 
being, the Provisional People's Committee (PPC: 28 Feb. 1946 - 
21 Feb. 1947), the provisional government of North Korea under 
the tutelage of the Soviet Union, adopted a flood of laws and 
decrees, every one of which included provisions for sexual 
equality. Until the 1970s, the DPRK government was faithful to 
its commitment of sexual equality: it guaranteed women's full 
employment by central economic planning; it expanded the range 
of socialisation of child-care and education as far as its 
economy could afford; and it sought socialisation of household 
chores through community feeding and laundering systems.
However, sexual equality became blatantly at odds with 
political patriarchy from the 1970s onwards. In the history of
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the "revolutionary family," the Kims depicted Kim Jongsook, Kim 
Jongil's late mother, and Kang Bansuck, Kim II Sung's late 
mother, as devoted mothers and subordinated wives to the Kims, 
rather than as revolutionary fighters. The traditional notion of 
women's foremost role as mothers and wives, and not individuals 
or individual workers, was resuscitated and reinstated.
In 1971, Kim II Sung addressed the Fourth Congress of the 
Democratic Women's League of Korea (DWLK) under the title "On the 
Revolutionization and Proletarianization of Women" (Works 6, 
1979, pp. 112-3). In this address, Kim II Sung demanded women to 
marry late, in order to contribute for a longer while to the 
party and revolution. This late marriage policy presupposed that 
married women had to stay at home, or, at least, take sole 
responsibility for the family as mothers and wives. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, Kim emphasized that women's 
revolutionization and proletarianization held the utmost 
importance 'in revolutionizing the family'. He explained in 
considerable detail the important role of women as mothers and 
wives, rather than as workers. Instead of freeing women from 
traditional familial duty, the alleged "revolutionization and 
proletarianization" tied up women more strongly with the family.
6. 2 Women under the Law
Since its inception, the DPRK legislature has adopted and 
maintained provisions of sexual equality in almost every law and 
decree, effecting radical reforms in society. The PPC was the
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first government to transform social relations in Korea: its
legal reforms became the foundation of the first Constitution of 
1949; and its social reforms enhanced women's rights 
unprecedentedly in Korean history. The Constitution, promulgated 
in 1948 and altered in 1972, also promised sexual equality in all 
domains of social life. Accordingly, the DPRK legislature adopted 
the Socialist Labour Law (1978) and the Law concerning Upbringing 
and Education of Children (1976), although the Socialist Family 
Law belatedly came into being in 1991.
6.2.1 Legal Reforms under the PPC
During its short life, the PPC transformed North Korean 
society irreversibly. All feudal relations were declared 
abolished; and laws contradicting the provisions of sexual 
equality became null and void instantly. The Law on Agrarian 
Reform (6 Mar. 1946) vested the right to use land with the 
tillers; it confiscated the land owned by the Japanese state, 
individuals and organisations, or owned by "traitors to the 
Korean nation"; and it redistributed the land to the families on 
the criteria of the number and age of households, including those 
of women. This land reform entitled women to receive land in 
their own right, not in tandem with their fathers or husbands, 
marking a milestone in Korean women's economic independence. The 
Twenty-Points Platform of the PPC (23 Mar. 1946) promised to 
guarantee equal rights in the political and economic life to all 
people, irrespective of their sex, religion, and property (the 
Fifth Point) . The Labour Law for the Workers and Office Employees 
(24 June, 1946) established the principles of equal pay for equal
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work, equal opportunity to work, maternity protection, an eight 
hour working day, and a compulsory social insurance system.
Further, according to the Sexual Equality Law (30 July, 
1946), women were formally given equal rights in every domain of 
political, economic, social, and cultural life (§1); women have 
equal rights in employment, social insurance, and education (§3) ; 
women have the right to choose to marry, or divorce, and the 
right of child custody (§4-5); concubinage, polygyny, and 
prostitution were prohibited (§7); women have an equal right to 
inherit property, and to demand a share of property in the case 
of divorce (§8) ; and all the laws and decrees by the Japanese 
colonial government became invalid on and after the day of 
proclamation of this law (§9). Although existing concubinage was 
de facto accepted, this law embodied sexual equality in full 
swing. Yet, women's rights to inherit and demand a share of 
property were held to be meaningless after the full abolition of 
private ownership in 1958. Also, by the Decree of Citizenship 
Registration (9 Aug. 1946), women aged over eighteen were issued 
ID cards as individuals, on equal terms with men. The Abolition 
Act of Persistent Feudal Custom (24 Jan. 1947) again emphasized 
sexual equality in the family and marriage. Although these laws 
remained for a while rather nominal, because of budget limits and 
persistent social custom, they were followed up in subsequent 
legislation.
6.2.2 Sexual Equality in the Constitutions
The first Constitution of 1948 was more like an approval for 
the legislation by the PPC rather than a new device. In addition
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to the general provision of equal rights for the people (Articles 
11-12), Article 22 specifically provided sexual equality in every 
domain of private and public life. Also, the Constitution obliged 
the state to protect marriage and family, and provided equal 
rights for the children born outside wedlock to the rights of 
those born within (Article 23) .
The Socialist Constitution of 1972 announced that class 
oppression and exploitation were eliminated for ever (Article 6) . 
In this Constitution, too, sexual equality is guaranteed in 
considerable detail (Article 62): women have the same social 
status and rights as men; the state shall protect mothers and 
children through providing maternity leave and a shorter working 
day for mothers, increasing child-care facilities, and taking 
other policy measures; the state shall free women from the burden 
of household chores, and provide conditions that enable women to 
participate in public activities. Also, the state shall protect 
marriage and the family, and take scrupulous care to strengthen 
the family as the cell of society (Article 63; my emphasis). The 
relevant article resonated with Kim's aforementioned address: in 
the course of strengthening the family, women's roles as mothers 
and wives had to be reinforced.
6.2.3 The Socialist Labour Law
From the Labour Law for the Workers and Office Employees 
(1946) onwards, the DPRK has abided by the principle of equal pay 
for equal work, and has concerned itself with women's full
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employment and maternity protection.5 Also, in 1966, the Working 
Day Regulation for Working Mothers (Cabinet Resolution No.23) 
shortened the working day for mothers with three or more children 
under the age of thirteen.6
The Socialist Labour Law of 1978 was promulgated on the 
principle of collectivism (§3) — i.e., "individuals for the sake 
of the collective, the collective for the sake of individuals". 
According to the Socialist Labour Law, like the 1968 Constitution 
of the GDR, all the workers have the duty and right to work (§4- 
5; my emphasis). Yet, this new Labour Law was not novel in its 
provisions: the principles of the 1946 Labour Law remained almost 
intact; but the shorter working hours for working mothers gained 
legal ground. The difference between the two Labour Laws lay in 
the scope of application: while the 1946 Law concerned industrial 
workers and office employees, the Socialist Labour Law applied 
to all workers, including agricultural and fishery workers. 
However, as work became a duty, unmarried women were forced to 
work, unless they were full-time students.
The Labour Laws of the DPRK are dubious by any rigorous
5 Pregnant women were allowed maternity leave for 35 days 
before, and 42 days after giving birth (§14). After the second 
trimester of pregnancy, women might be transferred to light work, 
in which case their wages were decided by the average for the 
last six months (§15) . Working women with an infant under the age 
of one were allowed to breast feed twice a day for thirty minutes 
each (§16) . Pregnant women and breast feeding mothers should not 
be assigned to overtime or night work (§17).
6 Working mothers could work for six hours a day, six days 
a week (the normal working hours were eight hours a day, six days 
a week) . Or, if the nature of a work place did not allow shorter 
working hours, working mothers might work for eight hours a day, 
five days a week. This Regulation was reconfirmed by Kim II Sung, 
who instructed the government to shorten working hours for 
working mothers with three or more children, and pay the same 
wages as if they worked for eight hours (1973).
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evaluation of sexual equality. They have emphasised the principle 
of equal pay for equal work and the protection of female labour 
and maternity, but not equal opportunities in work assignment and 
promotion. Instead of widening the range of women's occupations, 
a Cabinet Resolution of 1958 (No.84: "On the Increase of Women's 
Labour Participation in Every Sector of the National Economy") 
specified education and health care as women's fields, setting 
up the target proportion of women in the two fields up to 60 
percent. Kim II Sung (Works 1, 1979) also pointed out that "since 
male labour is required in difficult and important sectors such 
as heavy and chemical industry, men can not work in the education 
sector. Therefore, more women should be involved in education, 
particularly in primary education (sic; my emphasis)." Education 
and child care, health care, and the textile industry have been 
women's work since then. Therefore, "sexual equality" in the DPRK 
is explicitly and contradictorily a specific sexual division of 
labour.
6.2.4 The Socialist Family Law
The DPRK did not establish a single code of family law until 
1990. Familial relations were covered by many different laws, 
including the Sexual Equality Law of 1946 which has been the 
principal code of familial relations. In 1955, the DPRK abolished 
the family register system by the Decree of Citizenship 
Registration which regulated the formation and dissolution of 
familial relationships. The abolition of the family register 
system led to the eclipse of the (male) head of a family. Yet, 
while the Sexual Equality Law allowed divorce, both by mutual
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agreement and by court decision, the Cabinet Resolution No.24 of 
1956 repudiated divorce by agreement, making divorce possible 
only by court decision.7
The Socialist Family Law of 1990 is the first coherent code 
of familial relations, albeit very simple and short (with 54 
paragraphs in total). The Socialist Family Law, in contrast to 
the Family Law of the ROK, does not include provisions for the 
family register, computation of relatives, or the prohibition of 
marriage between the parties who have the same surname and 
origin.8 Many paragraphs are mere repetition of previous laws, 
but the Law stipulates that "the state shall encourage youths to 
marry after devoting themselves to their nation and people, and 
to society and the collective" (§9; my emphasis), repeating the 
1971 Kim II Sung address, and discouraging early marriage.9
7 This change in divorce procedure was similar to that of 
the GDR. In the GDR, the Marriage and Divorce Decree of 1955 
allowed a simple procedure for separation and divorce, abolishing 
the "guilt principle", but the Family Law of 1965 introduced a 
court investigation procedure to bring about reconciliation. The 
same pattern happened in the Soviet Union and in the People,s 
Republic of China. The DPRK restricted divorces relatively early 
on, since divorce by agreement in many cases led to the desertion 
of an uneducated wife in favour of a young and well-educated 
mistress, as happened in the ROK.
8 In fact, since the abolition of the family register 
system, many North Korean youngsters have no idea of their 
origin. The abolition also made the complicated computation of 
relatives unnecessary.
9 This late marriage policy stems from men's long military 
service (up to 10 years by conscription) and the need for female 
labour to fill the void of missing young male labour. After the 
1971 Kim II Sung address "On the Revo lut ionisation and 
Proletarianization of Women", the Sixth Congress of the League 
of the Socialist Working Youths (June, 1971) passed a resolution 
that demanded late marriage for all youths —  the suggested 
marriage age was 32 for men, and 27 for women (NUB, 1975) . In 
1976, a Cabinet Resolution decided that the marriageable age of 
men should be over 30, that of women over 28 (DPRK Research 
Centre, 1983). The authorities would not allow marriage
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Marriage is concluded by marriage registration, which the state 
is able to interfere with (Youn Miryang, 1991; KWDI, 1992). The 
DPRK also prohibits cohabitation of unmarried couples: a conjugal 
relationship without marriage registration is prohibited (S12). 
The short supply of houses and the well-organised civil 
monitoring system almost completely prevent cohabitation.
The provisions of parental rights and child-custody are a 
blending of Korean custom and sexual equality. Children take the 
surname of the father (§26) , but the husband and wife keep their 
surnames after marriage (§17), in accordance with Korean custom. 
Yet, in the case of divorce, child custody is to be decided by 
agreement, or, if necessary, by the court. Children under the age 
of three shall be brought up by mothers, unless unavoidable 
circumstances require otherwise (§22). The relationship between 
stepparent and stepchildren is assumed to be equivalent to a 
blood relationship (§29). Although this paragraph forces the 
husband and wife by marriage to enter into a parental 
relationship with the children of their spouses, it does not 
differentiate the relationship between stepmother and children 
from the relationship between stepfather and children. However, 
after the step-parental relationship is established, the parental 
relationship between the natural parent and the children is to 
be terminated (§29). Consequently, many divorcees lose their 
parental rights when their ex-spouses who reside with their 
children remarry.
registration against the Resolution, and without marriage 
registration, housing was not supplied. These conditions to a 
great extent discouraged early marriage. But because of economic 
decline, the DPRK in practice allowed early marriage in the 
1980s.
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Education of the children is an important duty of parents 
(§27). Parents must bring up their children as revolutionary, new 
communist humans (§27). In return, offspring must support their 
parents when their parents cannot work (§28). In the case of 
orphanage, grandparents have the duty to support the orphaned 
children (§35). In return, too, grandchildren must support their 
grandparents when they cannot work, or they have no other 
relatives to support them (§38). Siblings also have the duty to 
support their disabled or sick sisters and brothers (§36). 
Relatives, sisters or brothers, or other members of the family 
must support inactive members of the family — e.g., minors or 
elderly people, or the disabled (§37). Those who do not support 
members of the family could face punishment: up to two years of 
imprisonment or of ' correction' labour under the Penal Code 
(§155). Despite the DPRK's announcement of a completed socialist 
revolution, these provisions still echo the Korean custom of 
extended families, imposing the duty to support the members of 
a family on the family itself.
6.2.5 Abortion and Crimes against Women
In the DPRK, like in the GDR, abortion is legal, and free 
on demand. Until 1982, any woman who wanted an abortion had to 
produce her ID card to the medical institutes and police, and 
reveal the father of the child. Fearful of possible punishment 
for ‘'sexual misdemeanour”, many men murdered their pregnant 
lovers, which became a social problem. In 1982, Kim Jongil came 
to the rescue of pregnant women by ordering the authorities 
concerned not to demand the ID card from those women, and to
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allow abortions in secret (Im Jonghee and Choi Bongrye 
Interviews).
In the DPRK Penal Code, rape is defined in two patterns: one 
by using violence or intimidation (§172), the other by using the 
power derived from responsibilities at work or other relations 
(§173) . §172 reads: "one who raped a woman by violence or
intimidation shall be imprisoned for less than five years" (my 
emphasis) . But §173 reads: "one who exact sexual intercourse from 
a woman who is under his responsibility at work or at other duty- 
bound relationship shall be imprisoned for less than two years" 
(my emphasis). Therefore, violence or intimidation is necessary 
in constructing rape, and the rape victim is limited to women 
only. The Penal Code did not recognise other patterns of crimes 
against women, leaving women vulnerable to sexual harassment of 
other sorts.
Unlike in the ROK, legal reforms in the DPRK have been 
pursued by the WPK and the government, and formally provided 
better protection and equal opportunities for women at work and 
at home. However, from the 1970s onwards, no legal reform 
concerning sexual equality was initiated. The 1990 Family Law was 
not for sexual equality, but for state control over the private 
life of people. Although the DPRK devoted itself to radical 
reforms during the embryonic stage of regime building, it is now 
compromising communist ideas with Korean customs, reflecting an 
incomplete socialist revolution by any reasonable criterion.
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6. 3 Women in Education
As the DPRK pursued the proletarianisation of men and women, 
women's equal opportunity in education has been guaranteed from 
the Sexual Equality Law of 1946 onwards. Further, since the 1958 
Cabinet Resolution No.84, women's participation has steadily 
increased in higher education that prepares students for 
teaching, child-care, and health care.
6.3.1 Education System
Since 1972, the DPRK has provided eleven years of compulsory 
schooling, from the age of five to sixteen. Compulsory schooling 
includes one year of Kindergarten, four years of People's School 
(Inmin Hakgyo: Primary School), and six years of high school 
attendance (Figure 6.1). After eleven years of schooling, 
students have to choose either to advance to higher education, 
which depends on the class of the student's family, or to enter 
the labour force. For young men, military service is an 
attractive alternative, though the class position of a man's 
family may in some cases prohibit him from serving in the army.10
The Theses on Socialist Education of 1977, which declare the 
basic principles of education in the DPRK, prescribe the content 
of socialist education as ideological instruction, scientific- 
technology, and gymnastics. These three contents of socialist
10 The DPRK has a conscript military service system, but 
excludes the "class enemies" — e.g., members of the former 
landlord family—  from conscription. Military service in the DPRK 
normally lasts for eight to ten years. After long service, men 
are rewarded by being recruited into better jobs than those 
without military experience. A woman working for ten years in a 
work place often faces a male newcomer presiding over her.
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Figure 6.1 Education System
education are in accord with the pedagogy of other communist 
countries, but communist ideas are revised by the Chuche 
Thoughts. Accordingly, in the People's School, the emphasis has 
been put on basic literacy and numeracy, and ideological 
instruction (the Chuche Thoughts), occupying 67.6 percent of 
educational curricula (Moon Yong-Ryn, 1987); while in High 
School, scientific-technological training is the most important 
part (41.6 percent: Ibid.).
Unlike the GDR, the DPRK does not provide comprehensive 
compulsory vocational training outside formal schooling. Instead,
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a complementary system of study-while-working provides many adult 
workers with part-time higher education, with full wages until 
their graduation. This study-while-working system includes 
factory colleges, higher technical schools, and evening and 
correspondence courses of the regular colleges. The Plenary 
Meeting of the Central Committee of the WPK of 1960 decided to 
improve the training for technicians, and set up factory colleges 
and higher technical schools in major factories and enterprises, 
in accordance with "the goal of intellectualizing the whole 
society" (Kyowon Sinmun, 1992; Li Yong Bok, 1986). Factory 
colleges offer a four year on-the-job course which lead to 
certification as an engineer for those who successfully complete 
it and pass the state examination. By 1987, Factory colleges 
constituted 40 percent of total higher educational institutions 
(Moon Yong-Ryn, 1987). Since 1981, farm colleges and fishermen's 
colleges have been added to the study-while-working system 
(Kyowon Sinmun, 1992).
Regular colleges and universities also look more like 
vocational institutes, with less academic but more technical and 
practical courses on offer. Most of these institutions are 
regional colleges, each with a single specialisation, such as 
technical, medical, agricultural, or arts studies (Thomas and 
Postlethwaite, 1983) . The Kim II Sung University is the only 
existing equivalent to western universities, and provides the 
most promising future for graduates.
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6.3.2 Sex-Stereotyping in the Education System
Despite the DPRK's rhetoric of women's emancipation, sexual 
segregation in its education system is more severe than in the 
ROK. Male and female pupils are separated from the People's 
School onwards: coeducation is found only in the Kindergartens 
and colleges; the People's School has separate boys' and girls' 
classes; and high schools are all single-sex establishments, 
except for a few special schools for the privileged or gifted 
(Toikoo, 1982). When a Japanese journalist asked the reason for 
single-sex education, the unanimous answer was:
First of all, single-sex education is to develop the 
distinctive characteristics of men and women. Although 
men's and women's social status must be equal, men should 
be brave, while women should be elegant. Secondly, men and 
women are different in biological, physiological nature. 
Men and women can not play football together. (In the case 
of coeducation) what could women do, while men are playing 
football in the (only) playground?" (Toikoo, 1982; my 
emphasis).
Accordingly, in the high school curriculum, girls' schools 
offer home economics, embroidery, and sewing as compulsory 
courses, whereas boys' schools offer training in basic 
electricity and mechanical skills, or sports such as oriental 
fencing and karate. The educational authorities in the DPRK 
without question accept the traditional division of labour as 
desirable. Like in the ROK, the education system of the DPRK 
contributes to sex-stereotyping and sexual segregation rather 
than to widening the spectrum of women's activities.
6.3.3 Women in Higher Education
After compulsory education, about 16 percent of high school
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leavers advance to higher education (Nam Insook, 1992), and a 
third of them (5 percent) become full-time students (Suh Dongik,
1987). The proportion of college and university students in the 
total population is estimated at 1.46 percent (Eberstadt and 
Banister, 1990). Although there are entrance examinations for 
each college or university, the final decision about admission 
is made by the local party committees upon reports by teachers 
in the People's School and high school. In this admission 
procedure, the first requirement is the family background of the 
students (Suh Dongik, 1987; The Daily Chosun, 1991),11 and the 
second is the loyalty and devotion of the student to the WPK. 
Academic achievement comes last.
According to the Central Statistics Bureau of the DPRK (CSB) 
the proportion of women among graduates of universities and 
specialised colleges was 35.2 percent in 1988 (Table 6.1). Yet, 
the proportion of women among university graduates was 28.8 
percent, while the proportion of women among college graduates 
was 40.2 percent, revealing that women were more likely to enter 
specialised colleges than universities.
The reported distribution of women students by the field of 
study indicates a strong tendency towards sexual segregation. 
Women are concentrated in humanities and literature (composing 
a third of students), but are rare in technology (Nam Insook, 
1992; Interviews). In the field of education, the proportion of
11 Many highly academically qualified applicants have failed 
to enter college, because of their "anti-revolutionary, 
reactionary" family background. A refugee, Han Heeback, was a 
case. He obtained very high marks during the school years and at 
the university examination, but failed to advance because his 
grandparents were landlords (Interviews with Cho Sungkoon, Kim 
Unhak, and Han Heeback).
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women changes in inverse proportion to the schooling level for 
which the students study: the higher the level, the smaller the 
proportion of women. In the Teacher's Colleges that offer 
training course for primary schools, the proportion of women is 
about 80 percent. In the Second Pedagogical Universities that 
train teachers for junior high school, the proportion of women 
is 50 percent, while in the First Pedagogical Universities that 
train teachers for senior high school, the proportion of women 
drops to 30 percent (Nam Insook, 1992; Youn Miryang, 1991).
Table 6.1 College and University Graduates, 1988
(in 1,000)
Total Male Female % of Fe.
Total Graduates 
among them 
University Graduates 
College Graduates
1,353
592
761
876
421
455
477
171
306
35
29
40
* Source: Eberstadt and Banister (1992), The Population of North Korea, p. 
76.
Outside regular colleges and universities, women tend to 
advance to technical colleges that offer three-year courses at 
a higher level of skill, or short-term technical institutes that 
offer six-month courses at the apprenticeship level (Nam Insook, 
1992). Women are concentrated in the dressmaking, food- 
processing, crafts, or nursery courses. In particular, 
dressmaking and food-processing courses are so sex-stereotyped 
that a man can rarely be found.12
12 A refugee, Lee Ungpyung who was a pilot in the air force, 
unwittingly revealed the sex-stereotyping of fields of studies. 
When he filled in the application form for college, he wrote the 
military service as the first choice, food-processing course as 
the second, and political economy as the last. Seeing his
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The inaccessibility of educational statistics obstructs a 
clear picture of the status of DPRK women in the education 
system. However, it is clear that the DPRK educational 
authorities' commitment to the "feminisation" of some fields of 
study reinforces the sexual segregation in occupations, leading 
women to smaller earnings and lower prestige.
6. 4 Women in Employment
Not only because of communist ideology, but also because of 
the shortage of the labour force, the DPRK has made every effort 
to increase women's labour participation. In particular, the 1958 
Cabinet Resolution No. 84 wanted to "increase the labour 
participation of women in every sector of the national economy." 
By 1990 the proportion of women in the labour force grew to 49 
percent. However, the Resolution restricted the spectrum of 
women's occupations. Further, as the DPRK economy has stagnated 
since the 1970s, many married women have been transferred to non­
paid voluntary labour. Despite the rhetoric of revolutionisation 
and proletarianization of women, women remain a secondary labour 
force and labour reservoir, with a far narrower range of 
occupations and less prestige and earnings.
6.4.1 Women in the Labour Force
Like the ROK and the GDR, the DPRK population has always had
application form, all his friends bullied him as philandering or 
effeminate, since food-processing was regarded as a women's 
course (Suh Dongik, 1987).
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a female surplus. Further, according to the report by the Central 
Statistics Bureau of the DPRK, the sex ratio — i.e., the number 
of males per hundred females—  rapidly dropped from the 1970s 
onwards, falling to 84.2 (Eberstadt and Banister, 1992, p. 32), 
showing an extreme anomaly in the sex ratios.13 Regardless of 
whether these "missing males" (Eberstadt and Banister, 1992) were 
mobilised to the military, the population structure of the DPRK, 
or, at least, the reported sex ratios, would demand a high level 
of female participation to fill the void of the male population. 
Consequently, women were reported to make up half the total 
labour force (Table 6.2).
The Central Statistics Bureau of the DPRK recently reported 
four occupational categories, which surprisingly comprise 
virtually 100 percent of the entire civilian population aged 16 
and over — i.e., out of the 6,950 thousand female population aged 
16 and over, 6,950 thousand female employees were included in the 
four occupational categories in 1986. Such a figure suggests that 
the population aged 16 and above may refer to those who are 
actually economically active (Table 6.3).
13 The sex ratio was reported to be 100 in 1946, but became 
86.9 in 1975, 84.2 in 1987. This demographically mysterious
"missing males problem" (Eberstadt and Banister, 1992, p. 86), 
the anomalous sex ratio, strongly supports the proposition that 
a sizeable and growing proportion of the male population was 
purposely excluded from official counts from the 1970s onwards, 
most plausibly for military reasons. The proportion of military 
forces in the DPRK population is estimated at 6 percent in 1986 
(Ibid., pp. 93-97). Yet, recent studies suggest the figure must 
be even higher.
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Table 6.2 Women in the Labour Force (in %)
Year Reported 
Sex Ratio0
Estimated 
Sex Ratio2*
% of women 
in the 
total LF3)
Women's
lpr4)
Men's
lpr4)
1953 88 - 26 - -
1963 94 94 36 37 75
1986 84 97 57 I 100 100
1990 - 98 49 - -
* Note 1). Reported by the Central Statistics Bureau, cited by Eberstadt and
Banister (1992) with permission of the CSB, Pyongyang, May 25, 1990.
* Note 2). Estimated by Eberstadt and Banister (1992), including the military.
* Note 3). Source of the data for 1953 and 1963, Central Yearbooks of the
DPRK, 1953 and 1963; for 1986, Eberstadt and Banister (1992), pp. 82-83 
(see Table 6.3); for 1990, the Address by Yuh Yungoo at the 85th 
Congress of IPU, Pyongyang, broadcasted by Pyongyang Radio and Chungang 
Radio, May 1, 1991.
* Note 4). LPR is the percentage of the employed in the population aged 16 and
above. For 1963, estimated by Eberstadt and Banister (1992); for 1986, 
the calculation is based on the CSB report of population ages 16 and 
above by occupation and the CSB report of civilian population by age 
group. These reports are cited by Eberstadt and Banister (1992).
Table 6.3 Population aged 16 and Over by Occupations, 1986
Occupations State
Worker
Official Farmer Coop
Worker
Total
In thousands
Male 2,990 855 1,305 41 5,191
Female 3,840 1,205 1,836 69 6,950
The Proportion of women in Each Occupations (%)
56 59 59 63 57
The Distribution of Men and Women to Each Occupations (%)
Male 58 17 24 1 100
Female 55 17 27 1 100
* Note 1). The numbers of the population in each occupation are cited in
Eberstadt and Banister (1992), p. 80.
* Note 2). "State worker" refers to the workers in state-owned industrial
enterprises; "Official” to the officials in the government agencies or 
other institutions; "Farmer" to those in cooperative agricultural 
units; and "Coop worker" to those in cooperative industrial units.
Confusingly, the statistics are not coherent. Whereas the 
DPRK has reported that women made up 48-49 percent of the total 
labour force (48 percent in 1975, the Rodong Sinmun, July 30, 
1975; 49 percent in 1990, at the IPU Congress, Pyongyang, May 1,
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1991), Table 6.3 shows that the proportion of women in the 
employed must be higher than 57 percent. The most plausible 
explanation for this rapid and inconsistent change in the 
proportion of women in the labour force is that the 1986 
statistics reported by the CSB excluded the military, while other 
reports included the military population. Therefore, while a 
sizeable number of "missing males" are serving in the military, 
a great deal of economic and productive responsibility rests with 
women, especially when the "missing males" must be the young and 
most productive age group.
6.4.2 Women's Vocational Qualifications
It is impossible to obtain an accurate description of the 
structure of women's vocational qualifications. Yet, in addition 
to the number of university and college graduates (report by the 
CSB, 1988) , the DPRK has twice reported the number of skilled 
workers and specialists, for 1963 and 1989 (Table 6.4).
Table 6.4 Skilled Workers and Specialists, 1963 and 1989
Year in numbers (1,000) % of Women
Total Male Female
1963 294 241 43 15
1989 1,350 850 500 37
Growth Rate (%) 360 250 1,060
* Source: Kim Ae-Sil (1991), p. 196.
Between 1964 and 1989, the number of female skilled workers 
and specialists has increased by 1,060 percent, compared with a 
male rise of 250 percent. Although becoming skilled workers or 
specialists does not necessarily mean being highly qualified, the 
growth rate of women is impressive, narrowing the sexual gap in
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vocational qualifications.
6.4.3 The Sexual Division of Labour
Immediately after the Korean War, the DPRK government 
mobilised every possible human resource into the reconstruction 
of the national economy. The aforementioned 1958 Cabinet 
Resolution "On the Increase of Women's Labour Participation into 
Every Sector of National Economy" was part of these efforts. 
Although this Resolution already indicated a presupposition of 
different roles between the sexes in labour, until the mid-1960s 
the DPRK government had tried to change the sexual division of 
labour. The DPRK proclaimed that "women can do every job that men 
do", and assigned women into a few "men's jobs." One notable 
example was the launch of "The Women", a deep-sea fishing vessel 
with all women crews, in the late 1950s (Youn Miryang, 1991; 
RCDPRK, 1983). "The Women" ceased to exist within a year, 
reportedly because of the poor performance of the crew and severe 
criticisms, but it had joined in the "300-days Fishing Movement" 
on the same conditions as other fishing vessels with all-male 
crews.14 Also, in the 1960s, the DPRK assigned women to coal­
mining, organising "The Women Rock-Driller Company" at the Wee- 
Won Coal Mine (RCDPRK, 1983; Kim Ae-Sil, 1991). Although the
14 In the DPRK, as in communist China, "movement" refers to 
a mass mobilisation towards a government-established goal, 
social, economic or political. For example, the famous Chollima 
Movement was the DPRK's equivalent of the Chinese "Great Leap 
Forward Movement" during the late 1950s. It started an effort to 
complete the processes of industrial socialisation and 
agricultural collectivisation. Many "movements" have swept the 
DPRK as a way of encouraging labour competition —  i.e., as non­
monetary incentives. The "300-days Fishing Movement" demanded 
fishing vessels to continue fishing for almost a year without 
returning.
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Women Rock-Driller Company was dissolved in 1965, allegedly 
because of sabotage by women rock-drillers, a few women are still 
working in pits (The Daily Workers. 29 Nov. 1983) .
These early efforts of the DPRK government to change the 
sexual division of labour, however, gradually turned into mere 
rhetoric. Faced with the criticisms of ignoring women's physical 
conditions and harming women's maternity, the DPRK government 
resorted to assigning women into jobs that were regarded as 
suitable for women, rather than improving working conditions. In 
1980, the proportion of women in light and textile industries was 
estimated at 70 percent, and in primary education at 80 percent 
(Lee Whan-Gu, 1986) . Instead of further questioning the sexual 
division of labour, the DPRK retreated to the traditional notion 
of different roles for the two sexes.
6.4.4 Lesser Earnings in Women's Work
Any analysis of the working conditions of DPRK women either 
becomes pure guesswork, or relies on piecemeal estimation, 
because of the lack of authoritative statistics. Yet, the 
principle of equal pay for equal work has never been disputed or 
questioned among the scholars who are interested in the DPRK. 
Yet, a cluster of piecemeal sources suggest that women's earnings 
are smaller than men's, because of the sexually segregated 
assignment to occupations. While men take "laborious and 
difficult jobs" with larger earnings, women are assigned jobs 
"suitable for the peculiar characteristics of women" (sic!: 
Central Yearbook, 1970) with smaller rewards. Also, the larger 
the proportion of women in an occupation, the lower the average
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wage (Table 6.5). Without breaching the principle of equal pay 
for equal work, therefore, the DPRK government has effectively 
made women the secondary labour force, receiving smaller wages.
Table 6.5 Proportion and Average Wages of
Women in Each Economic Sector (1985)
Industrial Sector % of Women Average Wages 
(DPRK Won °)
Primary Education 80 70-100
Light/Textile Industry/Office Workers 70 60-80
High School 35 80-100
Technical School 30 90-130
Mining 20 92-180
Heavy Industry 15 92-150
Universities 15 120-200
* Note: the source for the proportion of women in each sectors is Lee
Whan-Gu (1986), p. 267; the average wages were drawn from Nae-Woe 
Tonashin [The Internal and External Affairs Correspondent], No. 448 (8 
Nov. 1985) and No. 460 (16 Aug. 1985).
* Note 1): Won is DPRK currency.
6.4.5 Domestic Workshops: Housewives' Part-Time Work
Since the early 1980s, with the economy in decline, and with 
many plants only in partial operation (Hwang Eui-Gak, 1993), the 
DPRK government allowed more and more married women to stay at 
home as housewives.15 According to refugees, up to 70 percent of 
married women in rural areas choose not to be employed (Youn 
Miryang, 1991; Kim Ae-Sil, 1991) . Yet, staying at home all day 
long has not been an option open to DPRK women. Although they are 
not employed full-time, DPRK women have to join either in
15 However, unmarried women are not allowed to stay at home. 
This compulsory assignment to a job is effectively sustained by 
food rationing. In the food rationing system, employed persons 
and full-time students receive 700g of rice and subsidiary foods; 
those registered as dependants receive 300g of rice and other 
foods. Those aged over eighteen are not permitted to register as 
dependants, except housewives.
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'voluntary labour' or in the Ganae Jakup-Ban (Domestic Workshops) 
that produce consumer goods in a variety of community centres.
'Voluntary labour' in fact refers to a kind of forced 
labour, which enjoins all the unemployed to engage at least once 
a week, six to eight hours a day, in manual labour without pay, 
even without provisions of equipment necessary for the work. 
'Voluntary labour' has been mobilised into road work or drainage 
works, or even into large scale construction sites.16 'Voluntary 
labour' was a familiar phenomenon in almost every communist 
regime, and left behind the problem of women's unpaid work 
outside the home being unmeasured.
While 'voluntary labour' is not paid, but compulsory, 
Domestic Workshops provide a little incentive to join in. 
Domestic Workshops originated in the Socialist Labour Law of 1978 
which stipulated that the state, enterprises, and local 
authorities should organise Domestic Workshops or Cooperatives 
for those who were not employed (§31). Domestic Workshops gained 
a new momentum in 1983 when the DPRK government declared it the 
Year for Increasing Consumer Goods (Youn Miryang, 1991; Kang 
Gwang-Ha, 1990).
Domestic Workshops are organised in connection with plants, 
factories, mining, community councils, and collective farms.
16 The media of the DPRK often unwittingly reveal the scale 
of 'voluntary labour'. In Hyesan city, 730 housewives were 
reported to work for the housing construction 'voluntarily' 
—  i.e., without pay (The Korean Woman. Feb. 1980). It was also 
proudly reported that a large number of housewives provided their 
labour for extension work of the Kim Cheak Iron and Still 
Company, the largest iron and still plant in the DPRK (The Korean 
Woman. Mar. 1988) . In the Gum-Duk Mining Company, as many as 
3,000 housewives joined in this 'voluntary labour' (The Korean 
Woman. May 1988).
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Domestic Workshops in plants or factories produce goods, using 
waste materials, which are related to the products of the plant 
or factory. Workshops in community councils supply local 
specialities; workshops in collective farms produce various 
vegetables apart from the main products of the farm, or breed a 
small number of pigs, chickens, or goats.17
Part of the products from Domestic Workshops are permitted 
to be sold on the market: 80 percent of the products must be 
submitted to the local government, but the remaining 20 percent 
accrues to the workers, either in cash after selling, or in kind. 
Although the period workers serve in the workshop is not included 
in the service length for pension entitlement, and although 
workers have to work six to eight hours a day, many married women 
prefer those workshops, because of the flexible working hours and 
less strict rules than in ful1-employment (Refugees: Im Jonghee 
and Choi Bongrye) . The growth of Domestic Workshops has been very 
fast: during five years, from 1984 to 1988, the average annual 
growth rate was 20.8 percent, products of Domestic Workshops 
composing 9.5 percent of total consumer goods on sale on the 
market (The Daily Donq-A. 13 Sep. 1990).
This Domestic Workshop system is the DPRK's equivalent to
17 For example, a Domestic Workshop in Gae-Cheon County bred 
375 goats, pigs, and chickens, and cleared land at the height of 
850 meters above the sea (The Korean Woman. Mar. 1984). The 
Domestic Workshop in the Jin-Cheon Children's Clothing Factory 
makes hats, slippers and gloves for children using remnants of 
dress materials (The Korean Woman. June 1984). The Domestic 
Workshop at the Ansan Button Factory produces buttons, using 
waste vinyl wrappers (The Korean Woman. June 1988).
The size of Domestic Workshops varies, from as small as 
three or four member teams to several hundreds of workers. In the 
case of Sunkyo District Domestic Workshop, a district (community) 
workshop in Pyongyang, the number of members is as high as 5,000, 
producing 6,000 small items (Kim Ae-Sil, 1991).
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part-time jobs: it does not guarantee stable earnings; it does 
not provide job security, any chance of promotion, self-
achievement, or pension. Further, the Domestic Workshops have to 
hunt for the materials necessary for their products by 
themselves. Those in plants or factories are able to take
advantage of waste materials from the plants, but others have to
collect the rare material that workers have at home (Refugees: 
Im Jonghee and Choi Bongrye), or create goods almost out of 
nothing.
Despite the problem of material supply and lack of
prospects, Domestic Workshops at least pay members for their 
labour. With the short supply of consumer goods in the DPRK, 
Domestic Workshops are understandably favoured by many married 
women because of the reward of consumer goods. However, during 
the late 1980s, the DPRK government put more emphasis on 
'voluntary labour', and demanded that Domestic Workshops as a 
unit should join in 'voluntary labour', urging many women into 
unpaid work both outside and inside the home (The Resolution of 
the DWLK Central Committee, 4-5, Nov. 1988) . Yet, the DPRK's 
statistics of the population and the number of the employed 
suggest they invariably include those women working in Domestic 
Workshops or 'voluntary labour' in the category of the employed.
DPRK women have filled the gap of the "missing males" in the 
labour market, as full-time employees, members of Domestic 
Workshops, or voluntary labourers. They are however a secondary 
labour force, being assigned into specific "women's jobs" with 
lower pay than men; working in Domestic Workshops with small and 
unstable earnings and no prospects; and joining in manual work
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without pay. While women are performing the paid and unpaid work 
outside the home, they at the same time take the sole 
responsibility for household chores.
6. 5 Women in the Family
During the early stage of regime-building, the WKP attempted 
to reduce the influence of familial relationships and to dissolve 
the traditional patriarchal family. Making divorce easy and fast 
—  i.e., divorce by agreement between the spouses —  was part of 
the effort to weaken familial bonds. However, as the communist 
regime consolidated its power, the family was revalued as the 
cell of society, and many patriarchal aspects of traditional 
familial relationships returned. Although child-care has been 
socialised on a large scale, women's role as mothers remains of 
foremost importance. Although local governments have attempted 
to save women's labour for household chores, sharing household 
work between the spouses is improbable, if not unthinkable. 
Further, as the Kims set the late wife and mother of Kim II Sung 
as the true ideals for Korean women, as loyal devotees of their 
husbands and sons, so women's loyalty and devotion to the family 
became an indispensable element in the 'revolutionisation of 
women'. Therefore, political patriarchy has reinforced the 
patriarchal family system.
6.5.1 Marriage and Divorce
Until the end of the 1970s, the DPRK had a strict policy
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requiring late marriage. Under this late marriage policy, the 
average age for the first marriage was reported at 26-28 for 
women, and 30-31 for men (Youn Miryang, 1991; Bunge, 1981). 
However, in the 1980s, there was a great surge in the annual 
numbers of marriages (Table 6.6). This marriage boom is 
attributed to two factors: first, a 31 percent increase in the 
number of women aged 20-34, from 2.2 million in 1980 to 2.9 
million in 1987 (Eberstadt and Banister, 1992); and secondly, and 
more importantly, the relaxation of the late marriage policy 
during the 1980s. Eberstadt argues that the surge in the annual 
number of marriages can not be wholly explained by the increased 
number of women in the peak marriage ages (Ibid., pp. 63-66).
Table 6.6 Marriage and Divorce
Year The Number of Marriage Divorce Rate
Marriages
(A)
Divorces
(B)
per 1,000 
Population
per 1,000 
Population
to Marriage 
(B/A*100)
1953 30,564 3,453 3.6 0.4 11.5
1956 107,098 4,124 11.4 0.4 3.9
1965 107,493 3,021 8.7 0.2 2.8
1970 86,639 3,971 5.9 0.2 4.6
1975 84,819 3,714 5.3 0.2 4.4
1980 99,871 4,359 5.8 0.2 4.4
1985 142,753 4,526 7.6 0.2 3.2
1987 188,007 4,231 9.7 0.2 2.3
* Note: Calculation based on the numbers of marriage, divorce, and
population.
* Sources: The numbers of Marriages and Divorces are reported by the CSB, 
and cited by Eberstadt and Banister (1992), p. 64; the numbers of 
population are reported by the CSB, and cited by Eberstadt and Banister 
(1992), p. 32.
According to the refugees from the DPRK (Youn Miryang, 1991; 
Nam Insook, 1991; Son Bong-Sook et.al., 1991), the government 
weakened the late marriage policy because of economic decline.
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With many plants in partial operation,18 providing jobs for all 
of the working age population became very difficult. Married 
women are thus permitted to stay at home, and early marriage is 
not discouraged any more. During the 1980s, the average age for 
the first marriage is reported to be 23-24 for women, 25-27 for 
men.
While marriage is booming, the number of divorces remains 
negligible. Since the 1956 Cabinet Resolution made divorce 
effective only by a court decision, the DPRK has continuously 
discouraged divorce. The effect was a sharp drop in the annual 
divorce ratio to marriages in 1956. The GDR also discouraged 
divorce through court investigation, but the divorce rate of the 
GDR was higher than that of the FRG. By contrast, after the 1956 
Cabinet Resolution, the divorce rate of the DPRK remained lower 
than that of the ROK, recording a fifth of the ROK divorce rate 
per 1,000 population, in 1987. The low divorce rate of the DPRK 
partly reflects the firm hold of the state over people's life, 
but also echoes the Rule of the Three Obediences, since the ROK 
has also recorded lower divorce rates than other industrialised 
countries.
6.5.2 Triple Burden: The Family, the State and Employment
As the DPRK suffered from shortages of labour, it was not 
interested in birth control until the 1970s. Rather, like the 
GDR, it had a pro-natal policy, restricting access to 
contraceptives or abortion, and providing benefits for mothers
18 In extreme cases, plants are reportedly operating at only 
25 percent of capacity (Guardian Weekly. 5 June, 1994).
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with more than three children. However, in 1974, Kim II Sung 
declared that the ideal number of children in the family was 
three (Choi Hong-Gi, 1977), suggesting a policy change towards 
mild birth control. Kim II Sung's instruction had such a powerful 
impact that the crude birth rate fell by 2 percent, and the total 
fertility rate per woman dropped by 3 points, during 1970-1975 
(Table 6.7). Refugees of late report that most households have 
four members: the spouses and two children. Yet, extended
families with three generations living together are not rare, 
particularly in rural areas. The single person household is 
reported as almost non-existent. Therefore, the average size of 
a family — i.e., the number of household members—  remains bigger 
than in the ROK or western countries.
Table 6.7 Birth Rate, Fertility, and Family Size
Year Crude Birth Rate 
in Percentage
Total Fertility 
Rate per Woman
Average Number of 
Household Members
1960 3.85 5.40
1970 4.47 6.94
1980 2.18 3.03 5.1
1987 2.89 2.50 4.8
* Note 1). The Crude Birth Rate is reported by the CSB, cited from
Eberstadt and Banister (1992), p. 42.
* Note 2). The Fertility Rate is estimated by Eberstadt and Banister
(1992), Appendix A, pp. 108-110. Fertility Rate refers to the average 
number of children a woman has during her life time.
* Note 3). The average number of household members is reported by the CSB to
the UN Population Fund in 1989. NUB (1991) Social Indicators of South 
and North Korea, p. 152.
To keep the proportion of women in the labour force high, 
the provision of child-care facilities was an urgent necessity. 
Like other communist regimes, the DPRK has paid great attention 
to such facilities. The government has proudly paraded facilities 
which accommodate 80 percent of all pre-school age children free
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of charge.19 The remaining 20 percent of children come mainly 
from the families of the WPK cadre members whose wives tend to 
stay at home as full-time housewives, or from the collective 
farms, which include many elderly people who take care of the 
children. Creches and kindergartens are run by enterprises, 
localities, collective farms, or by the state. Daily, weekly, or 
monthly child-care is available, but mothers prefer daily care 
in which children are accommodated during the mothers' working 
hours.
Yet, mothers hold the responsibility of being 'the first 
instructor to children' at home, because 'it is the mother who 
bears and rears children, not the father' (Kim II Sung's 
instruction: The Korean Woman. Feb. 1981; The Choilima. Feb.- 
Mar. 1982; The Choi lima. Jan. 1983; The Choi lima. July 1989). 
Whenever issues related to children are discussed, the media 
emphasizes the responsibility of mothers, not parents. Regardless 
of their employment, and regardless of education provided in 
child-care facilities, mothers alone are to blame if anything 
goes wrong with the children. Sharing the responsibility of 
upbringing between the spouses is an unfamiliar issue in the 
DPRK. It is for this reason that women's revolutionization is of 
utmost importance —  mothers are responsible for bringing up the 
children as revolutionaries (Kim II Sung, Works 6, pp. 112-135).
At the same time, the duty of household chores rests solely 
with wives. DPRK families depicted in novels are thoroughly male-
19 In 1986, the total pre-school age population was reported
2.5 million (Eberstadt and Banister, 1992, p. 40), and the DPRK 
provided 28,358 creches and 19,262 kindergartens with a total 
capacity of 2 million children (Bang Wanjoo, 1987, p. 138).
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dominated. Wives hardly expect their husbands to share household 
work. Instead, for example, a husband gets angry because his wife 
failed to prepare the lunch table for his retired parents before 
she went to work (Kim Yonghan, 1975). A wife is anxious about her 
cooking, because her husband may skip breakfast if the meal is 
not delicious (Rim Jaesung, 1983). Another wife is obsessed with 
returning home during her lunch time, in order to make a fresh 
lunch for her husband (Urn Danwoong, 1980) . In a recent novel, the 
husband is very supportive of the wife's work in employment, but 
gets angry when he has to do household work (Paek Namryong,
1988) . The Korean Woman, the magazine of the DWLK, also demands 
women that 'respect and listen to their husbands and parents-in- 
law' , and do their best to 'keep the house clean and tidy' (The 
Korean Woman. Sep. 1981; Mar. 1986). The Choilima, a magazine 
published by the WPK, repeatedly asks women to respect their 
husbands: when women talk about their husbands, they should refer 
to the husband as 'my master', 'master of my family', or 'the 
head of my family', while men are expected to call their wives 
'my wife' or 'the keeper of my family' (The Choi lima. Apr. - May 
1981; Nov. 1988).
The supposed true models of Korean women, Kim II Sung's late 
wife and mother, are depicted as loyal wives and wise mothers who 
always obeyed their husbands without question. Kim's late wife 
Kim Jongsook, who was an anti-Japanese guerilla warrior, is 
invariably described as preparing meals and doing needle work for 
the warriors, while joining in armed struggle. In an alleged 
memoir about Kim Jongsook, she tells a young guerrilla (the 
author) that 'sewing and cooking are by nature women's work' (The
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Korean Woman. Feb. 1986). When the ideal woman heroically took 
on the double responsibility of household work and struggle 
against Japanese imperialism, who today can dare to demand the 
equal sharing of household work? Therefore, DPRK women are under 
the triple burden of employment, the state, and the family.
6. 6 Women's Political Representation
In politics, at least formally, DPRK women are far better 
represented than their southern sisters. The proportion of women 
representatives in the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) has 
remained around 20 percent; two women were elected as Vice 
Chairpersons of the SPA; there has been at least one woman 
minister in the Cabinet, except for the fifth Cabinet (1972- 
1977) ; and the proportion of women in the Central Committee of 
the WPK was 6.54 percent in 1970, and 3.33 percent in 1990. 
However, since the 1970s, women have experienced a political 
setback: the erstwhile-powerful women's organisation, the
Democratic Women's League of Korea (DWLK), has been in decline, 
both in size and voice; and no woman has been newly recruited 
into central positions in decision making bodies. As the Kims try 
to reinstate patriarchal order in politics, women's voice has 
become weaker and weaker.
6.6.1 Women in the Supreme People's Assembly
The SPA is, according to the Constitution, the supreme 
sovereign organ of the DPRK. However, its function is only to
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approve the decisions of the Politburo, and its meetings last 
less than a month in total for its four year period of office. 
The number of Representatives has varied term by term, from 215 
to 655, of which the proportion of women has been 9.1 percent at 
the nadir, and 21 percent at the zenith (Table 6.8).20
Table 6.8 Women in the Supreme People's Assembly
Term Election Total Number of Number of Women % of Women
Year MPs 1) St-MPs 2) MPs St-MPs MPs St-MPs
1 1948 572 34 69 1 12 3
2 1957 215 32 27 2 13 6
3 1962 383 27 35 3 9 11
4 1967 457 18 73 1 16 6
5 1972 451 19 113 2 21 11
6 1977 579 19 120 2 21 11
7 1982 615 19 121 2 20 11
8 1986 655 15 138 3 21 20
9 1990 687 15 138 2 20 13
* Note 1). MPs refers to the Representatives.
* Note 2). St—MPs refers to the members of the Standing Committee.
* Source: Youn Miryang (1991), p. 115. This table is based on the reports
of the SPA, "The Election Result and the Composition of 
Representatives" at the first session of each term.
Despite the nominal position of the SPA, the relatively high 
proportion of women in the SPA reflects the WPK's principle of 
sexual equality in politics. Further, the fact that many women 
Representatives had been awarded the title "Hero of Exertion”, 
the highest level of honour, before they entered the SPA implies
20 In all DPRK elections, votes are cast for or against a 
single candidate. Since 1962, the turnout rate and the support 
rate have been both 100 percent (NUB, 1991). The candidates for 
the SPA are all selected by the WPK, but allegedly nominated by 
either the WPK, the Chungwoo Party, or other affiliates of the 
National Front that comprises all organisations of the DPRK. The 
Chungwoo party is allegedly the political wing of a religious 
group, the Chundokyo (The Heavenly Friends) which originated in 
a popular revolutionary movement of the nineteenth century. This 
party claims itself to be a 'friendly party to the WPK', and 
helps the WPK to keep the appearance of a multi-party system.
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that the Representatives are selected for their achievements and 
merits. Among the 47 women Representatives who were elected more 
than three times, 25 were Heroes of Exertion (53.2 percent: Youn 
Miryang, 1991).
Seven women have been selected in the Standing Committee 
which exercises the SPA's authority when the SPA is out of 
session. Among the women members of the Standing Committee, three 
women were prominent communists who had joined the anti-Japanese 
struggle either as intellectuals or as armed guerillas; one was 
devoted to building the WPK during the early stage of the DPRK; 
two were academics; and the other is Kim Songae, Kim II Sung's 
wife. With the exception of Kim Songae, the other six women 
members in the Standing Committee reached their position on their 
own merits, and were well known, even in the ROK. In this light, 
the women Representatives in the SPA indeed "represent" the 
contribution women have made to the DPRK —  or, the DPRK 
acknowledges women's contribution to society. Yet, the percentage 
of women Representatives falls short of sexual equality, and 
reveals the limitation of state-induced women's emancipation.
In various levels of the People's Assemblies, the proportion 
of women representatives are reportedly slightly higher than in 
the SPA, ranging from 13.1 percent to 33.1 percent. As in the GDR 
or the FRG, the lower the level of assemblies, the higher the 
proportion of women representatives. The "Iron Law of Andrarchy" 
operates.
6.6.2 Women in the Government
The DPRK Cabinet (Administration Council) is composed of a
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Premier, several Deputy Premiers (at present 10 Deputy Premiers) , 
Ministers and Directors, and Chairpersons of many ministerial 
ranks of Committees. The total number of the Cabinet members 
varies, but has averaged around 30. Of the 260 men and women who 
have ever been in the Cabinet, from 1948 up to now, only 5 were 
women (1.9 percent: Youn Miryang, 1991). Compared with the
proportion of women in the SPA, the proportion of women in the 
Cabinet is surprisingly low. Yet, women in the DPRK Cabinet have 
in some sense received better treatment than in many other 
countries.
The most prominent woman member in the Cabinet is Kim 
Bokshin, Deputy Premier. She first obtained a high reputation as 
a manager of a military uniform and textile supply factory during 
the war. Because of her highly regarded management in the 
factory, she was accepted to the Central School for Party Cadre 
Members, and began political activities. She is reportedly an 
excellent technocrat in industrial management and administration. 
She has successively filled various posts in the Cabinet such as 
Minister of Textile Industry (1967-72), Chairperson of Trade 
Committee (1982-1986) , Chairperson of External Economic Relations 
Committee (1986-1990), and Minister of Light Industry (1990-). 
She has been Deputy Premier since 1977 until now, while holding 
other positions in the Cabinet as well.
Another woman, Youn Kijong, is an expert in finance. She has 
remained Minister of Finance since 1977. She is known as a genius 
in statistics, accounting and finance. Of the two women Ministers 
of Culture, one (Park Yongshin) was a famous actress, and the 
other (Huh Jongsook) a renowned intellectual, theoretician, and
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activist for the then-nascent communist movement, capable of 
speaking five languages without difficulty. The remaining woman 
Minister was responsible for agriculture, having a strong Soviet 
connection.
The positions held by women shows that, at least in the 
Cabinet, the sexual division of labour has been ignored. Also, 
as all five women Ministers were zealous communists or eminent 
technocrats, it is certain that they obtained their positions for 
excellent ability and achievement. Unlike Honecker in the GDR, 
Kim II Sung never appointed his wife to the Cabinet. DPRK women 
Ministers have not been restricted to the traditional women's 
spheres, either. In that sense, women members in the Cabinet have 
received fairer rewards than in many other countries, although 
their proportion is nevertheless low.
6.6.3 Women in the Workers' Party of Korea
The proportion of women in the WPK's membership has not been 
reported, but is estimated at 30 to 40 percent. Although the WPK 
has held Party Congresses five times, only the second Congress 
reported the number and proportion of women delegates to the 
Congress —  142 women made up 14.4 percent of delegates (WPK 
Documents, Vol. 1) . Yet, the composition of the Central Committee 
of the WPK is accessible information: the proportion of women in 
the Central Committee has been between 2.3 percent and 6.5 
percent (Table 6.9). The women members in the Central Committee 
include most of those women in the Cabinet and the SPA. However, 
unlike the Standing Committee of the SPA or the Cabinet, the 
Party Central Committee includes many women whose only
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achievement might be successful marriage to powerful men, or 
whose family happens to be in close relationship with the Kims. 
All the members of the Kim family are included. The Party Central 
Committee seems to be a blend of a new aristocracy and 
technocrats.
Table 6.9 Women in the Central Committee of the WPK
Congress Number of Women Proportion of Women
Date Regular Candidate Regular Candidate
Member Member Member Member
1946 2/43 - 5
1948 2/67 - 3
1956 2/71 - 3
1961 2/85 3/50 2 6
1970 7/107 6/55 7 11
1980 6/169 8/103 4 8
1990 6/180 8/148 3 5
* Note: The column of the number of women members is to read as (the number
of women)/(total number of members).
* Source: Youn Miryang (1991) p. 183. This table is based on the reports
of the Organisational Committee to the Party Congress in each 
Congresses (1946-1990). The reports were traced and recorded through 
the broadcast of the Pyongyang Radio and the Chungang Radio.
The Politburo of the Central Committee, at present composed 
of one standing member (Kim Jongil) ,21 ten regular and ten 
candidate members, has two women candidate members: Kim Bokshin 
and Lee Sunshil. Lee Sunshil has worked for the party 
organisation, and was honoured in 1982 with the Kim II Sung 
Medal, the highest medal in the DPRK. She is well known for her 
espionage activities against the ROK. In 1991, she penetrated
21 Before the death of Kim II Sung (1994) and Oh 
Jinwoo(1995) , the number of standing members was 3 : Kim II Sung, 
Kim Jongil and Oh Jinwoo. After the death of the two members, the 
Party has not yet recruited any new standing member.
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into the ROK, and initiated an illegal communist group in Seoul. 
After returning to Pyongyang, the communist group was detected 
by the Korean Central Information Agency, which made her famous 
even in the ROK. Like the SED of the GDR, the WPK has never 
elected a regular woman member to the Politburo.
6.6.4 The Democratic Women's League of Korea
The DWLK had been one of the most important organisations 
in the DPRK until the 1970s. Under the leadership of Park Jongae, 
who was Minister of Agriculture during 1957-1962, the DWLK grew 
rapidly: its membership was 0.6 million in 1946, 2.5 million in 
1962, and 2.7 million in 1971. However, it suddenly declined in 
size and voice during the 1980s, experiencing a dramatic loss of 
membership —  only a meagre 0.2 million membership remained in 
1987 (Youn Miryang, 1991, p. 185)
The DWLK was the driving force in the mobilisation of women 
into the labour force, during and after the Korean War, and 
boasted of its great contribution to the DPRK's nation-building 
and post-war reconstruction. The first President of the DWLK, 
Park Jongae, was awarded the Stalin Medal in 1951, because of her 
contribution to the army during the war.
When the DPRK began to carry out the "Three Revolutions 
Movement”23 in the 1970s, the DWLK set up its targets for the
22 The sources of the number of members are: for 1946, Han 
and Shim (1988), p. 89; for 1962, Central Yearbook of the DPRK 
1964, p. 156; for 1971, The Daily Workers. 6 Oct. 1971; and for 
1987, Bang Wanjoo (1987), p. 74.
23 The Three Revolutions Movement demands DPRK people to join 
in new revolutionary struggles in thoughts (ideology), 
technology, and culture. The 'Ideological Revolution' is to make 
all the people into revolutionaries and the working class. This
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movement: for the Ideological Revolution, DWLK members were
required to read the book "Learn from Kang Bansuck, the Mother 
of Korea" at least 100 times; for the Technological Revolution, 
the members should try to invent and create new devices related 
to their work; for the Cultural Revolution, mothers should pay 
greater attention to education in order to make their children 
into revolutionaries and the working class (Report at the DWLK 
30th Anniversary, Nov. 1976) . As the DWLK's target for the Three 
Revolutions Movement reveals, the DWLK stood in the front line 
of idolisation of the Kims. The DWLK praised Kang Bansuck and Kim 
Jongsook, because of their loyalty and devotion to their husbands 
and sons, which reinstated the notion of women's foremost role 
as mothers.24 Instead of rejecting the roles of submissive 
mothers and wives, the DWLK has led its membership to return to 
the family, to be good mothers and loyal wives.
The decline of the DWLK became clear in 1983 when it held 
the Fifth Congress. In this Congress, the DWLK amended its 
regulations and programme, restricting the conditions of 
membership. Initially, the DWLK was open to all adult women, aged
is only possible when the people are guided by the Chuche 
Thoughts. The Technological Revolution is to develop new 
technology and engineering. The Cultural Revolution is to make 
all the people intellectuals, with at least high school leaving 
level of knowledge, and capable of coping with new technology.
24 Many articles that allegedly recall the activities and 
personality of Kim Jongsook have been indispensable elements of 
The Korean Woman. Scarcely a single issue of the magazine failed 
to publish an anecdote about Kim Jongsook in the 1980s. She was 
called the First Royal Guard (to Kim II Sung) or the Mother of 
Revolution. In a film (The First Royal Guard) , Kim Jongsook makes 
a pair of feet-warmers with her hair for Kim II Sung, and risks 
her life to rescue Kim II Sung. A famous group sculpture "The 
Water of the Fatherland" depicts Kim Jongsook passing a cup of 
water to Kim II Sung, with her head lowered, and her knees bent.
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18 to 55, regardless of whether they were affiliated with other 
organisations. Now, the DWLK is open to women without any other 
organisational affiliation. As all youths aged 18 to 30 are in 
the League of Socialist Working Youths, and as all employees are 
required to join either the National League of Trade Unions or 
the League of Agricultural Workers, the amended regulations of 
the DWLK meant that it became the organisation of full-time 
housewives. The result was a dramatic reduction in membership, 
to less than a tenth of former membership. Although the DPRK 
officially explains that as the regime has succeeded in achieving 
full emancipation of women, there remains very little cause for 
a huge women's organisation, the true reason that underlies the 
decline of the DWLK is speculated to be the conflict between Kim 
Songae, the President of the DWLK since 1971, and Kim Jongil. 
Allegedly, the heir to power was not on good terms with his 
stepmother, and felt threatened by his half-brothers. To restrain 
the influence of his stepmother and half-brothers, the 
organisation under the control of Kim Songae was weakened. In 
short, while the DPRK trumpets its success in achieving the full 
emancipation of women, the major women's organisation is devoted 
to making women into wise mothers and loyal wives. The 
traditional Rule of the Three Obediences is stronger in the DPRK 
than in the ROK —  political patriarchy has revived social 
patriarchy as well.
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6 • 7 Summary
DPRK women have contributed to the DPRK economy to such an 
extent that, excluding the military population, the proportion 
of women in the labour force has risen up to 57 percent. However, 
they form a secondary, and complementary, labour force. Many only 
fill the gap of "missing males”, and when men return to work 
after military service, women with long work service have to 
endure male newcomers presiding over them. When the DPRK economy 
was in desperate need of labour, women were assumed to be able 
to do everything men can do; but when the economy stagnated, 
married women were required to provide unpaid 'voluntary labour' 
rather than ful1-employment.
Nevertheless, in the DPRK women's formal political 
representation is in better shape than in the ROK: the proportion 
of women in the SPA is around 20 percent; in the Cabinet, women 
hold positions that are not sex-stereotyped, and require a high 
standard of qualification and ability.
However, during the 1980s and 1990s, DPRK women retreated 
into the home: in the economy, women's unpaid work outside the 
home has been increasing; in politics, the once-powerful women's 
organisation has been in decline; and in political office, no 
woman from the post revolutionary generations has reached top 
positions; and the state has reimposed the role of loyal wives 
and wise mothers on married women, reinstating the traditional 
Three Obediences' Rule.
Worst of all is the lack of possibility to develop an 
autonomous women's movement and organisation. While all
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organisations and the whole media in the DPRK function as a 
mouthpiece for the government, expressing complaints about sexual 
oppression is suppressed. Women are under-represented in 
politics, but non-represented in their own interests. Only when 
politics allows autonomous interest-articulation, will women's 
issues be taken seriously. Despite its loud rhetoric and the 
claim of women's emancipation, the DPRK has failed fundamentally 
to change gender relations.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
A COMPREHENSIVE COMPARISON OF THE FOUR COUNTRIES
7. 1 Methods of Analysis
After the respective partitions of Germany and Korea, the 
GDR and the DPRK took initiatives affecting the status of women: 
especially in legal reforms and the mobilisation of women into 
the labour force. As a result, these new states appeared to 
differ from their severed halves. Yet, the FRG and the ROK 
greatly enhanced women's status in society in their own ways. By 
the end of the 1980s, at least in legal reforms, the two 
capitalist regimes had almost caught up on their communist 
counterparts. In the economic and political arena, however, women 
in capitalist regimes remained less represented than their 
communist sisters. The evidence I have surveyed enables me to 
address my initial questions. Did communist regimes indeed make 
changes in gender relations? If so, to what extent? Did cultural 
traditions hinder the efforts to emancipate women? If so, to what 
extent? In this Chapter, the changes in the four countries are 
analyzed in terms of legal reforms, political representation, and 
the economic position of women. The two questions of this study 
are hereby hypothesized:
Hypothesis One. Women's position is equal among communist and 
capitalist regimes, regardless of the political system.
Hypothesis Two. Women's position is equal among the Communist 
regimes, regardless of cultural tradition.
In order to vindicate the communist claim that communism is
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the vehicle for women's emancipation, Hypothesis One must be 
rejected, whilst Hypothesis Two be accepted. If the comprehensive 
comparison of the four country suggests that women in communist 
regimes are better off in the legal, political, or socio-economic 
arena, Hypothesis One will be rejected, supporting the communist 
claim. If women's position is not equal or similar among the 
communist regimes, Hypothesis Two will be rejected. The rejection 
of Hypothesis Two could confirm that cultural traditions hinder 
the efforts made by communist regimes towards sexual equality, 
leading to the rejection of the communist claim. I will argue 
that women's emancipation in practice inextricably involves 
changes in gender relations that are shaped by cultural 
traditions.
The analysis of women's position in the legal, political, 
and economic arena involves both qualitative and quantitative 
dimensions. Although economic analysis could be carried out by 
quantitative methods, the analysis of legal changes can hardly 
be quantitative, whilst the analysis of women's political 
representation requires both qualitative and quantitative 
perspectives. Therefore, in analysing women's status of the four 
countries, I employ both qualitative and quantitative methods: 
in the analysis of the legal and political status of women, 
qualitative analysis with figurative comparison is carried out; 
and in the analysis of the economic position of women, a limited 
quantitative comparison with standardized variables is 
undertaken. In either case, I try to deal with concrete and 
tangible data rather than abstract arguments.
In analysing the legal systems of the four countries, I take
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the method of ordinal scaling. Ordinal scaling can provide a 
comprehensive picture of legal changes in the four countries in 
a single table. Ordinal scaling is to give numbers according to 
the order, or to the preference, of a set objective, but not at 
regular intervals. For example, giving number 3 to the best, 
number 2 to the middle, and number 1 to the worst is typical 
ordinal scaling. Yet, these numbers do not tell how much, or to 
what extent, number 3 is better than number 2 or number l.1
In the analysis of the political representation of women, 
a figurative comparison of women in parliaments and governments 
is undertaken. In addition, the sexual division in ministerial 
positions is analyzed. Although numeric figures in parliaments 
and government do not necessarily reflect women's representation 
in practice, social perceptions towards women's role in politics 
could be indicated.
The socio-economic position of women is analyzed by a 
limited number of indicators. Indicators are selected through 
face validation, but limited because of data availability. The 
indicators are measured by standardized variables and compared 
by the mean and standard deviation of each indicator in each 
country, and the average of all indicators in each country. In 
this socio-economic analysis, the DPRK is excluded because of the 
lack of reliable statistical data. Also, because the data 
concerning wage differentials in the GDR is available only after 
1980, the time span for this analysis is limited from 1980 to 
1989.
1 Ordinal scaling could be mistaken as quantification, but 
the numbers given by an ordinal scale can not be transferred, 
without misleading results, into linear equations.
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7. 2 Sexual Equality Under The Lav
Before partition, German women had lived under the same law 
that embodied Christian values and the duty of the Three Ks. 
Likewise, Korean women had lived under the Rule of the Three 
Obediences. Immediately after the respective partitions, 
communist regimes made great advances for women through legal and 
political reforms. But legal reforms in communist regimes reached 
a plateau very early on. Since the 1960s, communist regimes 
hardly renewed legal reforms towards sexual equality, while women 
in capitalist societies struggled for, and sometimes induced 
legal reforms, making the gap between communist and capitalist 
regimes narrower and narrower.
7.2.1 Ordinal Scaling
As to the indicators of sexual equality under the law, I 
have taken fourteen factors that have been disputed, or fought 
for, by feminists, as listed below:
1) . the constitutional guarantee of sexual equality;
2). the principle of sexual equality in the family;
3) . the choice of marriage, divorce, and remarriage;
4). equality in parental authority and child custody;
5) . the wife's equal right to the family property;
6) . the principle of equal pay for equal work;
7). the scope of sexual equality in employment;
8) . provisions for maternity leave;
9). provisions for leave of absence for child care;
10) . provision of child-care facilities;
11). legality of abortion;
12). the scope of criminalisation of rape;
13). the scope of crimes against women;
14). sexual freedom.
Each indicator in each country is to be ranked as a scale 
from 3 to 0, in accordance with the relative preference for
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women. I give Scale 3 to what I consider is the best for sexual 
equality, Scale 2 to what seems in the course of positive 
progress towards sexual equality, and Scale 1 to what seems in 
need of reform. Scale 0 would indicate complete lack of sexual 
equality in the specific aspect. Certainly, part of my scaling 
could evoke criticisms. For example, I give Scale 3 to a law that 
allows abortion free on demand, Scale 2 to abortion on demand, 
but at women's cost, and Scale 1 to restricted abortion. Scale 
0 would be total prohibition of abortion. Even among feminists, 
the question of who should pay for abortion is not yet agreed. 
But, I would argue, the cost of abortion does affect women's 
control over their body and their life, and abortion free on 
demand is thus necessary. Yet, in principle, I take account of 
the debates and discussions among feminists of various 
perspectives in scaling.
The sum of scales given to each country will show, albeit 
approximately, the performance of the country in the quest of 
sexual equality — i.e., the larger the sum, the better for sexual 
equality. Yet, the differences in the sum scored by each country 
do not measure the precise extent of sexual equality. They only 
show which country is more favourable, or preferable, for women. 
Indicators are scaled in every decade — i.e., in 1950, 1960, 
1970, 1980, and in 1989. The change in indicator scales suggests 
legal development in the specific aspect of the four countries.
7.2.2 Legal Indicators of Equality
1. Constitutional Guarantee of Sexual Equality: The criteria 
for scaling of constitutions are two: (1) the existence of a
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provision of sexual equality; and (2) the immediacy of the 
effect.
When the constitution guarantees sexual equality with 
immediate enforcement — e.g., through a precedence clause to 
annul the laws that contradict the principle of sexual equality—  
I give Scale 3 to the constitution. If the constitution promises 
sexual equality, but without a precedence clause, it scores Scale 
2. If the constitution does not provide a precedence clause, many 
laws that contradict the principle of sexual equality might be 
valid for a considerable while. The constitution promising sexual 
equality but having a clause that limits the effect of sexual 
equality provision scores Scale 1. Scale 0 is given to a 
constitution without any provision of sexual equality altogether.
In the cases of the GDR and the DPRK, the first 
Constitutions contained precedence clauses, which immediately 
annulled laws that contradicted the principle of sexual equality. 
By contrast, the FRG Basic Law provided that any previous law 
that contradicted the equal right provision remained in force 
until it would be adjusted to the Basic Law, but no later than 
December 1953 (§117 (1)). Therefore, the Constitutions of the GDR 
and the DPRK have scored Scale 3 since 1948, while the Basic Law 
of the FRG scored Scale 1.
The case of the ROK is more complicated. Although the ROK 
Constitution of 1948 contained a precedence clause stipulating 
that any previous law was to remain in force unless it 
contradicted the provisions of the Constitution (§127) , many laws 
that violated the equal right provision remained valid, even 
without promulgation of new laws. As late as 1960, the first ROK
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Civil Code came into force. The ROK Constitution was thus 
measured as Scale 1 until 1960.
2. The Principle of Sexual Ecrualitv in the Family: The
criteria for scaling are: (1) the existence of the provision of 
sexual equality in the Family Law; and (2) whether, or to what 
extent, the Family Law gives precedence to male members of the 
family.
If the Family Law guarantees sexual equality within the 
family, including equal right to family property, inheritance and 
succession, and to the choice of family name, without giving 
precedence to male members of the family or to the male paternal 
lineage, the law scores 3. If the Family Law gives precedence to 
the paternal lineage in familial succession, but not in property 
inheritance, it scores 2. If the Family Law gives precedence to 
male members of the family as to the family property or 
succession, or as to the choice of family name, albeit promising 
sexual equality in principle, it scores 1. If the Family Law 
discriminates against women even without an empty promise of 
sexual equality, it is graded as 0.
In the cases of the GDR and the DPRK, before the legislation 
of a single Family Law (in the GDR, 1965; in the DPRK, 1990), 
several laws were enacted to provide sexual equality in the 
family — e.g., Thesis on the Effects of Marriage in General (GDR, 
1949) , and the Sexual Equality Law (DPRK, 1946). Also, both the 
GDR and the DPRK abolished the priority of male members of the 
family. Therefore, both countries have scored 3 since 1949.
In the FRG, until 1957 when the Equal Rights Law
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(Gleichberechtigungsgesetz) was adopted, the principle of sexual 
equality in the family was not established. Thus it was graded
0. Even after the Equal Rights Law, the FRG gave precedence to 
paternal lineage in the choice of family name until 1977, thus 
scoring 1. Only after 1977 was sexual equality in the family a 
rule in the FRG. Afterwards, the FRG Family Law scored 3.
In the ROK, before the 1960 Civil Code, there was no 
provision of equal rights in the family (Scale 0) . Also, the 1960 
Civil Code gave precedence to male members of the family in 
inheritance and succession, scoring 1. It was not until 1977 that 
an inheritance became divided in equal proportion among the heirs 
who have the same precedence, regardless of sex. Yet, the 
principle of paternal succession and the male headship of a 
family remained unchanged. Therefore, the ROK 1977 Family Law is 
ranked Scale 2.
3. Choice of Marriage and Divorce: The criterion here is 
simple: whether the Family Law allows women to choose marriage, 
divorce or remarriage. If the Family Law provides women with 
equal right of choice to marry, divorce, or remarry, without 
unnecessary conditions — e.g., restriction over child custody in 
the case of women's remarriage, compulsory procedural 
restrictions on marriage or divorce, or prohibition of women's 
remarriage for a prolonged while—  it scores 3. If the law 
imposes procedural restrictions on women in the case of 
remarriage, including prohibition of women's remarriage for a 
while, it scores 2. When medical knowledge was limited, 
prohibiting women's remarriage for a while was acceptable on the
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ground of possible pregnancy. But recent development in medics 
proves this restriction unnecessary. If the law imposes 
substantial restrictions on women in the case of divorce and 
marriage — e.g., depriving women of child custody, or the state 
interfering with regulations or restrictions—  it scores 1. If 
the law does not allow women to raise a divorce case, or 
prohibits women's remarriage, it scores 0.
In the GDR and the FRG, the guilt principle 
(Vershuldensprinzip) was a grave and substantial restriction in 
divorce procedure (Scale 1) . The GDR changed the guilt principle 
into the irreparable breakdown principle (Zerruettungsprinzip) 
by the 1955 Marriage and Divorce Decree, scoring 2 since then. 
However, the FRG kept the guilt principle until 1977 when the 
Marriage and Family Law (EheRG) adopted the irreparable breakdown 
principle. Therefore, the GDR scores 2 since 1955, while the FRG 
scores 2 only after 1977.
In the ROK, substantial restrictions were imposed on women 
over divorce or remarriage by depriving them of child custody and 
the right of access to their children until 1977 — i.e, divorced 
or remarried mothers were regarded as non-related to the children 
of previous marriage at all. Thus it scored 1. After 1977, the 
ROK Family Law of marriage and divorce became similar to the 
other countries, being made Scale 2. However, in the case of the 
DPRK, the freedom of marriage and divorce is much restricted. 
While early laws allowed a wide range of freedom of marriage and 
divorce with only procedural restrictions, the 1956 Cabinet 
Resolution restricted marriage: it was concluded only by
registration, and divorce only by court decision. Therefore, the
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score of the DPRK changed from 2 (1946) to 1 (1956) . In the DPRK, 
the freedom of marriage and divorce was not increasing, but 
declining. The 1990 Socialist Family Law contains the same 
restrictions (§10-22).
4. Ecrualitv in Parental Authority and Child Custody; Here 
the criteria for scaling are: (1) equal parental authority of the 
father and mother over the children during the marriage; and (2) 
equal child custody in the case of divorce.
If the Family Law guarantees equal parental power for the 
mother and father, and does not give precedence to the father 
over child custody in the case of divorce or the mother's 
remarriage, it is Scale 3. If the Family Law guarantees equal 
parental power for the mother and father, but gives precedence 
to the father over child custody in the case of divorce or the 
mother's remarriage, it is Scale 2. If the law promises equal 
parental authority during the marriage, but deprives the mother 
of child custody in the case of divorce or her remarriage, it is
Scale 1, since it gravely mars women's choice. If the law denies
the parental authority of the mother, and deprives her of child 
custody after divorce, it is Scale 0.
In the GDR and the DPRK, the 1950 Law for the Protection of
the Rights of Mothers and Children (GDR) and the 1946 Sexual 
Equality Law (DPRK) gave equal parental authority to fathers and 
mothers, and demanded that child custody be decided by divorce 
agreement. Therefore, the GDR and the DPRK have scored 3 since 
1950.
In the FRG, only after 1957 did women obtain equal parental
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authority, and equal right to child custody in the case of 
divorce. Therefore, the FRG scored 1 before 1957, and scored 3 
afterwards. However, in the ROK, not until 1977 did women have 
parental authority over their children. Nor had women child
custody in the case of divorce. Thus it was Scale 0. Even after
1977 women did not have child custody in the case of divorce
(Scale 1) . Only since 1990 have ROK women had equal parental 
authority and equal right to child custody (Scale 3).
5. The Wife/s Equal Right to the Family Property: The
criteria for scaling here are: (1) married women's right to
separate property; and (2) the wife's equal right to the family 
property that was accumulated during the marriage.
If the Family Law fully recognises the wife's property
rights to own and manage a separate property that was her 
entitlement before the marriage, and recognises the equal right 
of the spouses to the family property that was accumulated during 
the marriage, regardless of whether the wife contributed through 
her paid employment, the law is Scale 3. In this case, the wife 
can claim a portion of the family property in the case of 
divorce, in her own right, not as an alimony.
If the law recognises the wife's property right over her 
separate property, but recognises the wife's equal right to the 
property that was accumulated during the marriage only when she 
contributed to the property through paid employment, it is Scale 
2. It does not recognise the wife's contribution to the property 
through her unpaid domestic labour.
If the law recognises the wife's property right over her
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separate property, but denies altogether her right to the family 
property that was accumulated during the marriage, it is Scale 
1. If the law does not allow the wife property right at all, it 
is Scale 0. In both cases, women's property rights are severely 
breached.
Although private ownership over capital property was denied 
in the GDR, all commodities, property rights, and savings 
accumulated during the marriage belonged jointly to both spouses, 
and would be divided equally in the proceedings of divorce. The 
provisory clause which allowed a spouse's claim for a larger 
share because of greater need, or a spouse's exclusion from 
property sharing because he or she had not contributed to the 
creation of the common property by either gainful employment or 
participation in household chores did not discriminate against 
women, nor denied women's contribution through household chores. 
Therefore, the GDR scored Scale 3 from 1950 onwards. In the FRG, 
the 1957 Equal Rights Law first recognised women's right to have 
and manage special property and separate property of their own. 
Also, the 1957 law provided the wife a right to her share of the 
family property, regardless of whether she had contributed to the 
family income by gainful employment. Thus it has scored 3 since 
1957.
In the DPRK, the 1946 Sexual Equality Law provided women 
with the equal right to have property and to demand, 
unconditionally, a share of property in the case of divorce. 
Therefore, the DPRK has scored 3 since 1946. In the ROK, women's 
property right during marriage was not recognised until the 1960 
Civil Code (Scale 0) . Although the 1960 Civil Code did recognise
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women's right to have separate property, it assumed that any 
property of which the title was uncertain belonged to the 
husband. It also ignored wives' contribution to obtaining family 
property, either through their employment or through household 
work (Scale 1) . The 1977 amendment of the Civil Code provided 
that the family property of which the title was uncertain was 
assumed to be joint property, partly recognising women's 
contribution (Scale 2) . Yet, it was not until 1990 that women's 
claim to a share of the family property, regardless of whether 
they contributed to the property through gainful employment, was 
recognised (Scale 3).
6. The Principle of Ecrual Pav for Ecrual Work: The criteria 
for scaling are: (1) the provision of the principle of sexual
equality in employment; (2) the principle of equal pay for equal 
work; and (3) the provision of procedures to claim against 
sexually discriminatory pay arrangements.
If the Labour Law specifically provides the principle of 
sexual equality in employment and the principle of equal pay for 
equal work, with the provision of procedure to claim 
discrimination against women, it scores 3. If the law provides 
the general principle of sexual equality in employment, not 
mentioning the principle of equal pay for equal work 
specifically, and provides procedures to protest against 
discriminatory pay arrangement, the law scores 2. If the law 
provides the principle of sexual equality, with or without 
specific mentioning of the principle of equal pay for equal work, 
but lacks the provision of a procedural remedy, the law scores
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1. If the law is silent about both principles, it scores 0.
In both the GDR and the DPRK, the principle of sexual 
equality in employment and the principle of equal pay for equal 
work were fully adopted in the labour laws, but without 
procedural remedies (Scale 1). In the FRG, sexual equality in 
employment was supposedly included in Article 3 of the Basic Law. 
Further, the constitutional guarantee of the autonomy of the two 
sides of industry — employers and employees—  took precedence 
over the principle of equal pay for equal work (Scale 0). Only 
in 1980, when the Labour Law to Comply with the European 
Community Provisions (EG Anpassungsgesetz) was adopted, were 
sexual equality in employment and the principle of equal pay for 
equal work established (Scale 3) .
In the ROK, the 1953 Labour Standards Law had a general 
equal treatment provision (§5) , but missed the principle of equal 
pay for equal work (Scale 1) . Even the Sexual Equality Employment 
Law of 1988 did not stipulate the principle of equal pay for 
equal work. Only by the amended Sexual Equality Employment Law 
of 1989 were sexual equality in employment and the principle of 
equal pay for equal work (equal pay for work of equal value) 
installed, with procedural remedies (Scale 3).
7. The Scope of Sexual Ecrualitv in Employment: The criteria 
for scaling are: (1) the scope of sexual equality in employment; 
(2) the provision of procedures to protest against 
discrimination. In many cases, the term sexual equality in 
employment has meant only equal opportunity in recruitment and 
equal pay for equal work. Discriminatory practices against women
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— e.g., sexually segregated work assignments, slim chances of 
getting promotion, and more often, early retirement of women—  
have escaped the application of the principle of sexual equality.
If the Labour Law explicitly demands sexual equality not 
only in recruitment, but also in work — e.g., work assignment, 
working conditions, promotion, resignation, retirement and 
dismissal—  and if the law provides procedures to claim the 
existence of discrimination, the law scores 3. When the law 
demands sexual equality only in general terms, but provides 
procedures to claim discrimination, it scores 2. If the law 
demands sexual equality in every aspect of employment, including 
work assignment, promotion, retirement and dismissal, but lacks 
procedures to protest against discrimination, it scores 1. If the 
law demands sexual equality only in general terms, and lacks 
procedures to claim discrimination, it scores 0.
Both the GDR and the DPRK demand sexual equality only in 
general terms, and lack legal procedures to claim discrimination 
(Scale 0) . They might presume that the guarantee of sexual 
equality could automatically lead to prevention of 
discrimination. Yet, in the case of DPRK, the 1958 Cabinet 
Resolution specified education and health care as women's fields, 
involving sexual inequality in a specifically sexual division of 
labour.
Similarly, in the FRG, the discriminatory practice of 
assigning women to lower wage groups prevailed until 1980 (Scale 
0). However, the 1980 Labour Law (EG Anpassungsgesetz) obliges 
equal treatment of men and women for all aspects of appointment, 
promotion and dismissal. Should a dispute arise, the employer has
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to prove that discrimination has not taken place (Scale 3)• In 
the ROK, too, it was only after the 1988 Sexual Equality 
Employment Law that sexual equality covered all aspects of 
employment, and that legal procedures were provided to claim 
discrimination (Scale 3).
8. The Provisions for Maternity Leave; The Criteria for 
scaling are: (1) the provision of paid maternity leave; and (2) 
the length of maternity leave.
If the Labour Law provides paid maternity leave for up to 
one year before or after giving birth, it scores 3. If the law 
provides paid maternity leave for up to six months before or 
after giving birth, it scores 2. If the law provides maternity 
leave for up to three months before or after giving birth, it is 
Scale 1. If the law does not provide paid maternity leave, it 
scores 0.
In addition to twenty six weeks maternity leave before and 
after giving birth, GDR women were allowed to stay at home up to 
the first birth day of the new born baby, at full pay, by the 
1977 Labour Law (AGB, Scale 3) . Before the AGB, the GDR allowed 
twenty six weeks maternity leave (Scale 2) . By contrast, the FRG 
allowed only fourteen weeks' maternity leave with pay after 1952 
(Scale 1). Similarly, the 1946 Labour Law of the DPRK allowed 77 
days of maternity leave (Scale 1) , and the 1953 Labour Standards 
Law of the ROK guaranteed 90 days of maternity leave (Scale 1) .
9. The Provisions for Leave of Absence for Child Care: The 
criteria for scaling are: (1) the provision of leave of absence
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for child care; and (2) the applicability of leave of absence 
—  either to any parent or only mothers.
If in addition to paid maternity leave, the Labour Law 
provides further leave of absence for child care for either 
fathers or mothers, for longer than a year, it scores 3. If the 
law provides further leave of absence for child care for either 
fathers or mothers, for less than a year, it scores 2. If the law 
provides further leave of absence for less than a year, but only 
for the mothers, it scores 1, since this provision imposes the 
responsibility of child care only on the mothers, not on the 
parents. If the law does not provide leave of absence, outside 
the maternity leave, it is Scale 0.
The GDR Labour Law of 1977 (AGB) allowed mothers or fathers 
to be released from work up to the third birthday of the child 
if they could not find a creche for their baby (Scale 3) . A 
decade later, the FRG provided mothers or fathers with leave of 
absence up to 10 months (1986/87) , with protection from dismissal 
for both partners and a right to return to equivalent employment 
after the period (Scale 2). Since 1988, the leave of absence has 
been extended up to 12 months (Scale 3).
However, the ROK Sexual Equality Employment Law of 1987 
provides leave of absence for female employees with an infant 
under one year old, upon request, but it must not exceed one year 
including paid maternity leave (90 days). The ROK law allows 
unpaid maternity leave only for mothers, and for less than a year 
(Scale 1). The DPRK labour laws do not provide leave of absence 
or release from work (Scale 0).
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10. The Provision of Child-Care Facilities: The criteria for 
scaling are: (1) who has the responsibility to provide child-care 
facilities; and (2) who pays the bill?
If the law obliges the state, enterprises, and local 
government to provide child care facilities free of charge, with 
binding power, it scores 3. If the law obliges the state, 
enterprises, and local government to provide child care
facilities, but at least part of the cost is imposed on the 
parents, it is Scale 2. If the law demands the state,
enterprises, and local government to provide child care
facilities, without binding power, and at least part of the cost 
is imposed on the parents, it is Scale 1. If the law is silent 
about who is responsible to provide and pay for child care 
facilities, it scores 0.
In the GDR and the DPRK, the state, enterprises and local 
government had to provide child care facilities, free of charge 
(Scale 3) . By contrast, the FRG and the ROK left child care 
facilities largely in private hands, at parents' cost (Scale 0) .
11. Abortion: The criteria for scaling are: (1) legality of 
abortion; and (2) who pays the cost of abortion.
If the law allows abortion on demand, and free of charge, 
it scores 3. If the law allows abortion on demand, but at the 
aborter's expense, it is Scale 2. Also, if the law allows 
abortion only under specific conditions, but the legal abortion 
is covered by national health care system, it is Scale 2. If the 
law restricts abortion under specific conditions, and at the 
aborter's cost, it scores 1. If the law prohibits abortion
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altogether, it scores 0.
In the DPRK, the penal code has been silent about abortion, 
and the medical establishments have provided free abortion on 
demand (Scale 3) , whereas the GDR restricted abortion until 1972. 
The 1950 Law for the Protection of Rights of Mothers and Children 
allowed abortions on the grounds of limited "indications, *' but 
if allowed, abortion was covered by the national health care 
system (Scale 2) . By the 1972 Law on the Interruption of 
Pregnancy, GDR women obtained the right to abortion, free on 
demand (Scale 3).
In the FRG, abortion had been illegal altogether until 1975 
(Scale 0). The 1975 Abortion Law allows abortions under limited 
conditions ("indications") , and the cost is paid by the health 
insurance if it fits any of the indications (Scale 2) . The ROK 
has restricted abortion under limited conditions, and at the 
aborter's cost (Scale 1).
12. The Scope of Criminalisation of Rape; The criterion for 
scaling is the definition of rape. The essential elements of a 
rape statute were traditionally: (1) force, (2) absence of 
consent, and (3) penile-vaginal penetration (Spohn and Horney, 
1992). The traditional statute did not include sexual conduct 
other than penile-vaginal penetration, sexual assaults with an 
object, or sexual assaults by a spouse. Critics demanded that 
rape must be redefined to include not only penile-vaginal 
penetration, but also forced cunnilingus, fellatio, anal 
intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part 
of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal
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opening of other person's body.
Further, together with the element of force, the consent 
standard required the rape victim to prove she physically 
resisted to the utmost — i.e., not only struggling and screaming, 
but doing everything she could under the circumstances. Critics 
argued that the law "required of a rape victim a level of 
resistance demanded of no other victim of violence" (BenDor, 
1976). Therefore, reformers and feminists have struggled for 
changes in definition and the consent standard by eliminating the 
requirement that the victim physically resist the attacker. Also, 
they demand to criminalize rape by husbands .
If the law defines rape as wide as requiring the consent 
standard only and includes rape by husbands, it is Scale 3. If 
the law defines rape as wide as requiring the consent standard 
only, but excludes rape by husbands, it scores 2. If the law 
defines rape as narrow as penile-vaginal penetration, but does 
not require force, it scores 1. If the law defines rape very 
narrow and requires the element of force, imposing the rape 
victim of the responsibility to prove the absence of consent, it 
scores 0.
However, all the four countries simply defined rape as 
sexual intercourse against a woman, requiring the element of 
violence or intimidation (All Scale 0).
The German Penal Code (StGB; in the FRG and GDR) 
distinguishes the crime of rape (§177) from the crime of forced 
sexual intercourse (§178). The crime of rape is concluded by the 
attacker's insuperable violence against a woman, while forced 
sexual intercourse does not necessarily include violence and a
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female victim. The DPRK Penal Code, similar to the StGB, 
distinguishes the crime of rape (§172) from the crime of exacting 
sexual intercourse against a woman who is under his 
responsibility at work or as other duty-bound relationship 
(§173). All three countries do not regard sexual intercourse as 
rape if violence or physical intimidation was absent. The absence 
of consent, in a sense, is not considered at all. The "forced 
sexual intercourse" in the three countries should be defined as 
rape.
The ROK Penal Code, with a slight difference, distinguishes 
the crime of rape (§297) from the crime of constructive rape 
(§298) . Rape refers to forced sexual intercourse against a woman, 
with insuperable violence or intimidation, whereas constructive 
rape means sexual intercourse while the woman was unconscious 
because of medicine, mental illness, or any other reasons. The 
ROK Penal Code, too, does not count the absence of consent.
13. The Scope of Crimes against Women: Here the criterion 
of scaling is whether the law protects women from sexual 
harassment of any kind other than rape. Critics of existing rape 
statutes have demanded that, in addition to redefinition of rape, 
sexual assault or harassment other than rape — i.e., other than 
penile-vaginal penetration—  should be punishable in the same way 
as other crimes of violence are punished to the degree of bodily 
harm inflicted to the victim.
If the law defines sexual harassment at work and various 
sexual assaults other than rape as punishable crimes, in 
accordance with the degree of the assault or harassment, it is
273
Scale 3. If the law defines sexual assaults as punishable crimes, 
in accordance with the degree of the assault, but is silent about 
sexual harassment at work, it is Scale 2. If the law defines 
sexual assaults as punishable crimes, but only when those were 
accompanied by violence or intimidation, it scores 1. If the law 
only recognises rape, but no other sexual assault, it scores 0.
The German Penal Code in the FRG and the GDR (StGB), does
not recognise crimes against women other than rape or "forced 
sexual intercourse." Nor does the DPRK Penal Code. Thus all three 
scored 0.2 Only the ROK Penal Code defines the crime of indecent 
assault against women (§299). Indecent assault means sexual 
assault against women other than sexual intercourse. But it does 
not recognise sexual harassment of all sorts at work. Thus the 
ROK scores 2.
Considering the crime of rape and crimes against women 
together, it is clear that all four countries are short of 
providing protection for women from various sexual crimes. As 
Teubner (1988) describes the German practice of rape cases, the 
law tends to "legitimize men's possessive power (Verfiigungsmacht) 
over women," at least in sexual crimes.
14. The Scope of Sexual Freedom; The criterion of scaling
here is whether the law guarantees adults sexual freedom without 
unnecessary restrictions. Most modern states criminalize sexual 
intercourse with children under a certain age. Yet, sexual 
relationship between adults with legal capacity, other than
2 I regard "forced sexual intercourse" as rape, full stop.
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adultery, is rarely prohibited by the law.3 If the law does not 
interfere with individuals' sexual relationships, and protects 
privacy, it is ranked on Scale 3. If the law does not interfere 
with, but lacks the protection of privacy, it scores 2. If the 
law regulates individuals' sexual behaviours, but only as a 
normative declaration, it scores 1. If the law prohibits 
individuals' sexual relationship outside marriage, it scores 0.
Although women's sexual 'misbehaviour' was still 
stigmatised, the law does not interfere with individuals' sexual 
conduct, and protects privacy in the GDR, the FRG and the ROK 
(Scale 3) . However, in the DPRK, the law prohibits conjugal 
relationship between unmarried couples (The Socialist Family 
Law) . Even before the Socialist Family Law, 'sexual misbehaviour' 
was punishable as one of several 'anti-social, amoral crimes' by 
the Penal Code. The Penal code of the DPRK permits the analogous 
interpretation of crimes, and enables judges to punish an unnamed 
'crime' by applying 'similar' cases. Sexual relationships outside 
the registered marriage are regarded as amoral, which is 
punishable crime in the Penal Code. Accordingly, cohabitation 
without marriage registration becomes a punishable crime.4 
Therefore, the DPRK alone scores 0.
3 Although in some countries homosexual relationships were 
made criminal offences, most modern countries force homosexual 
relationships into privacy or do not recognise them at all. 
However, homosexuality is not the concern of this thesis.
4 Many refugees witnessed instant executions of 'anti­
social, amoral criminals' at 'the people's court'. 'The people's 
court' allows the mass, without proper legal procedure, to 
consider a 'criminal' case and pronounce sentence at any public 
place. The people's court often ends in instant execution (death 
sentence). A famous actress was executed at the people's court 
because she committed adultery (Human Rights in North Korea, 
1991) .
275
7.2.3 Legal Rankings of the Four Countries
Table 7.1 summarises the changes in the thirteen indicators 
in the four countries. The changes in the total points suggest 
development in legal reforms of each country. During four 
decades, the FRG and the ROK have made efforts in legal reforms 
towards sexual equality, albeit slowly. While sexual equality in 
the statutes was almost non-existent in the 1950s, in both the 
two market economy countries, several legal reforms changed 
matters by the end of the 1980s. By contrast, the GDR and the 
DPRK initiated radical reforms in the beginning, but rarely made 
further efforts to consolidate the principle of sexual equality. 
The score of the FRG has changed from 6 to 29 (+23 points) , that 
of the ROK from 8 to 28 (+20 points), while the legal points of 
the GDR have increased only by 6 points. However, the DPRK was 
alone scaled down by one point. By the end of the 1980s, the gap 
between the two Germanies was narrowed to 3 points, and the ROK 
overtook the DPRK.
Therefore, the initial differences made by political regimes 
were almost eliminated by the end of the 1980s. In other words, 
women's status in capitalist and communist societies became even. 
This result partially supports Hypothesis One, heavily 
undermining the claim that communism is the vehicle for women's 
emancipation. At the same time, the result rejects Hypothesis Two 
because there were apparent differences between the two communist 
regimes, rejecting the communist claim.
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Table 7.1 Changes in Legal Rankings
In.0
FRG (Capitalist) GDR (Communist)
' 89 ' 80 '70 '60 '50 '45 '50 '60 '70 '80 '89
1 3 3 3 3 1 0 3 3 3 3 3
2 3 3 1 1 0 0 3 3 3 3 3
3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
4 3 3 3 3 1 0 3 3 3 3 3
5 3 3 3 3 0 0 3 3 3 3 3
6 3 3 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
7 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 3 3
9 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3
11 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 3 3
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
T 29 26 15 15 6 4 25 26 26 31 31
In.0
ROK (Capitalist) DPRK (Communist)
'90 '80 '70 '60 '50 '45 '50 '60 '70 '80 '90
1 3 3 3 3 1 0 3 3 3 3 3
2 3 2 1 1 0 0 3 3 3 3 3
3 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
4 3 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3
5 3 2 1 1 0 0 3 3 3 3 3
6 3 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3
11 1 1 1 1 1 0 3 3 3 3 3
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0
T 28 18 14 14 8 4 23 22 22 22 22
* Note 1). In. refers to indicators.
* Note 2). In the table, the decade labels move to the opposite direction
between two regimes: for the capitalist regimes, the decade labels move 
anti-clockwise (from right to left); for the communist regimes, the 
decade labels move clockwise(from left to right).
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7. 3 Political Representation of Women
At least in formal political representation, the communist 
regimes were far ahead of their severed national halves. In 
parliaments, the proportion of women in the communist regimes was 
around 20 percent, while that in the capitalist regimes was less 
than 10 percent, or, at the worst, almost nil. In ministerial 
positions, however, the difference between the capitalist and 
communist regimes were small, confirming that parliamentary 
representation does not reflect the true nature of power- 
distribution.
7.3.1 Women in Parliaments
In numeric terms, the proportion of women in the parliaments 
partially supports the communist claim to have achieved women's 
emancipation. The GDR recorded the highest proportion of women, 
and the DPRK followed next. The worst was the case of the ROK, 
recording often less than 1 percent of women in parliament. On 
average, the proportion of women was 29 percent in the GDR, and 
14 percent in the DPRK, while the corresponding figures in the 
FRG and ROK was 9 and 2 percent respectively. Figure 7.1 
summarises the changes in the proportion of women in parliaments 
(Sources: chapters 3-6).
Women in all the four countries suffered political setbacks 
during the late 1950s and early 1960s, but returned to the 
previous level of representation during the 1970s. From the 1970s 
onwards, the proportion of women in parliaments in the two 
communist regime remained steady, around 32 percent in the GDR,
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20 percent in the DPRK. The proportion of women in the FRG 
Bundestag increased sharply during the late 1980s, but in the ROK 
National Assembly it rather shrank during the same period.
Both the SED in the GDR and the WPK in the DPRK were in full 
control of election procedures, and nominated as many women 
candidates as they chose. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
political instabilities, which were manifested by the Berlin 
Crisis of 1961 in the GDR, and the purge of the Russian Sect 
within the WPK in the DPRK, coincided with the decrease in the
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Figure 7.1 Proportion of Women in Parliaments
proportion of women in parliaments. Yet, over the four decades, 
political changes in the two communist regimes rarely had a 
significant impact on women's parliamentary representation. 
Women's presence in parliaments depended almost solely on the 
party leadership. The gap between the two communist regimes,
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therefore, reflects different perceptions of women's political 
role, which are inexorably shaped by dominant cultural patterns 
in the two communist party leaderships. Korean communists appear 
to have failed to eliminate the influence of the Confucian 
tradition more than their German counterpart failed with 
Christian culture.
In the FRG, the increase in the proportion of women in the 
Bundestag during the 1980s began with the emergence of the 
Greens. The Greens nominated many women candidates, and 
pressurized other parties to do the same, appealing to women 
voters. The keen competition among the parties to attract votes 
ensured that other parties would respond to the initiative of the 
Greens, recognising women's issues. The advancement of women in 
the 1980s, therefore, was possible because women's votes 
mattered, and because women obtained political importance. In the 
case of the ROK, however, the change in the proportion of women 
in Korean National Assembly was directly linked with political 
change, more precisely, with the often-changing electoral system. 
In fact, the proportion of women MPs elected by the constituency 
has remained less than 1 percent, except once. Most women MPs 
entered the National Assembly through appointment by the 
President, or through a party-list. When the President held the 
power to appoint a third of MPs (1973-1979), the proportion of 
women recorded its highest level. The present electoral system, 
which combines constituency election with proportional 
representation, too, contributes to explaining female figures in 
the National Assembly — in the 1988 election, no woman was 
elected by the constituencies, but 6 women became
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parliamentarians by party-list. Korean women's failure in 
political representation is largely to be blamed on the political 
culture shaped by Confucian tradition, and the political 
partition between South and North Korea. The fact that the 
women's movement has been preoccupied with the amendment of the 
Family Law also meant that the non-representation of women was 
ignored.
The smaller proportion of women in the DPRK than in the GDR, 
and smaller proportion in the ROK than in the FRG suggest that 
cultural traditions hinder the communist efforts to achieve 
women's emancipation. However, as Table 7.2 reveals, the 
difference between the two Germanies or between the two Koreas 
was larger than the difference between the two communist regimes 
or between the two capitalist regimes. In other words, regime 
difference had a stronger impact on women's formal political 
representation than cultural difference, formally supporting the 
claim that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation.
The proportion of women in the GDR Volkskammer did not show 
much deviation from the average, maintaining a relatively high 
level of women's political representation. Although the 
difference between its highest point (34 percent) and its lowest 
(24 percent) was big (10 percentage point), its standard 
deviation was relatively small, taking a slightly rising linear 
pattern. In comparison, the proportion of women in the DPRK 
Supreme People's Assembly fluctuated. The difference between its 
highest point (21 percent) and its lowest (9 percent) was the 
biggest among the four countries. Its standard deviation was also 
the biggest, taking an unstable, yet fast-rising line.
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Table 7.2 Proportion of Women in the Four Parliaments
Year Proportion of Women 
(%)
in Parliament Regime
Difference
Cultural
Difference
GDR FRG DPRK ROK GDR- DPRK- GDR— FRG-
FRG ROK DPRK ROK
1948 12 1 12
1950 24 7 12 1 17 11 12 6
1954 28 9 12 1 18 12 15 9
1958 25 10 13 1 15 11 12 8
1961 25 9 9 0 16 9 15 8
1963 27 9 9 1 18 8 17 8
1967 30 7 16 2 22 14 14 6
1969 30 7 16 2 23 14 14 5
1972 32 6 21 3 26 19 11 4
1976 34 8 21 6 26 15 13 2
1982 32 9 20 3 24 16 13 6
1984 32 10 21 3 22 18 11 7
1988 32 16 21 2 16 19 11 14
Mean 28 9 17 2 20 14 13 7
CO • o • 3 3 5 1 4 4 2 3
* Note: Election years varied in each country: In the FRG, Bundestag
elections were held in 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1972, 1976, 
1980, 1983, and 1987; in the GDR, Volkskammer elections in 1950, 1954, 
1958, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1976, 1981, and 1986; in the ROK, National
Assembly elections in 1948, 1950, 1954, 1960, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1973, 
1978, 1981, 1984, and 1988; and in the DPRK, Supreme People's Assembly 
elections in 1948, 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1986, and 1990. 
Therefore, years labelled in the table were in some cases mid-term.
Until 1984, the proportion of women in the Bundestag had 
changed very little. The difference between the lowest (6 
percent) and highest point (10 percent) was very small, and its 
standard deviation was only 1.3, taking an almost horizontal 
linear pattern until then. However, the surge in the proportion 
of women in 1988 pulled the average up by 1 percentage point, and 
the standard deviation up to 2.6, suggesting a possibility of 
women's advancement in the future.
Despite the increase in the proportion owing to presidential
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appointments during the 1970s, the ROK average was a meagre 1.9 
percent, and the standard deviation 1.4, taking an apparent 
horizontal linear pattern.
At least in parliamentary representation, therefore, the two 
communist regimes were in better shape, not only in numbers or 
proportions of women, but also in the pattern of changes. The 
changes in the proportion of women in parliament in both 
communist regimes were taking rising linear patterns, while those 
in the two capitalist regimes were taking a near horizontal line. 
Also, despite the sheer size of difference in the average 
proportion of women in parliament between the two communist 
regimes, the small difference and similar patterns in the two 
capitalist regimes rather confirm the communist claim of women's 
emancipation, and communist determination in inducing changes. 
However, the firm grip of Confucian traditions hampered communist 
efforts towards change far more than that of Christianity.
7.3.2 Women in the Cabinet
While parliamentary representation of women displayed stark 
contrasts among the countries, representation of women in the 
Cabinet did not. All four countries had only a minuscule number 
of women ministers and women members in the Cabinet (or, in the 
Council of Ministers) . However, the number of women ministers was 
larger in the two capitalist regimes than in the communist 
regimes, reversing the trends of parliamentary representation. 
Considering the fact that the communist regimes had larger 
numbers of ministers or members of the Cabinet than the 
capitalist regimes, the smaller number of women in this level
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reveals the lack of true political representation in the 
communist regimes. While the GDR recorded the highest level of 
parliamentary representation of women, the number of ministers 
was smaller than in the ROK. The DPRK had the smallest number of 
women ministers. Table 7.3 summarises the number of women 
ministers and their posts in the four countries. Despite the 
differences in numbers, there remains a clear similarity: women 
ministers were in general in charge of health, education, and 
women's issues, which had been traditionally regarded as female 
spheres. In the case of the FRG, 8 out of 11 women ministers were 
in charge of health, education, and family and women's issues. 
In the GDR, 2 out of 4 women ministers took responsibility in 
education, and in the ROK, 5 out of 7 were in charge of 
education, health, and women's issues. Slightly different is the 
case of the DPRK, where 3 out of 5 women ministers were engaged 
in economic matters. While culture has been linked with females 
in Germany,5 it has been a male domain in Korea. In the ROK, no 
woman has ever been in charge of culture. Therefore, only the 
DPRK has ignored the sexual division of labour at the Cabinet 
level.
The shortage of women ministers in the communist regimes 
evinces scepticism about the claim that communism is the vehicle 
for women's emancipation. Since the communist regimes had a 
planned economy, the power of ministers was in practice much 
stronger than that of parliaments, holding the authority of 
policy making and implementation. The shortage of women in the
5 Remember a Nazi woman, who wrote "we want more than Three 
Ks. Besides Kinder, Kilche, Kirche, we want two more —  
Krankenhaus (Hospital) and Kultur (culture)." See Chapter Two.
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Cabinet, therefore, reveals that women in the communist regimes 
had only nominal representation, remaining far away from real 
power.
Table 7.3 Women in the Cabinets
Country Number Posts/Responsibility Names
6DR 6 Education Minister
Minister of Justice
President of 
German Bank
Ministerrang1)
E. Zaisser; M. Honecker 
H. Benjamin 
M. Wittkowski
G.Kuckhoff; E. Schmidt
FRG 11 Health
Family/Youth/Women
Education & Science
Economic Cooperation
Inner German Relations
Urban Planning & 
Housing
E. Schwarzhaupt; K. Strobel;
K. Strobel; A. Brauksiepe;
K. Focke; A. Huber;
R. Suessmuth; U. Lehr.
D. Wilms
M. Schlei
D. Wilms
G. Hasselfeldt
DPRK 5 Deputy Premier/Trade
Finance
Culture
Agriculture
Kim Bokshin 
Youn Kijong
Park Yongshin; Huh Jongsook 
Park Jongae
ROK 72) Trade & Industry
Public Relations
Health
Education
Political/Women's 
Issues
Rim Youngsin 
Kim Hwallan 
Kim Jongrye 
Kim Okgil
Park Hyunsook; Kim Yongjong; 
Kim Youndeuk
* Note 1). Ministerrang is not minister, but holds the status equivalent
to ministers.
* Note 2). During 1945-1989.
In politics, women's formal (parliamentary) representation 
supports the communist claim of women's emancipation, but women's 
absence in practical power (policy making and its implementation)
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denies it. These conflicting results consequently reject part of 
Hypothesis One, since women's position in the political arena was 
similar between the capitalist and the communist regimes.
7. 4 Women's Socio-Economic Positions
Communists argue that only when women participate in the 
labour market, or when women become the working class can women 
be emancipated. Women's labour participation is, therefore, the 
core of the communist pledge for sexual equality. Women's labour 
participation rate is far higher in communist than in capitalist 
regimes. However, it is yet to be examined whether the higher 
level of women's labour participation in communist regimes 
automatically yields better conditions for women in other socio­
economic aspects than in capitalist regimes. In this analysis, 
three indicators are measured with standardized statistical 
figures: the ratio of women's to men's labour participation rate; 
the ratio of women to men in university enrolment rate; and the 
ratio of women's to men's average wages.
In order to obtain conclusive evidence to accept or reject 
my hypotheses, all the four countries concerned would have to be 
analyzed together. However, because of the lack of statistical 
data, the DPRK must be excluded from this analysis.
7.4.1 Indicator Selection Process
The process of indicator selection and data preparation in 
general includes five main steps: face-validation,
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redirectioning, proportioning, transformation to natural 
logarithms, and finally, construction validation. Face validation 
is the process of examining the complete package of potentially 
useful measures to determine which ones by common sense best 
represent the different socio-economic conditions between men and 
women. Or, by common sense which ones most obviously mirror the 
socio-economic position of women. Redirectioning is the process 
of ensuring that all the measures run in the same direction so 
that in each case, as women's condition becomes more similar to 
men's, the ratio or percentage becomes larger. Proportioning is 
the process of ensuring that all the measures are proportions, 
ratios, or percentages, and thus have scores that range from 0 
to 1, or from 0 to 100 in percentage. The averaging of measures 
with this common characteristic is statistically more robust than 
the averaging of measures comprising a variety of proportions and 
raw counts (Harvey et.al., 1990). Transformation of the data to 
natural logarithms has the effect of pulling more extreme, 
deviant values into line, thus ensuring a higher correlation 
among the various measures. Yet, in this analysis, since all the 
data is standardized by ratio, ranging from 0 to 1, 
transformation to natural logarithms is not necessary. The final 
step of constructing validation is to ensure that these 
indicators are highly correlated with one another. Otherwise, one 
of several indicators may represent a quite different aspect, not 
the socio-economic condition of women. In general, construction 
of validation is carried out by factor analysis. However, in this 
analysis, since only a limited number of indicators are selected, 
factor analysis is not necessary. Only multi-correlation analysis
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is undertaken.
Considering the data availability and face validation, I 
select three indicators: (1) the ratio of women's to men's labour 
participation rate; (2) the ratio of women to men in university 
enrolment; and (3) the ratio of women's to men's average monthly 
wages. In multi-correlation analysis, these three indicators are 
highly correlated with each other,6 successfully constructing 
validity of these three indicators.
The ratio of women's to men's labour participation rate is 
the ratio of the proportion of women labour force participants 
in the female working age population to the proportion of men 
labour force participants in the male working age population. 
Indicator value 1 means women's labour participation rate is the 
same as men's. Values larger than 1 means women's labour 
participation rate is higher than men's, and values smaller than 
1 means the opposite. The ratio of women to men university 
enrolment is the ratio of women to men full-time university 
enrolment levels. Values less than 1 mean that a smaller number 
of women enrolled in universities than men. The ratio of women's 
to men's average monthly wages is the ratio of average women's 
earnings to average men's earnings. Values less than 1 mean 
women's average monthly wages are smaller than men's, denoting 
unequal working conditions for women.
6 Correlation matrix:
Labour University Wage
Labour 1 0.9148 0.8317
University 1 0.7907
Wage 1
* All are significant at 0.01 level.
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7.4.2 Indicators for the Three Countries
Table 7.4 shows the indicators in the three countries. In 
the GDR, women's labour participation rate was higher than men's, 
and their university enrolment rate was almost equal with men. 
Yet, their average monthly wages were smaller than men's, 
revealing that women's labour participation is not a cure-all.
FRG and ROK women's labour participation rates were far 
smaller than men's, so were their university enrolment rates and 
average monthly wages. On average, differences were larger 
between the two Germanies than between the FRG and the ROK, but 
wage differentials were relatively large in the GDR, considering 
women's equal labour participation. While the mean difference in 
labour participation rate was 0.35 between the GDR and the FRG, 
the mean difference in wage differentials was only 0.11, less 
than a third of the former (Table 7.5).
In Table 7.5, the standard deviations show the degree of 
change in each country. In the labour participation indicator, 
the GDR recorded the smallest standard deviation, because women's 
labour participation rate was already higher than men's. Yet, GDR 
women's to men's labour participation ratio was still rising. The 
relatively big standard deviations of the FRG and the ROK suggest 
more women in the two countries were fast entering the labour 
force. This is confirmed by the fact that the difference between 
the highest point and the lowest in the GDR was 0.04, while that 
of the FRG was 0.08, the ROK 0.07.
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Table 7.4 Indicators of Socio-Economic Equality
Country Year Labour University Wage Average Ratio
GDR 1980 1.01 0.94 0.71 0.89
1981 1.01 0.95 0.71 0.89
1982 1.02 0.97 0.72 0.90
1983 1.03 1.00 0.73 0.92
1984 1.03 0.99 0.74 0.92
1985 1.03 1.00 0.75 0.93
1986 1.03 1.01 0.75 0.93
1987 1.03 1.00 0.75 0.93
1988 1.04 0.96 0.75 0.92
1989 1.05 0.94 0.75 0.91
Mean 1.03 0.98 0.74 0.91
SD 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
FRG 1980 0.64 0.57 0.63 0.61
1981 0.66 0.60 0.61 0.62
1982 0.66 0.61 0.63 0.63
1983 0.67 0.61 0.63 0.64
1984 0.68 0.60 0.63 0.64
1985 0.69 0.61 0.63 0.64
1986 0.69 0.61 0.64 0.65
1987 0.70 0.61 0.64 0.65
1988 0.71 0.62 0.64 0.66
1989 0.72 0.62 0.64 0.66
Mean 0.68 0.61 0.63 0.64
SD 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
ROK 1980 0.56 0.29 0.44 0.43
1981 0.56 0.29 0.45 0.43
1982 0.58 0.32 0.45 0.45
1983 0.59 0.35 0.47 0.47
1984 0.57 0.36 0.47 0.47
1985 0.58 0.36 0.48 0.47
1986 0.60 0.36 0.49 0.48
1987 0.62 0.36 0.50 0.49
1988 0.62 0.37 0.51 0.50
1989 0.63 0.38 0.53 0.51
Mean 0.59 0.34 0.48 0.47
SD 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
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Table 7.5 Mean and Standard Deviation Differences
Difference between 
Countries Average
Difference in
Standard Deviation
Lab. Uni. Wage Lab. Uni. Wage
GDR—FRG 
FRG-ROK
0.35
0.09
0.37
0.27
0.11
0.15
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
* Note: Difference in Standard Deviation is the modulus.
In the university enrolment indicator, the GDR was not 
moving upwards, but fluctuating, while the other two countries 
were clearly heading upwards. This situation is partly the 
outcome of an already high level of women's university enrolment. 
Yet, considering the still-rising women's labour participation, 
the declining GDR women's university enrolment ratio in the late 
1980s casts shadows on the communist claim to be women's 
emancipationist.
Owing to the improvement in the wage differentials 
indicator, the ROK was the fastest changing. The ROK ratio rose 
by almost 0.1 point (10 percent), while the FRG ratio rose only 
0.03 point, the GDR 0.04 point. The standard deviation of the 
ROK, too, was the biggest. However, ROK wage differentials have 
yet to be reduced a great deal.
7.4.3 The Socio-Economic Position of Women
Since all indicators are standardized as ratios, averaging 
the three indicator values could provide a clear picture of 
women's relative positions among the three countries. Figure 7.2 
summarises the change in average values of three indicators in 
the three countries. Reflecting the decline in the university
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Figure 7.2 Socio-Economic Position of Women
enrolment ratio during the late 1980s, the GDR women's socio­
economic positions did not change for the better. The FRG and the 
ROK drew an almost horizontal, but rising line, albeit with a 
slight upward gradient.
Even without the DPRK average, the topology of the three 
countries in this figure resembles Figure 7.1. The difference 
between the two Germanies is far bigger than the difference 
between the FRG and the ROK, suggesting that regime difference 
has a stronger impact than cultural difference. If an estimated 
DPRK average line is added, this resemblance becomes bigger.
DPRK official statements, though inconsistent (See Chapter 
Six) , suggest that the women's to men's labour participation rate 
was similar to that of the GDR. However, the university enrolment 
indicator must have lain in between the FRG and the ROK, since 
the DPRK reported in 1988 that women made up 28.8 percent of
292
university and college graduates. When redirectioning this 
percentage into a ratio, women's to men's university enrolment 
ratio comes out 0.40, which is far lower than that of the FRG, 
but slightly higher than that of the ROK. Considering these two 
indicators together, the DPRK average must be far smaller than 
that of the GDR, but probably similar to that of the FRG. At 
least, the DPRK average must have been higher than that of the 
ROK, because two indicators already made a big difference, which 
the poor record of ROK wage differentials could never make up. 
Therefore, an estimated DPRK line could be drawn in between the 
GDR and the FRG, but nearer to the FRG.
Like women's political representation, the socio-economic 
condition of women in the four countries is not conclusive in 
either rejecting or accepting the two hypotheses. The socio­
economic condition of women rejects both Hypothesis One and Two. 
Only when Hypothesis One is rejected and Hypothesis Two is 
accepted could the communist claim to be women's emancipator be 
vindicated. Yet, the bigger difference between the two Germanies 
than between the two capitalist regimes suggest that, at least 
to a certain extent, regime efforts towards sexual equality do 
change the condition of women for the better.
7. 5 Summary
Returning to my initial question, the purpose of this 
chapter was to test the two hypotheses:
Hypothesis One. Women's position is equal among communist and
capitalist regimes regardless of the political system.
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Hypothesis Two. Women's position is equal amonq the
Communist regimes, regardless of cultural tradition.
Initially, communist regimes made big progress towards 
sexual equality, rejecting Hypothesis One and supporting the 
communist claim. However, during the four decades, cultural 
impediments hampered the change, and made differences not only 
between the communist and capitalist regimes, but also between 
the two communist regimes, clearly rejecting Hypothesis Two. The 
rejection of Hypothesis Two is a rejection of the claim that 
communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation. However, the 
bigger difference between the communist and capitalist regimes 
than between the two Germanies or between the two Koreas suggests 
that regime efforts to achieve sexual equality can make a 
difference by establishing platforms from which women can wage 
further struggles towards sexual equality.
In the legal arena, women in the two communist regimes 
initially enjoyed more favourable conditions. However, the legal 
reforms in the communist regimes reached a plateau rather early 
on, losing impetus towards further reforms towards sexual 
equality. By contrast, the two capitalist regimes continued legal 
reforms, though very slowly, and gained upon the communist 
regimes during the 1980s, thus accepting Hypothesis One — i.e., 
rejecting the communist claim.
In the indicators of political representation of women, 
numeric figures in parliaments strongly reject both Hypotheses 
One and Two —  i.e., partially supporting the communist claim, 
but also rejecting it at the same time. Further, the number of 
women in the Cabinet was higher in the capitalist regimes than
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in communist regimes, thus rejecting Hypothesis One — but in a 
way of undermining the communist claim.
As far as the three socio-economic indicators are concerned, 
the two communist regimes were far ahead of their capitalist 
halves, thus rejecting Hypothesis One. Yet, the big difference 
between the two communist regimes again rejects Hypothesis Two.
Therefore, the claim that communism is the vehicle for 
women's emancipation is not vindicated. Regime commitment towards 
sexual equality was obstructed by cultural traditions, and there 
remained inequality between the sexes — e.g., in the patterns of 
women's under-representation in politics, wage differentials 
between the sexes, and unresolved legal inequality.
While the communist regimes were sleeping on their initial 
achievements, women in capitalist regimes struggled for sexual 
equality, demanding and inducing many legal reforms, 
participating in the labour force, and fighting for equal 
treatment in employment. The surge during the late 1980s in the 
number of women MPs in the FRG was the outcome of women's 
struggles and demands, while ROK women have waged a decades-long 
war to amend many discriminatory laws.
Nevertheless, it becomes clear that the overall conditions 
of women were better guises in communist regimes than in 
capitalist regimes. If only, and this is a big If, women in 
communist regimes could have voiced their demands, they might 
have made further progress towards sexual equality. Sexual 
equality, after all, can not be given solely from above, but can 
be achieved at least partly through struggles from below, as all 
the reformist movements have succeeded only through struggles.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
8. 1 Test Result of the Hypotheses
Did communist regimes in practice emancipate women, or 
change the existing gender relations as they claimed they would? 
Did cultural traditions hinder the effort made by the communist 
regimes to emancipate women? In the quest for the answers, I 
restated these questions as two hypotheses, repeated below:
Hypothesis One. Women's position is equal among communist and 
capitalist regimes, regardless of the political system.
Hypothesis Two. Women's position is equal among the communist 
regimes, regardless of cultural tradition.
These hypotheses were tested by three different methods: 
ordinal scaling of women's legal status, figurative comparison 
of women's political representation, and an indicator analysis 
of the socio-economic position of women. The test result is 
summarised in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1 Test Result of Two Hypotheses
Aspects Hypothesis One Hypothesis Two
Legal Status A/R Reject
Political Representation A/R Reject
Socio-Economic Indicators Reject Reject
* Note: A/R means partial acceptance and partial rejection.
Hypothesis One was mostly rejected, but not completely. The 
two communist regimes initiated radical reforms during their 
early stage of regime-building, making apparent differences from
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their national halves. Equal opportunities in education were 
reasonably guaranteed, and in the GDR women received preferential 
treatment. At work, equal pay for equal work was guaranteed as 
a fundamental principle, and women's full employment was ensured 
through the planned economy. The proportion of women in 
parliaments was beyond comparison with their severed national 
halves. However, the two communist regimes slept on their early 
achievements and made no further effort to improve the legal 
position of women. In legal reforms for sexual equality, the DPRK 
was outpaced by the ROK during the 1980s.
In the numbers and responsibilities of women ministers, the 
two communist regimes were more feminist. Further, in both 
countries a larger proportion of women participated in the labour 
force, but only with smaller earnings than men. The 
responsibility for household work and child-care rested heavily 
with women, and sharing the household-responsibilities was not 
a common practice. Though greatly enhanced, women's position was 
far short of equality. Women's position in legal, political, and 
socio-economic aspects in the two communist regime was, 
therefore, not always higher than those in the two capitalist 
regimes, making little difference between the two regimes. In 
order to vindicate the communist claim that communism is the 
vehicle for women's emancipation, Hypothesis One needs to be 
rejected completely. Partial rejection — i.e., partial 
acceptance—  of Hypothesis One casts shadow on the communist 
claim, albeit not completely denying it.
Hypothesis Two was rejected in all aspects, suggesting that 
there are causes of sexual inequality other than capital, and
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that cultural tradition is one of such causes. The traditional 
Three Ks were found in the pattern of the sexual division of 
labour by occupations, by economic sectors, and by sex- 
stereotyping of the few ministerial positions occupied by women. 
The Rule of the Three Obediences remained healthy in the guise 
of the almost indissoluble marriage, the negligible rate of 
divorce, and of the two examplary role-models for North Korean 
women, who were depicted as subordinate, loyal, and devoted wives 
and mothers. Women's position in the DPRK was lower than in the 
GDR, as the Confucian tradition was more sexually oppressive than 
Christianity.
The claim that communism is the vehicle for women's
emancipation, therefore, proved untrue. Women's labour
participation also proved not to be the condition for women's
emancipation. Nonetheless, the fact that women's position in
general was higher in communist regimes than in capitalist 
regimes suggests that state intervention, or, state commitment, 
can to a great extent support women's struggle for sexual 
equality.
8. 2 Implications of the Study
The purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence 
about whether, or to what extent, communist regimes in practice 
emancipated women, or changed gender relations; and whether, or 
to what extent, cultural traditions hindered the regime effort 
to effect changes in gender relations. The test result evinces
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that communist regimes failed in practice to change gender- 
relations, but improved women's conditions more than capitalist 
regimes did. It also shows that cultural traditions hindered 
regime's effort for women's emancipation to varying degrees and 
extents.
This test-result does not definitively reject any of the 
feminist theories. However, the result most severely damages 
Marxist feminism, forcing it to overhaul thoroughly the claim 
that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation. There 
obviously are causes other than capital of sexual inequality. The 
result also attacks radical feminism for its limited — and mostly 
negative—  account of the role of the state. Even in a 
patriarchal culture, women's labour participation and the state's 
effort towards sexual equality have improved women's conditions. 
Therefore, the test-result of this study is to deny these two 
theories.
In comparison, socialist feminism and liberal feminism seem 
to gain solid ground for their claims. Women's labour 
participation and legal reforms indeed enhanced women's position 
in society. Yet, socialist feminism needs to take account of the 
different pattern of patriarchy in different societies; and 
liberal feminism to recognise the limitation of legal and 
political reforms. The state, through legal and political 
reforms, does make a difference. Yet, the grip of culture differs 
from country to country, from time to time, thus hindering state 
efforts for sexual equality.
Sexual equality has ultimately to be achieved at least 
partly through women's struggles. Women's experiences in
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communist: regimes strongly suggest that without political freedom 
to voice their demands, women's emancipation cannot be complete. 
In this light, I agree with the liberal and socialist feminist 
perspective of women's emancipation. If women with feminist 
concerns participate fully in the process of legal, political, 
and socio-economic reform, sexual equality can be achieved, 
although of course cultural traditions will persist and resist 
the reform for an indefinitely long while.
There have been many case studies concerning women's status 
in communist regimes — e.g., women's positions in the former 
Soviet Union, in the People's Republic of China (e.g., Gilmartin 
et.al., 1994), and in the GDR (e.g., Schubert, 1980; Frauenreport 
'90) . Also, there have been a few comparative studies of women's 
status in the GDR and the FRG (e.g., Helwig and Nickel, 1993; 
Shaffer, 1981; Helwig, 1982), and rarely, in the ROK and the DPRK 
(e.g., Nam Insook, 1991) . However, the first group of studies has 
focused on the limitations and achievements of communist regimes 
in improving women's conditions, and the second group has centred 
on the difference between the two states that shared the same 
culture.
There have also been other comparative studies concerning 
cultural differences affecting women's status (e.g., Parker, 
Russo, Sommer and Yaeger eds., 1992; Morgan, 1984), and studies 
focusing on the impact of public policies for sexual equality 
(e.g., Maclean and Groves eds., 1991; Lovenduski and Norris, 
1993; Sassoon, 1987). Again, these studies consider the impact 
of either culture or the state, not of both.
By contrast, this thesis has undertaken a cross-cultural and
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cross-regime analysis, examining what difference political 
regimes have made in women's emancipation, and what obstacles 
cultural patterns have imposed on regime efforts for sexual 
equality. It is a novel attempt, I dare say, to measure the 
impact of the state on women's emancipation, taking into full 
account the different cultural impediments. Therefore, this study 
will, I hope, contribute to the development of feminist analyses 
of the state and culture, adding empirical evidence to 
theoretical arguments.
8• 3 Limitations
In its search for empirical evidence, this study suffered 
most from the shortage of statistical data, particularly from the 
lack of DPRK statistics. Although shortage of reliable data is 
a common barrier in political science and sociological surveys, 
it endangers the validity of quantitative analysis in particular. 
Furthermore, any comparative analysis demands identical, or at 
least comparable, data structures for the countries compared. 
Even if all the countries except one provide comparable set of 
data, the comparison ends in an inconclusive result because of 
the one exception. The lack of the DPRK statistics set the limit 
in the validity to the test result.
My initial plan was to construct a Sexual Equality Index 
with time series data and to run a multiple regression to test 
my hypotheses. In order to construct a valid Sexual Equality 
Index, and for any quantitative analysis, a large number of
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indicators — preferably about 10—  would be required to yield 
a conclusive result. However, the process of indicator selection 
is circumscribed by the availability of data. I had to delete two 
potentially valid indicators, the ratio of women's to men's 
unemployment rate and the ratio of women's to men's part-time 
employment rate, because the related data turned out to be 
fragmented or non-existent. This situation forced me to give up 
the idea of constructing the Sexual Equality Index. Instead, I 
employed the mean and standard deviation analysis for a limited 
number of indicators.
Further, the lack of, not shortage of, DPRK statistical data 
again forced me to employ more qualitative methods. The lack of 
statistical data from the DPRK limits the scope of the analysis 
of the socio-economic position of women, leading to the exclusion 
of the DPRK in that analysis. The exclusion of the DPRK in the 
indicator analysis is the weakest point of this thesis.
Even after the exclusion of the DPRK, the data selection 
process was marred by the shortage of data. In the case of the 
GDR, data about the unemployment rate and men's proportion in 
part-time workers did not exist, and even data for men's and 
women's wage differentials became available only after 1980. In 
the case of the ROK, detailed surveys on part-time workers and 
women's unemployment rate have been published only every 3 years, 
since 1984. Most data are available only in the case of the FRG. 
By contrast almost all the necessary data are not available in 
the case of the DPRK, leading to the exclusion of the DPRK in the 
empirical socio-economic (indicator) analysis. Therefore, in this 
analysis, data selection was dominated by both availability of
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time series data and face validation.
To remedy this weakness, I applied a variety of methods in 
the survey of the DPRK, however. In addition to interviews with 
DPRK refugees, I examined magazines, monthly or bimonthly, and 
daily news papers of the DPRK issued from 1970 to 1992. The most 
important one among them was Korean Women which is the official 
monthly publication of the Democratic Korean Women's League, the 
only women's organisation in the DPRK. I am convinced that, as 
long as the DPRK regime remains the way as it is, no other study 
could have better access to information than these materials.
Future developments in statistics and the release of DPRK 
data, I hope, may enable follow-up studies to make a reliable 
Sexual Equality Index and measure the regime differences more 
exactly. The unification of Korea will certainly remove many 
obstacles for future studies.
8. 4 Suggestions for Further Studies
In this thesis, I avoid to discuss the question of 
differences in economic development between Korea and Germany. 
Differences in women's position may be attributable to the 
different levels of economic development rather than culture. 
However, women's position varies country to country even among 
the most advanced G7 countries. Follow-up studies may establish 
the relationship between women's position and economic 
development.
Also, I would suggest to examine the changes of women's
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position in post-communist regimes in the long run. In a short 
term, women's position is argued to deteriorate after the 
collapse of communist regimes (e.g., Funk and Muller ed., 1993). 
The regime transition from the planned economy to the market 
economy has not completed, however. Women's position after the 
regime transition is still an open question. Economic development 
and democratization may support women's emancipation in the 
future.
At the least, democratization will help women to voice their 
interest. Like the Independent Women's Association (UFV) in East 
Germany,1 women begin to organize themselves and advance to 
improve their situation by their own demands and struggles. In 
the long run, I believe, women's demands will force the state to 
improve women's situation. After all, women's demands and 
struggles have been, and will be, the most important factors in 
women's emancipation.
1 See Chapter 4 (Section 4.7).
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